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Tikhon Bernstam https://twitter.com/tikhon cofounded Scribd (YC S06) and Parse (YC S11). Read the transcript here http://blog.ycombinator.com/the-challenges-a-repeat-founder-faces.
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Hey, this is Craig Cannon and you're listening to Y Combinator's podcast. Today's episode is with T. Con Bernstam. T. Con is a multi-time YC founder. The first time he went through YC was the summer of 2006 with Scribd. And then five years later, during the summer of 2011 with Parse. And given that we're about a month away from the winter 2018 application deadline, I thought it'd be cool for T. Con to come in, talk about his experience, talk about his decision to do YC a second time, given that Scribd had already worked out pretty well, and what his experience has been like as an investor for these past few years. As always, if you want to read the transcript or watch the video, those are both at blog.ycombinator.com. And if you'd like to apply for the winter 2018 batch, that is at ycombinator.com/apply. All right, here we go.
So could you just start by explaining how you first found YC?
Yeah, I actually found YC because I was on Reddit. I was in graduate school, which meant I had a lot of free time. And so I was, Reddit was super early. This is back when like the top host might have like 10 points. And this is like before it even had comments. And via that, I found Paul Graham's essays on how to do a startup. And to me, the idea of doing a company was basically impossible. This is after the bubble or after the dot com crash. Everyone had basically declared like the web was over, like that's all done now. And so it was very, like Paul Graham's essays were really the only source that I had found
that kind of said, actually, here's a pathway to do it and like it can be done. And I was super interested in that. I applied to YC on a, like, really as, like, really on a long shot. I didn't think I'd get in. And so I interviewed in Palo Alto. And although the actual program was still back in Boston, in Cambridge, and I got in, so I just dropped out of graduate school.
What were you studying?
Physics, actually, theoretical physics. But I studied computer science and econ in undergrad. So that was kind of a small change. And so, yeah, so I dropped out of grad school and moved to Cambridge. And so then, yeah, me, Trip and Jared probably worked on like Scribd for at least Well, yeah, we worked on Scribd for at least like a year and a half before we got like real traction on it. So this is back in summer 2006.
And what was the initial pitch for Scribd, like in the application?
Well, yeah, so Scribd was actually like one of those pivot companies where like we applied with different ideas. And then, like, much like Reddit was actually a pivot company where like it was actually applied for something else, like it's like food delivery stuff.
Really?
Paul's like, yeah, Paul's like, I love you guys, Steve and Alexis, but I hate that idea. How about this kind of thing? Yeah. Steve's talked about that before. And so similarly, like Scribd actually was actually the merger of MeTripp and Jared, like during YC, they were working on some other projects. And like, it was like a Craigslist for colleges. Back then Craigslist was super hot. So like, everyone was trying to do, much like nowadays, everyone's doing like Uber for X. Like, back then it was Craigslist for X.
Glory days on the internet.
But then YouTube sold for over a billion and people said that was insane. You know, oh, my God, Google overpaid, which, you know, totally wrong. And so then YouTube became the hot one. So then we said, like, let's do YouTube for documents. Like, that was literally like the thinking. And, I mean, we'd also noticed this problem where Tripp's dad, who's at the Stanford Med School, was having trouble, like, basically viewing the documents like online that like he wanted to read. And like, not, he didn't have like the right reader. And like, sometimes I'd send my mom like a PostScript file and she'd be like, how the hell do I open this?
People were just downloading it and then they needed to download like Acrobat?
Yeah, like if you want to open a, yeah, because back then if you had like Adobe Reader, that I don't think that actually opened up like PostScript files back then. And maybe it did. But a lot of default viewers didn't. It just depended on your OS and what sort of default software you had bundled. But anyway, we just decided, like, why don't we allow the documents to be embedded inside of the webpages? And we started off with Flash. But we had always hoped that we could switch to HTML5, which we did much later.
And so what was the YC experience in so summer of six? What was it like?
It it was great. So this was back in Cambridge. Honestly, we would never have made it without that program. And I think that's true of actually most of those companies. And I'd argue probably most of the companies. Because without that community of like like minded people who are highly motivated and working on like the same general like pathway as you and also like people who've done it before, like Paul, Jessica, Jay, Paul, JL, Trevor and like Robert, who were basically there to like, kind of like, no, you guys are like, that's stupid. Get like, get back on course.
Because sometimes we would just go the wrong way for like a whole week, like before we'd see them and we show them and they say, what the hell are you guys doing? And they were and they were always right is the thing. So like, it's, I mean, it saved us years and the company wouldn't have worked without them. And so I'll I'll always be grateful for that. And it was, all the batches were small back then. I think Scribd summer of six was the second batch. So still my best friends are the people from like the summer of five and summer of six batch in Cambridge like. And that's like, so going on over a decade, just because those were the only people I knew doing startups. And like, they were the people I talked to. And it was great because like, one day you think with startups, one day you think your company is going to fail, like,
you know, you think you're getting sued or something, someone's threatening you. And the next day you think you're going to sell to Google for a huge amount. Like, because just because someone, some like person in M and A accidentally emails you. And so having other people going through the same thing, like the like the Twitch guys kind of working on their stuff, which took over a decade. And back then it was Kiko, which switched into Justin TV. But like having that sort of, having those people around in that community and then kind of like the guidance of the of the partners is probably the only reason that we survived.
And so how much money were you getting from YC at that point? It was not the same as it is now.
Yeah, back then it was fixed. It was $6,000 per person. So overall, we took in 18,000.
Congrats. That's huge.
We almost sold the company for that much.
And so, I mean, obviously, the money lasted. What did you do with it? Like, people get way more now.
Yeah, I'm always amazed how much people get now because the seed rounds today are bigger than like the series A that Dropbox and Airbnb did with Sequoia, which I think was roughly a mil each. Like, and so I'm like, how did you guys spend all that money usually if people run out? But back then, we struggled. And so for a couple of years, I was living on savings. We were basically, I was, I was basically living out of Trip's parents' house at Stanford. And like, his mom was getting irritated because I keep like eating all the candy and like, I was subsisting on, you know, top, like, top ramen and like, whatever food was available in their cabinets. So Trip, Jared and I worked for months, basically out of his living room. And without the generosity of his parents to even let us do that.
And did you raise after YC?
We did not. So back then, fundraising was very, very different than it is today. Also, just the environment in Cambridge is so much different than the valleys. But back then, like, the mood was so gloomy and like startups are over sort of thing that like, it took a really, there actually just weren't that many angels around. There weren't that many people who had either gotten, who had exited or like, who wanted to do that sort of thing. I mean, now Demo Day is oversubscribed and such, but back then it wasn't. Like, back then, I don't think it was even like a full room, actually.
And so you were just basically living off savings, like Scribd wasn't making enough money?
We actually stretched that 18K pretty darn far. Yeah, I mean, if you can somehow, as long as you can get your rent low, you can live for a long time.
Okay. Do you know approximately how long that actually went?
Well, I mean, yeah, it was another year after YC, so we scratched by on that. And I mean, being a, you know, being a wealthy grad student, no, so having zero savings, like, for really any of us, because Trip had just left Harvard, Jared dropped out of Harvard to do this.
So we just really like, we really tried to make every dime count.
Hmm. And so how long did you work on Scribd?
Yeah, so started like, like I said, summer 2006. I left about five and a half years later. I talked to the co-founders. I said, listen, I think like if we're not gonna like go more B to B like, like more like enterprise-y. I think that I should probably go because I'm really interested in doing something in that space. And so they were like, okay, cool. They actually invested in my next company, which was Parse, which we basically actually, so it was actually two of us who left. It was me and James Yu from Scribd. We, James was actually, I think, our first hire at Scribd. And so he and I were close friends and still are. And so
we left and the very next day we were coding and working on like the prototype of like what was not Parse, it was something else.
What was, okay, pause. What was that idea?
There were actually 12. We made 12 different landing pages. Well, because so with Scribd, we would spend about one month on every idea and like build out an app and then test it. And that's kind of why it might have taken longer. With Parse, we said, let's not waste a year. Let's make 12 landing pages, like kind of launch them and then see if people even give us an email.
And B to B products?
Yeah, in, in, in things that made money like, because I think in B to C, it's much harder to gauge whether you have a long-term traction or not, or if you're Chatroulette or something. And so, yeah, so we basically had 12 different pages that we launched. Like one was an API for companies to send gifts to like their best users because at Scribd, I always like wanted to like send gifts to people who uploaded like 100 documents. It'd be nice to do that programmatically. I don't think that even exists still. So like then we just looked if people clicked on the pricing page and if they'd send up and put an email in. And then anyone who typed in their email, we would email them being like, why did you sign up for this? This was a crappy landing page that we made in like two hours.
How are they getting to the landing page? Were you do like outbound marketing for any of this stuff?
ShowHN was like basically, but this is before product time. So it was mostly ShowHN. It was, it was, it was on Twitter.
You're doing ShowHN landing pages?
Yes, like ShowHN, this service exists. Actually Parse launched that way too. Parse launched as a landing page.
Yeah. Back then it was called Z Stack. And we didn't own the parse.com domain, which we only got later, thanks to the Stripe founders and Stripe CTO.
And so, yeah, it was called Z Stack. We launched a landing page. Again, just we wanted to make sure people actually wanted this thing. Cause we knew like from our own experience, building mobile apps at Scribd, at other companies, that everyone was sort of reinventing the wheel, redoing the same sort of like code that like, like push notification type stuff that really could be generalized. And back then, like AWS was kind of just still very much in its infancy, but you could see the need for like, Heroku had just sold for 250 million to Salesforce. So like the pitch of like Heroku for mobile, like kind of was like a very, like, I actually dislike X for Y pitches now, like all these now.
But you were riding those waves in the past.
Yes. I am 100% guilty of doing those in the past. And so we, we actually, I think my, I think the pitch deck I used at Y C,
at the demo day was, yeah, it was Heroku for mobile was like actually the like title of what, of what the company was.
Okay. And just stepping back a little bit, what made you decide to go with Z Stack versus the other 11?
Yeah, it was actually talking to the users. So we had talked to the users on.
But to be clear, there was no product for any of them.
So parse is more complicated. Parse was, parse is actually the merger of three independent entities. So Ilya was a solo founder in Parse, working on like a find your friends app sort of thing, which like was very popular at the time. And Kevin wasn't even in Y C. Kevin emailed, Kevin had been in Y C previously, and then was working at Google, emails Paul and says, listen, I want to get back into startups. Like if you have anything, let me know. Paul emails the list like, hey, there's this great guy, great hacker, like you guys should like talk to him if you're looking for a co-founder. And so James and I met with Kevin, Ilya met with Kevin. We ended up all trying to work together for,
for like a couple of weeks and like just to see if we'd harmonize. I mean, I don't advise people work with people they don't know. But hey, worked for Twitch.
Yeah, it's worked for some people. It hasn't worked for a lot of people. Yeah.
Yeah.
Okay.
Okay. So what were those two ideas then that merged?
Oh yeah, so we were actually more in the payments space. More, so James and I were interested in like recurring subscription billing space. Where people were, I mean, people still have trouble like actually getting like recurring billing working. I mean, it's getting better now, thanks to Stripe. But, um, so stuff for like normal people basically take payments like that were recurring. I mean, we, we were still very much in the ideation phase where we were very happy to pivot to whatever was kind of, whatever we felt would be like the best type of like business. And, yeah, and then, um,
basically we also started working on Parse, uh, and we basically launched that landing page, uh, pretty quickly into YC. And we launched it on Hacker News, it was a show, HN. It was called zstack.com, I think, at the time.
And so what were it like, what was the pitch?
It was literally a theme for us theme, it was like a $9 theme for us theme that has these hot air balloons on it. You can still buy it today. And, and, and just, it was, uh, basically Heroku for mobile. Like, basically, we're gonna take away the DevOps and like the, the backend like part of it. So you can just focus on like the like frontend, like, like native, uh, you know, code. And not have to worry about thinking about like your database and all that stuff. Abstracting it away via our SDKs.
Yeah, and I mean, I've used a product before, but just like, to be clear for everyone else who's listening, could you just give the quick explanation of what it actually became?
Yeah, yeah, so Parse is a platform that helps you make, uh, mobile applications much, much faster. Uh, we, we estimate roughly 10x faster. Um, and so normally if you're making a mobile app, you'd have to like write all of the code that like, that the actual, like, the like native client interface on the phone that the person would play with. But then you'd have to think about how, how does that app talk to some server in like Virginia? And then what does it send? And then where's that data going? How am I querying it? Like how am I, what happens if that server goes down? So Parse took care of that whole second part of this, of the stack. So that you just did the client stuff, you make a, like a pretty native UI.
We didn't believe much in the, at the time, in sort of the like, HTML5 approach, which now is working better, but like the sort of phone gap type of thing like we we believe that native apps at the time were like definitely superior in experience. And so we just tried to like abstract away like all basically like the really hard like kind of like 80% of stuff that people shouldn't have to know how to do them in order to make apps.
And had you guys decided that like you wanted to go through YC again?
Oh yeah, we I talked to Paul almost immediately.
On leaving Scribd?
Yeah, and I was like, yeah, me and James have these ideas. We're not sure exactly which one we're gonna do. And Paul's like, alright, well, let's do this again.
Really? So, okay, so you applied like kind of blind, like there's no product still?
Well, we agreed with Paul that we would focus on a company called PintPay, which was the subscription billing service. Back then billing and like payments companies were super hot. Like WePay just raised a bunch of money. Stripe was famously doing really well. But we definitely never wanted to compete with Stripe. So we were looking for other angles inside of payments. You know, that you could do things like anti-fraud type stuff on payments.
So basically like another idea was sort of funded through YC? And then you just changed it?
Yes.
And you brought people on in the meantime?
That actually happens a surprising amount of the time.
Yeah, I would say, yeah. And so by the end of the summer, though, you're Heroku.
We're Heroku for mobile. Yeah, or I later switched to AWS for mobile. But basically like an AWS tailored for developers of mobile applications.
Okay, and so why did you want to do it a second time? YC?
Oh, I mean, well, okay, first off, the first time, we would never have made it without YC. And that's likely true the second time as well. Again, it's largely for the same reasons as the first time. I still don't think I know anything about startups. Like, the more and more I do this, the more and more I'm convinced how little I know. And so like having that circuit, having that like community of people like who are highly motivated, having my first Customers there, right there in the batch, where I could say, hey, like, like, you're making a mobile app. Use this. Yeah. Like, that's really, really helpful. Cause then you suddenly get feedback. And then every, every dinner, every week, you go to them and say, hey, I launched this new stuff. Check this out. And then, you know, we bring our laptops and show what we're doing.
And then like half the time it was stupid and the people told us that we, and then we stopped. And then the other half, they're like, well, why not like expand on this that way? And we're like, oh, cause that's the problem you're having in mobile. It's not that.
How did you start getting customers afterward? Because it makes sense, like when you're surrounded by startups, you can just grab a ton of people. And I found Parz by going to hackathons because people are using it all the time.
Um, but how did you get people who would pay for it?
Yeah, so, um, we didn't have pricing for actually quite a while. It was a free service. We didn't know how to do pricing properly back then. Like, and so we were mostly focused on can we get, are we making something that's making a few people really happy? Like, so we would talk to the developers, like who had signed up and who started using our like beta, you know, which started, we started off just basically like sending data to the cloud. Like to like S3, say.
And, um, by talking to the developers and seeing like, do we have a product where people are really disappointed if we just like went away?
Which I think is a really good test. If, if you, if you can't find some niche that is absolutely like fanatic about your product. Then you likely don't have strong product market fit. And, um, most of the times that I've failed in startups was basically trying to push growth before I had product market fit.
And so we found this core segment of developers who really wanted to make native apps much, much faster. Ranging from like agencies who were making apps for everyone from like Green Bay Packers to like the travel channel and weather channel and Cadillac. Who actually all, all of them using Parz. But like, we found people who really cared about this, like this makes my life much, much better. And then we actually talked to them and like use that, we use their feedback to kind of make the product better. In, in the ways that like it should be better. And we've, I mean, we, we actually moved really fast. All, all four of us were coding. And so we.
We worked and we kept kind of launching features constantly. And we got the parse.com name thanks to Greg, the CTO of Stripe. Cause I asked, I was over at their office and I asked them, what was your guy's second choice? Cause like Stripe's an awesome name. And they're like, well, if Stripe didn't work, we're going to be parse. I was like, that, like, that's available?
And they just gave it to you for 10 bucks or something?
They didn't own it. So they had, they had written a script to email all the owners of like one word, English, one syllable domains like Stripe, parse, things like that.
And asked them like, hey, we're, you know, a couple of people working on a startup, you know, are you interested in selling? You know, most never replied, but like parse and Stripe owners did. And so I, I won't say how much Stripe cost, but parse was only 15K, parse.com.
That's not bad.
All things considered. And so, so going through YC the second time, like what became valuable to you? I assume it was different than the, well, first of all, it was like way more people, right? In summer 11, right? But what was valuable the second time?
Well, again, like having like customers or like, or the actual users like inside of the batch where I could like talk to them, having that community, cause it actually gets quite lonely when you're just sitting there like coding, like, you know, 16 hours a day or like, like, even if you're with like the same three people every day, like it's nice to have that community of other people who are doing the same thing. The partner smacked us around a bit like, no, no, you guys like are going the wrong way. And they were, they were almost always right. And so we got a lot of good, like, it, it kept us honest about shipping every week, like shipping new stuff, not, not, not being embarrassed to ship too early, which is like really, really common, especially amongst like developers who just want to keep coding instead of shipping.
And so the, the partner's advice was priceless, but, and then, and then a demo day, I mean, fundraising was.
A thousand X easier. I can't imagine the fundraising, you know, minus the YC demo day. We raised, we were wildly oversubscribed, but we only took 1.5. We stopped there for our seed round. And like, we really were able to get some of like the most, like some of the best investors and some of the most like, like kind of like famous, like valley type people. And it was like, it was really, it was really awesome.
Yeah. And then it was like two years and then Facebook acquired you guys?
Something like that?
Yeah. So we started Parse in 2011. Facebook acquired the company in 2013. We'd actually had M and A discussions with several other companies along the way, like in 2012 and, and early 2013. But we, we actually raised our series A like right after demo day. We basically went and started to like raise our A. Because we actually thought we already had basically like enough traction to start doing that. And we, and it actually was a fairly, fairly quick process. We raised 5.5 million from Ignition. So in total raised 7 million.
That just happened.
And then we started hiring and we kind of like, we were able to recruit some just amazing developers. A lot of people off the Google search team, for instance, people, a lot of developers were passionate about the problem and like, like working on their, on the tools that solve their own problems. So that was helpful. And being such a developer focused brand also helped us. And YC was great for that. Being able to like, kind of, you know, post like, hey, like we're hiring on like on Hacker News back then.
I mean, because that's always a question, like I wonder, right? Because people are looking for those jobs, but you guys are also just looking to find people. So like, what was the effective, what were the effective strategies for finding developers to come work on Parse? You just made a cool product or, or what?
Well, we often, we would talk to a lot of our actual users, like, I mean, there were some amazing like engineers who were like using Parse. And so even if we couldn't hire them, we could talk to like their friends. But also, um, once we kind of got like a couple amazing. hires out of the Google search team. We just kept asking every, we asked every single hire like who's the best person you've worked with? Like who would you co-found a company with? And then we would just go to that person and I asked the same, I asked the same question like to that person. And even if I couldn't get like that individual, I could, you just kept, kind of kept moving down the tree.
Yeah. And so that actually worked really, really well. And we were able to hire like a lot of like friends or people we'd worked with previously. So I think, I think Kevin had worked with like several of the Google folks previously.
And so like they already knew and trusted kind of like, like us and we already had, we had kind of a good friendly group that wasn't all just kind of strangers. And we were, but, but I mean, eventually we ended up hiring everyone from like, we hired, some of our best people were actually users of Parse. Like the guy who ran all our community and such was actually making Parse apps. He had just graduated. And so that was actually another great strategy. Hacker News jobs post was a really good one. And I guess that alone actually worked really, really well. And so now Parse is like shut down, right?
It is. Yeah. So just the other day, I think the end of January, Facebook finally, so Facebook open sourced the entire project. And now there are actually little companies that like provide Parse hosting, much like Oh man, really? Yeah, much like It's AWS for Parse.
Well, cause there's, there's actually like very little profitable businesses, like all those folks who host WordPress for businesses. You know, they can like, cause WordPress is an open source project. Now Parse is too. So there are people who just took over the hosting part of it. And so, but the Parse team, to their credit, like they kept building and working and adding features to the open source project. It's really, really good. And So there's a lot of people who switched over who like we actually helped everyone migrate over from like from using like our servers over to like the open source project and like how to do that. The company did an amazing job with that. I think it was one of the best shutdowns of a company that I've seen. So often users are really angry and like, but
this was a really graceful, long, like over a year notice that we were gonna be shut down. Open Source did like migration tools. Too many startups end up just kind of like closing like.
Oh, for sure. Yeah, it's happened. Do you think there's another Parse coming down the pipeline? Like someone's gonna try it again?
Well, Firebase did, right? So they were actually in our batch. They were a different company at the time. They were doing like basically chat for every website. So like, you know how a website like, like how like, how like, how Twitch has like a chat little box? They were trying to do that for everyone. And they ended up pivoting later into doing basically like Parse again. So they're, and then Google bought them. So Google, Google has their own Parse, and then Facebook had one.
Okay. All right. So, so you can use Firebase, I guess, or Parse.
Firebase is great, actually, yeah.
Yeah. And so, okay, so you didn't go to Facebook, right?
No.
Okay. So what happens after Parse? What do you do?
Yeah. So I was like fairly burned out after, I had no break between Scribd and Parse. Like literally, it was like the next day, I just started working again. So after many, many years, I guess, I, I, I'd always wanted to travel. I'd never done so. And so I've spent about two years traveling, backpacked South America without a computer, which was great.
What was that like?
And lived in Europe for a while, did a lot of speaking at conferences, that, that sort of, and I tried to learn more about the international startup scene. It feels like every, every city internationally, or a lot of them, think like, how do we build the Silicon Valley of like? You know, South America, or how do we build the Silicon Valley of like Peru? And it's like, that's not really the right approach, I don't think. They'd be better off focusing on like being really friendly to like one niche. Like, we're gonna be really friendly to Bitcoin people. Like, we're gonna make the banks be friendly to Bitcoin startups. And like, you might get more people going there and not dealing with all like this, all the difficulty that say like drones have here, like with all the regulations.
So you could see like a drone valley and like a Bitcoin valley. I mean, Mark Andreessen has drone.
Stop.
No, I completely agree with you though, right? Like, there's no reason why like, you know, all the pharmaceutical startups couldn't be in Germany or something. And so what did you learn? From like, so you're speaking at all these conferences and stuff, and you eventually stopped doing all that speaking, right? Did you pick anything up along the way?
Yeah, the number one question that I got was, how do we raise money? How did you do that?
And it's really unfortunate because, like, much like that, like the angel ecosystem that had to build in Silicon Valley, like, it took a long time. Like, back in like even 06, there were not that many investors and like terms were not good. Like, I mean, nowadays, the typical seed round out of YC is higher than like the Series A post-money that Sequoia did in Dropbox and in Airbnb. So you have to envision like this climate was completely different. Like, there was not this like flood of capital chasing like every good startup.
So that's kind of how it feels in most international areas.
And so what do you tell people? Come out here?
What I was telling folks, yeah, I mean, I said if you can, like, raising out in the valley is, I mean, like, for instance, like, Algolia was in Paris at the same time I was there, and they ended up moving here. Frontapp from Paris also moved here, where, Frontapp, I'm an investor in. And so, the honest truth is like, I mean, I still think living and doing a startup here...
is very beneficial and it has certain downsides, it's very expensive here, but in terms of fundraising, that certainly helps. Also, investors are largely averse to like non Delaware C Corps, which a lot of these companies outside of the US are. Like, for instance, I, as an investor now, in like, you know, over sixty or seventy companies, I don't understand like the legal ramifications of investing in like a company in like, you know, South America.
So you basically just avoid them?
Well, it just, it would be a large like legal headache to think about, to go have like lawyers review this and see, because, yeah, so with, with the Delaware C Corp stuff, you already had that figured out. So I, I actually just encourage folks to like, to like, apply to like Y Combinator, or if they can't get into Y C, apply to like five hundred startups, whatever. But like, these, these programs are so perfect for people internationally. And I love what Stripe is doing with Atlas, like helping people, they're trying, they're letting anyone be an entrepreneur like around the world. That is such an awesome, ambitious goal in solving that problem. So I think things have gotten much, much better than back when I was like, back in like when I was
hearing that in twenty like fourteen, largely due to the efforts like that. And like, Y C does a really good job of taking like, there's a great company called Razorpay that I'm an investor in, that's kind of like Stripe for India. And, you know, they like, Y C helped them with the whole transition.
It's super valuable. And so that's probably a good transition. So you said like sixty angel investments at this point? Do you have a particular strategy, an area you're focusing on? How's it going?
Yeah, so I've been, I'm, I've so far invested in like Cruise, which just sold to GM,
Gusto, LendUp, Checker, Optimizely, Reddit, things like that. For me,
In the early stage investing, I really, the first thing I'll look for at least is like, like, is there a large market? Because like, without a market, it's really hard to be successful, even if you build a great product. And so, is there a large market? And are these founders like, like a really relentless team that is determined? Or like, I actually have this joke question I'll sometimes, like, kind of, I don't actually ask founders this, but like, I'm like, hey, you know, there's this conference in like, you know, like, in like, the UAE, and someone just dropped out. Do you want to go give a talk? It'll, it'll, it'll take you a week.
It's like what you did.
Yeah. It'll take you a week.
And like, they were kind of like the conferences that I was actually going to.
Yeah, I guess you weren't a founder at the time, but still.
No, yeah.
But like, often, if founders are willing to take long distractions and doing things that are not relevant to their companies, that's a bad sign. And so, you, you kind of learn to identify the folks who are relentless.
Like, what are other signals you see in people?
I actually like solo founders. I know that's an unconventional thing in the valley, but Drew was initially a solo founder with Dropbox. And a lot of other great companies were as well, or had one founder who really drove the project through.
So, I think people who are willing to go through it solo, it's already hard enough. People who can persevere for like, a year or longer by themselves, I, I kind of really admire that. You can, you can kind of, I mean, references in some sense, like, you know, like, if, if you ask people, like, you know, who are the best people you ever worked with? And they name someone, that's probably someone who's pretty good.
As a technical person, do you vet the product, like, the tech side of it at all?
Yes, but I kind of believe, and I'm stealing a lot of this from Mark and Drewson, but that a really strong team in a really great market will eventually build the right product. And like, they'll figure it out, like, because the market will drag the right product out of them, whether it's kicking and screaming. Like Docker came out of Doc Cloud, you know? There's lots of things. Twitch came out of Justin TV. Justin TV was actually, had this one vertical of like gaming that was really growing. And they actually ditched the rest of it and just did the gaming vertical. And so often, like, good markets will actually, good growing markets will actually eventually steer you in the right direction.
So as an investor, have you been burned yet? I mean, you've only been doing it for a couple of years, right? Are there any, like, hard lessons you've had to learn?
I think one good thing, well, I think people complain about valuations every single year. I've heard this since 2005. I remember when Optimized Lease Seed Round was at four, and people were like, "That's so expensive, I'm never gonna pay that." Like, you know, now it's probably a multi-billion dollar company. So I don't listen to that anymore. I think a lot of the best deals can feel expensive. As Gary Tan recently said, investors make their money, basically, on being in the deal everyone wants to be in, or being in the deal nobody wants to be in. And I think that's largely true. Like, if you look at, like, say Dropbox and Airbnb, they took, like, over a year to go from Demo Day to their Series A.
So you don't have to actually rush into things at Demo Day. There's a lot of room in the post-seed world, where you can kind of invest, like, maybe at a slightly higher valuation, but like before the Series A. And so I've done a lot of that as well.
And how are you finding those deals?
Often they're products I use, or often they're things that actually solve problems that I had. Like, in terms of areas I focus on, I guess I should mention a lot of B2B and like enterprise, a lot of autonomous vehicle tech, like much like Cruise, and a lot in like marketplaces. I'm still bullish on, I don't think that there are enough marketplaces for all the different verticals yet.
Like, for example?
Okay, I'm an investor in Quartzy, which is actually, which is a great startup, just did their Series B. And they are bringing, for life science laboratories, like at universities, or say at like Genentech, they're uniting, like, they're fixing the whole like inventory system problem, like, because most folks just have like, either like, a chalkboard with like, writing down what they have, or like, whatever, or like, some paper binder. So they are uniting the life science labs with the suppliers. And that's very valuable. And much like Airbnb, like, a lot of people said, like, why do we need Airbnb, we already have Craigslist. But often, these experiences are much better when they're custom tailored. Yeah.
Yeah, I think it was Chris Dixon who like, made that graphic a while ago, of like, breaking Craigslist out into like, all these billion dollar companies, something like that. Yeah, no, I think it's true. It's, there's so many companies that are just like, we see it with YC, and Jared actually wrote a post about it last year, the startup site Geist, like, all the trends. Like, people often don't pay attention to the unsexy, but like, giant markets.
Yeah. And those are often like, the most interesting ones, in terms of like, investments. And so, a lot of my investments didn't seem sexy at the time, but worked out.
And so, like, where are the markets you think that like, people, in addition to those marketplaces, like, people ought to be paying attention to? Because right now, there's a lot of noise around, you know, say, for example, like, VR, or machine learning, AI stuff. Do you think that those things are worth startups going for right now? Or are there other things that you think are good opportunities?
Yeah. So I actually really like existing huge markets that are growing. This is not, not everyone agrees with this. Some people say... Look for a small market and like expand it like I think that's kind of I think I think in zero to one Peter Thiel kind of talks about this that that certainly can work. But I think a lot of Dropbox is like a great example. A lot of famous investors I won't name passed on Dropbox at a $2 million valuation saying the space is too crowded. But when you see a huge market that's fragmented with like lots of like companies like many were public already doing the same kind of thing just badly. If you can make a 10x better product, like you can really win and there's room for lots of winners, right?
Box is public, they you know, they started like roughly in the same like era. Uh, you know, Dropbox is doing really, really well. I think they just hit a billion dollar run rate or something. And there's room for lots of winners in huge markets. And so I I I'm guilty of following like trends and like saying like, oh, YouTube is hot. Let's do like YouTube for X like, oh, like.
But don't.
It's Cruz Rex. Don't do that. Yeah. Don't, don't do that. Because that that that's rarely how the best companies were formed. Like when Stripe started, everyone said, why another payments company? Everyone already has a payment system. But they made a 10x better product that developers loved. They found a niche of people who loved what they were doing. Uh, developer friendly and they assigned merchant IDs on the fly. That was huge. Dropbox had like the same kind of reaction. Airbnb, I mean, uh, as Cybo posted, like, you know, all the famous investors passed on that. Like, because they didn't really, well, they didn't necessarily understand the problem like, you know, why would I rent out the living room of my brownstone in in Manhattan? I don't, you know.
Do you? Do you think it is an education problem? Because that happens with Y C a lot, right? Like there, there are people that are seemingly entering a crowded space, but in actuality, like they are going to be the winner. Right? So if you are the founder of that company, how do you educate people if you do in fact need money from them? Like, what do you? Is it? Or is it just about education?
I think Y C is actually like done in a really admirable job in just picking relentless individuals like the Airbnb got like the Airbnb. Team, which was like a team that just was never going to give up. And even when they're not sure about the market or idea, they'll bet on really amazing people. Uh, who who are relentless. And I think that's one of the genius parts of Y C and Y Y C has worked out so well.
I suspect nowadays, I think you kind of have to ship at least part of that 10x better product, just because the application, nowadays, I don't think I would even get into YC if I had flat right now, but because it's much harder to get into, there's just more applications now than there were back then. And so I think if you can show some traction or some product market fit in a large market, that's always good. But in terms, I mean, I just think investors are, I think a lot of investors are wrong on this. And I think a great way to find startup ideas is to look at the Inc. 500 magazine, you know, and it shows the fastest growing startups, like
in terms like revenue, like, say, like year over year or like over three years. And then just look at those markets and then see if you have founder market fit in any of them. Do you know any of those markets really well? And then if you, you know, have a secret, as Peter Thiel would say, like, if you know something about like, if like, like, much like the way like Drew knew that, you know, we can make a much better backup cloud storage type product like than this. And like, it's ridiculous, people are using USB drives for backing up stuff, like, and that's because all the products suck, even though there are public companies in this space. And that's so he just sat down and built the 10x better product. So I really like looking at the software that you use every day and seeing which ones annoy you, like which ones make you
like really cringe. And I always write those down, because if you're using that, it means it's probably one of the better products, or it's what people are forced to use. And if you can build the 10x better product, people will switch.
Totally. And I think paying attention to market size makes a huge difference. I'm, I'm still shocked that there aren't more like, not Cruise look-alikes, but self-driving in general, like personal transportation is so massive that like, there's room for like 10 of them.
Yeah, Sebastian Thrun recently was, I think he was quoted saying, basically roughly, a self-driving like, kind of like engineer type person is worth roughly like $10 million, like, in like an acquisition or like in like M&A. I mean, I mean, Cruise was 50 people and sold for a billion. But keep in mind, GM stock price actually went up on the news. So like, the market actually, I think, viewed this positively because GM wisely noted that
They were gonna either become a software and technology company, or kind of become a dinosaur relic. Because I believe this is true of all companies. Like, all companies will either become software companies, or they're gonna die.
As an investor now, do you have just a fear of choosing the right idea? If you were to do a startup again? Like, are you scared of doing one? Or would you want to?
That's such a great question. And that's, okay, yes, absolutely. And I actually think repeat founders are actually at a disadvantage in many ways. Because you feel this pressure to come up with some genius idea, when usually the best startups are not a genius idea. They're not some brilliant flash in the pan. It's just doing something that, like, Facebook, MySpace already existed. Friendster had already existed. But like, Mark just really nailed it. He started with colleges. He built something awesome that people loved. And so I think often, just doing things better is like, not a bad strategy. But as a second time founder, or a third time founder, I feel a pressure to like, it's like the sophomore slump that Richard Feynman talks about in physics,
where he wasn't allowed to work on small ideas anymore. He had to work on some gigantic thing. But all the best discoveries in physics came from like, kind of, hey, that doesn't seem right. Like, you know, it's kind of odd that Maxwell's equations say that, like, you know, speed of light is always constant.
So what do you do to actively combat that in your brain? And just the people around you as well?
I think you have to, I almost want to say like, not work in secret, but like, I wouldn't even talk too much about my idea, probably, because it would sound so stupid. But the best, I think the best companies do sound like, kind of dumb. And also, being willing to experiment with lots of kind of dumb ideas, and maybe focusing on markets where there already is a so-called winner. I think there's room for lots of winners in lots of markets.
It's really tough, too, because I know, I know tons of successful people that work on all these little side projects, but are embarrassed to put them out. Because they're just like stupid little toys. And like, you know, it would be, I don't know, inappropriate, or just not cool for them to put out some like Chrome extension that they just built for themselves.
And then this actually gets worse. Then you kind of get tempted to like, take the money people offer you because like whatever in fundraising. You're like, okay, I'll take a couple million dollars just to like, fess a seed around. But then you're suddenly almost stuck in whatever market and product that you kind of picked, and you've probably picked wrong. Uh, just like we did, just like I did every time.
So knowing that you've picked wrong, like you kind of get stuck and it's too awkward to tell your investors that you're changing and pivoting. And so I think second time founders raise money too fast. Like I'm not going to raise money until I have strong product market fit. And I know what I'm doing.
And a friend of mine who actually raised money too early was just lamenting how that probably killed his second company.
Man, and what about those people who were successful and then decide that they want to like, create a like, a lab where they have like, seven startups to them, to their own?
Yeah, that's like really interesting, right? Like Max, Max Levchin's done really well with that. I kid Yelp come out of that, uh, Slide, which he sold to Google. Yeah, I think Affirm and then there's some great ones. Um, that, that model's really worked out for him.
I feel like he's an outlier.
But I don't know. It can be wrong.
The other labs, I don't think I've seen be as successful. Like, I think, like, why Combinator used to not like being called an incubator? Because like, uh, the, most incubators haven't really worked out that well. Um, Max's aside.
I think it's hard to really honestly focus on that many different ideas, um, that are all in progress. I mean, landing pages are one thing. Cause they're, cause they're all the same template. You're modifying text effectively, like often. But like, if you're building out, having teams that are working on like six, seven different projects, it's hard to figure out that that really strong product market fit, which is what most startups fail. Most startups fail because they'd never get strong product market fit.
Agreed. Okay. So kind of like, uh, wrapping up, if you, as a multi-time founder, if you were to give some advice to someone who's starting their first company. What would you tell them in terms of like, "Don't spend time doing this, spend time doing that"?
This is to a first-time founder?
Uh, why don't we do both? Like, so first time and second time, or whatever.
Everything that's not working on your product and finding product-market fit is a waste of time. Like, that's the only thing that you should be doing. Don't worry about fundraising, don't worry about everything else. If you... The folks who do fundraise too early typically get into real trouble because they never are able to get the product-market fit. Really focus on finding that huge market. Go to that INC 5000 list, find the fastest-growing companies, find a market that you know really, really well, better than anyone else. So have founder-market fit. And like, make it a big one that's growing. And then just build a 10x... Focus on building a 10x better product in that space.
All right, thanks for listening. So as always, please rate and subscribe to the show. And if you want to read the transcript or check out the video, they're both at blog.ycombinator.com. Okay, see you next time.
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