Pod Insights WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk Inside Hitler's Bunker (Eclipse, Alan Moorehead) About this episode As a new year's treat, Al Murray has recorded a chapter of 'Eclipse' by Alan Moorehead. This incredible history, republished by We Have Ways, was first published in 1945.
In chapter 14, Moorehead reconstructs, in terrifying detail, the collapse of Germany and Hitler's fragile grasp on reality slipping away.
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0:58 Speaker 00 Eclipse by Alan Moorehead Chapter 14: The Battle of the Ardennes
1:05 Speaker 00 In November, when one of the hardest winters on record was beginning to set in, the Germans came under an entirely new system of command. Hitler at last had divided the bulk of his forces into two independent commands: Guderian, the tank expert with some 200 divisions in the east; Grunstedt, with some 60 or 70 divisions in the west. There existed barely a dozen German divisions inside the Reich itself, but reinforcements were coming in. The German Home Guard, the Volksturm, was formed. Sedentary workers, formerly considered unfit, were drafted to the front to meet the crisis. At the same time, many thousands of garrison soldiers were withdrawn from Norway, Finland, the Baltic States, and the Balkans. All this
1:48 Speaker 00 enabled Hitler to reconstitute an army at least equal in size, if not in quality, to the army with which he had begun the war.
1:57 Speaker 00 Of Hitler himself, at this time, one had heard nothing reliable. Some reported him mad, others dead. I was shown one highly circumstantial report of how the Führer spent his day. It was related that he began with a conference at ten a.m. and then retired alone to his office. For the next five or six hours, he could be seen staring at his maps. He sat there without food or drink, entirely alone. Then he called for Model, his chief of staff, and said, "Call Rundstedt," or Gudarian, as the case might be. Now, the story runs that Model, being a shrewd man, would realise that Hitler had taken a decision about something or other, and that it would be unwise to brook him over it. And so Model would inquire tactfully if the Führer's meditations had been fruitful. Hitler then would reply,
2:42 Speaker 00 "We must destroy Arken," or something of that sort. At that, Model would hurry to Rundstedt and hiss in his ear—hiss is my own bit of decoration—"Destroy Arken." And Rundstedt would pass into the present. Hitler: "Well, Marshal, what are your plans?" Rundstedt: "We must destroy Arken." Hitler: "Excellent." The report went on to say that if Rundstedt was not primed beforehand and suggested something quite contrary to what Hitler was thinking, then inevitably a violent scene would ensue.
3:14 Speaker 00 It is an attractive story, and a colourful one. Yet one did not dismiss it entirely as gossip, because there was a great deal of outside evidence that something of the sort was actually going on. Mad or sane, the majority of Hitler's decisions and intuitions throughout the war had been remarkably sound, and in any event, the generals, having left the presence, were free to carry out the tactics in their own highly professional manner. Then, too, was it not a fact that blind faith and devotion to a leader in warfare could carry out more than all the most cleverly conceived plans? At all events, there was nothing very crazy in the way the Reich set about defending its borders in this extreme hour. Himmler, as chief executive officer, showed immense
3:54 Speaker 00 ability as an organiser and as a stiffener of morale. Gudarian and Rundstedt were probably the best possible choices for command in the field. Moreover, on top of this, an entirely new complex was beginning to operate through the German mind. The German began to feel roughly as the Englishman felt in the autumn of 1940. "Very well, I fight alone. Let the whole world come on top of me. I will accept death, because that will be a better and an easier thing than occupation by the enemy."
4:23 Speaker 00 At the roots of this dramatic feeling, there was probably a split between the English and the German mind. The Englishman after ten centuries of security never really admitted that he could be beaten. He was emotionally and constitutionally unable to accept such an idea. Against all the facts, he profoundly believed that he would somehow get out of the mess in the end. The German, on the contrary, accepted the idea of defeat with positive gusto. He was almost in the frame of mind of a Regency gambler. "All right, I have gambled for the highest stakes and won. Now that I am losing, I will lose for the highest stakes. I will collapse utterly and heroically." Both English and Germans adored defeats. Dunkirk will remain in the English mind long after Tunis is forgotten.
5:06 Speaker 00 The siege of Stalingrad will rally future generations of German children long after they have found the 1940 advance into France rather a bore. But where the Englishman carries this masochistic emotion, only a certain distance, the German takes it to the bitter end. Hitler had taught the people to live for utter victory or utter defeat. Now, at the end of 1944, he appeared to be in a fair way of winding up the war by nearly gratifying both those ambitions. Terrified of the Reds, terrified of the Allied bombing, terrified of the inevitable suffering ahead, at least a section of the German people saw themselves as preparing for the greatest act of national immolation in European history. They would go gloriously and desperately to their utter defeat.
5:50 Speaker 00 The Allied November offensive was begun with a series of staggered attacks. One after another, the seven armies were to move on to the Rhine and endeavour to establish bridgeheads on the other side. It was hoped that the Ruhr would be pierced. Setbacks occurred from the very beginning. First Patton, and then Patch, the commander of the 7th US Army, got ahead only to find that they had no strategic reserves with which to follow through. Then, when they came to advance again, they found the enemy had closed in before them. One week followed another through November, and still the seven armies, straining forward together side by side, were measuring their gains only in thousands of yards.
6:29 Speaker 00 For Rundstedt, in defence, the problem was not difficult. If the Allies were going to maintain an even pressure along the whole line like this, then his difficulties were halved. He had merely to space his men along the front from Switzerland to the North Sea and let the Allies come on. So long as we did not mount a definite spearhead, he was perfectly secure. There was no need for him to retire onto the Rhine and the Siegfried Line. His men were well dug in where they were, and since he was in defence, he was obliged to commit far fewer men than the Allies. Moreover, since his troops were not obliged to expose themselves, they suffered fewer casualties than we did. All through this unhappy month, Rundstedt was building up a strategic reserve which he called the Sixth Panzer Army. It was kept out of battle.
7:13 Speaker 00 It was given priorities in the New Panthers and Mark I and II Tiger Tanks. The best of the SS troops and Panzer Grenadiers were fed into its ranks. The Sixth Panzer Army was at first designed to counter-attack any determined Allied breakthrough, especially in the direction of Cologne. But, when it became clear that the Allies were going to persist in their policy of mounting no spearhead, of maintaining an even and ineffectual pressure, then Rundstedt began to conceive great plans for the future. His Sixth Panzer Army would attack. Arken, the first German city, had fallen in ruins, but the Allies had only succeeded in reaching the Rhine at one or two places, and they had no immediate hopes of making a bridgehead anywhere. The Siegfried Line still existed.
7:58 Speaker 00 Clearly, the Allies were not going to get anywhere at this rate, and the time had come for the Germans to go over to the offensive. The Rundstedt Plan was one of the most imaginative and daring proposals of the war. He resolved to put his fresh and secret Sixth Panzer Army straight through the Ardennes Forest, and then, having crossed the Merz, it would proceed straight to Brussels and Antwerp. The possibilities were endless. To begin with, Eisenhower's forces would be cut in half. Four Allied armies, the Canadian, the British, the Ninth US, and most of the First US, would be bottled up in Holland and Belgium. With Antwerp taken, they had no escape route by the sea. Their only hope would be to fight their way south into France, abandoning their vast
8:41 Speaker 00 system of dumps and many, many thousands of guns, tanks, workshops, and men. There was even some doubt as to whether the trapped armies could put up much resistance. Once Antwerp fell, they had no other supply port. Within a week, so the German planners argued, we might have exhausted our shells. This plan, towards which Rundstedt began to move early in December, was not so fantastic as it sounds. His information was excellent. Agents left behind in France, Belgium and Holland were bringing him a constant stream of news. He knew pretty well where every Allied division was placed, and by December it was apparent that in the Ardennes-Luxemburg sector, the Americans had put pretty well everything they possessed into the shop window.
9:23 Speaker 00 They were braced for offensive, they were not expecting a German counter-attack. And so, the great bulk of the Americans were either in or immediately behind the front line. Once he broke through that line, and Rundstedt saw that he would emerge into empty space, an empty space that extended across the Meuse through Brussels to the sea. Our information about the Germans meanwhile was very bad indeed. We were now up against Germany itself and no news came out of Germany. Hitherto, we had always travelled through friendly country, where the French, the Belgians and the Dutch had eagerly brought us information of the enemy movements. But now the boot was on the other foot. Rundstedt could be pretty certain of getting surprised. Then too, there was the terrain.
10:06 Speaker 00 All his lifetime, Rundstedt and many of his senior planners had studied the Ardennes. It was one of the classic gateways in and out of Germany. They knew every mile of the way. Then again, there was the factor of Allied morale. While the Germans had been growing more and more desperate, something quite different was happening in the British and American ranks. It was apparent to every soldier of reasonable intelligence that the war was going to end in our favour. Why then should one unnecessarily expose oneself on the eve of victory? What was the sense of being killed at the 11th hour? Already, people at home were arguing about the post-war world. Finally, there was the quality and size of Rundstedt's striking force. In addition to the Sixth, he planned also to commit the Fifth Panzer Army, which was already in the line opposite Liege.
10:51 Speaker 00 That is to say, he massed together the largest armored spearhead the world had ever known: ten Panzer divisions, plus sixteen or seventeen motorized infantry divisions of the highest caliber. We ourselves had never attempted to gather such a striking force, certainly, we had nothing like it on D-Day. It was doubtful if the Russians had ever given or received such a blow in one place. In round figures, you might estimate that this terrific hammer blow had behind it nearly two thousand tanks, a quarter of a million men. In addition, two devices new to modern warfare were employed: an offensive reconnaissance brigade of Germans, some of them dressed in American uniforms and travelling in American tanks and trucks with American markings, and a flying bomb barrage. The Luftwaffe, which had been taking a rest for several months, was regrouped.
11:36 Speaker 00 It planned to put up thousands of aircraft, all to be used tactically in support of the ground troops. Add all these factors together: the Allies' unpreparedness, the excellence of the German planning and intelligence, the temporary disbalance of the Allied morale, and the size and quality of the German force, and you must concede that Rundstedt had a reasonable hope of so cutting up Eisenhower's armies that they would not recover for many months to come. Once negative, the Western Front of Germany might have good chances of holding off the Russians for another winter, and then with the summer, the V1 and V2, the rocket and the jet-propelled fighters in mass production, the prefabricated U-boat in mass production. Yes, anything might happen if the Reich got through intact to the summer of 1945. They might even propose a separate peace to Russia.
12:21 Speaker 00 Hitler might say to Moscow, "Look, you see the Allied position in the West is hopeless. Let us come to an agreement and finish the war." The whole plan was hatched in the utmost secrecy, and right up to the last moment, only Hitler and a handful of the senior generals and politicians knew about it. Outside the Nazi Party, Hitler was far from certain that he could command obedience. The July attempt on his life had warned him that he could trust no one implicitly. He lived surrounded by SS guards. He rarely appeared in public.
12:52 Speaker 00 One day, a week or two before the battle, the German commanders on the front were suddenly summoned to a conference. They were led by securitas routes to the Führers headquarters, and every care was taken to ensure that they would not be able to fix the place on the map. At the entrance, their weapons were taken from them, and then, the generals entered the conference room in a body. SS men stood round the walls with tommy guns. Hitler appeared, and at once launched into a tirade about the Nazi struggle for power, about the Jewish Bolshevik menace. While the generals sat there in silence, and astonishment, the leader went on and on as though he was addressing a political meeting. Then at last, he got down to brass tacks. He outlined the plan. He called for the utmost sacrifice, he said that this was Germany's last chance.
13:37 Speaker 00 The Wehrmacht must get through to Antwerp, and he promised 3,000 fighter aircraft in support. Model and Rundstedt sat there at the table alongside Hitler, nodding agreement. To many in that room, the plan seemed crazy. There might have been some way of circumventing a harebrained scheme of the Führer, but with Model there, nodding his head, there was nothing more to say. They had to obey. Again, they were obliged to swear loyalty to the Führer, and indeed, he had shown some of his old fire that day. Then, still under the eyes of the SS, they were led out of the room, given back their weapons, and driven away. All Rundstedt needed now was a clear day for his start, and then dark, foggy weather for the follow-through, so that the Allied air fleets would be unable to put up.
14:19 Speaker 00 In the middle of December, he got what he wanted. On December the fourteenth and fifteenth, the Fifth Panzer Army was slipped quietly out of the line and sent south through the forest roads to a point opposite Luxembourg, round the town of Prun. The Sixth Panzer Army quietly moved into the line in the place vacated by the Fifth. On December the sixteenth, both armies struck together on a front less than forty miles wide. The shock was chaotic. An American division which had just landed in France took the first blow around Malmedy and was rolled up in a few hours. An American armour division was caught on its flank and knocked off balance. Three or four other American divisions were either encircled or overrun.
15:01 Speaker 00 Divisional and corps headquarters, even army headquarters, were forced to pack and run. A stream of flying bombs came over, not hitting anything much but adding to the unreal and frightening savagery of the assault. German parachutists began sniping on bridges far behind the US lines, and then to spread the confusion squadrons of apparently friendly tanks appeared, only to open up murderously when they got within range. No man could trust another in the forward areas. Stavlo fell, and the American system of communications broke down. No one, not even at Schaeff, had any clear idea of what was happening. Whole corps of Americans were cut off somewhere in the battle area. It was useless trying to send them orders, since one knew nothing definitely of what was going on.
15:44 Speaker 00 With fantastic speed, the Germans appeared in one village after another. All through December 17th the battle was out of our control. On the 18th it was serious. Worse still, a fog had settled over the battlefield. I cannot see anyone disentangling the chaotic history of those two days. Apart from a mass of unrelated detail, only one thing stands out clearly: the American units in the midst of the German flood, being without orders or information, simply took things into their own hands and fought back. This is probably the major imponderable of warfare, to know just when men will suddenly, and often of their own free will, commit an act of unthinking desperate bravery. Once started, it has a contagious effect and each man tries to outdo the other.
16:29 Speaker 00 But why it should start, and how, is something you can never know for certain beforehand. You can expect the soldiers to fight up to a certain known standard, but here in the Ardennes the Americans rose above themselves, and in the midst of so much confusion and doubt and bloodshed, they held on, long after the time when normally all hope would have been lost.
16:49 Speaker 00 It was this desperate resistance by isolated Americans in the early days, this and nothing else, which saved Belgium and Holland from being overrun. Parts of Belgium might still have been overrun later on had certain dispositions not been taken, like the appointment of Montgomery. But the crises were never again as imperative, and these later moves followed logically and inevitably upon one another. It was here on the battlefield that the issue was really decided, when the common American soldier elected to fight up to the point of his death. Once that decision was taken, and apparently taken almost inspirationally by tens of thousands of men, then it was axiomatic that Eisenhower should call on Montgomery and urge Patton and Bradley up from the south.
17:31 Speaker 00 Had the American soldier on the spot not risen immediately to this crisis, then nothing Montgomery or Bradley could have done would have altered the situation. They had no reserves to call on quickly enough, had the soldiers in the First American Army panicked. But since they did not panic, then plans could be made anew and Montgomery was able to fight what I believe to be his greatest battle. Montgomery was in bed in Belgium on the night of December the 18th, when Eisenhower called him on the telephone and asked him to take command of the troops in the main battle area, that is to say the First and Ninth American Armies, which were deployed from the neighbourhood of Arken down to the Luxembourg border. Montgomery was living at his tactical headquarters, with half a dozen young men who had been trained over many months as his personal liaison officers.
18:15 Speaker 00 Before he went back to bed, he ordered them to set out and contact the various American corps wherever they might be, gather their news and then rendezvous with them at General Hodge's First Army headquarters at 1pm the following day. At the same time, another batch of liaison officers set off for the neighbourhood of the Merz bridges to gather information down there. News, accurate news above all else, was the vital thing at this moment. Montgomery went back to bed and slept until his usual hour. Having breakfasted the following morning, he sat down to make his battle plan. Already on his own authority, he had taken a number of precautionary measures in the past forty-eight hours. He had secretly transferred a British corps down from Holland and it was now moving into positions covering Brussels and Antwerp.
19:00 Speaker 00 The thing now to decide was, what is Grunstedt's plan? Where is he committing his major strength and where is it making for? Montgomery decided that the Germans, having passed through Stavlo, were going to wheel northward and perform a left hook which would then bring them to the Merz in the neighbourhood of Liège. He therefore decided that we must on no account counter-attack. The Americans must regroup and stand in front of this vital thrust. A corps must be formed for this purpose and posted in front of Liège. With this plan in his pocket, he set off for General Hodge's headquarters. Meanwhile, the liaison officers were going through a series of wholly unusual adventures. Any trip in a jeep over those ice-bound, foggy roads was a considerable experience,
19:45 Speaker 00 but the chief difficulty occurred when the British officers entered the American lines. They knew no passwords, and several of them were promptly arrested as spies and parachutists. Others found that the American corps to which they were assigned had been cut off in the night. Somehow, by various means, they managed to get themselves out of arrest to drive on to their destination, to gather the news and then make their way back. All succeeded in making their rendezvous with the Commander-in-Chief at 1pm, and Montgomery at once came in possession of a thing that was of the utmost value. He was the only man on the front who possessed accurate first-hand news of what was going on. It confirmed his belief that Rundstedt was committing his main striking forces here
20:29 Speaker 00 in the north towards Liège. It had been the American intention on this morning, of December the 19th, to counter-attack and proceed to the rescue of their isolated comrades. This plan was now countermanded. Montgomery instead formed his corps defensively in the path of the German advance with General Collins, who took Cherbourg, in command. Collins was immediately engaged in battle, and his whole corps was drawn into immensely heavy fighting. Montgomery again formed the corps, but again this second corps was sucked into the battle before it had any hope of acting offensively. And so, for the third time, another American corps was reformed in front of Liège.
21:06 Speaker 00 By this time, Christmas Day, a series of electric changes had happened over the broad face of the battle area. Rundstedt, seeing that his left hook on Liège was getting nowhere, decided to slip southward and strike against towards Namur and Dinon. It was the same sort of thing, the original breakthrough, then the holding back of the Allies on either flank, while a fresh striking force was passed through up to the pinnacle of the salient. But in order to penetrate in the direction of Dinon and Namur, he needed the crossroads town of Bastogne, just off the northerly corner of Luxembourg. The 101st US Airborne Division was already surrounded in Bastogne, and great pressure was brought to bear upon the garrison to force its collapse. The Germans had even sent a rather pompous note to the American commander, ordering
21:51 Speaker 00 a surrender, and had received the unusual but lucid reply: "Nuts." A bitter series of onslaughts upon Bastogne began, and the only ray of light for the Allies upon that sector was the fact that General Patton, with his 3rd Army, was marching northward through Luxembourg to the rescue. In the centre, things were easing slightly. Montgomery's staff, the same staff which planned and fought a dozen other battles from Allemagne to Normandy, was working very smoothly with the Americans on the regrouping. It had been found that the Merz bridges were unmined, and practically the only forces between the Merz and Antwerp were a handful of military policemen. This was being rapidly corrected by the arrival of the British troops, some four divisions
22:32 Speaker 00 in all, including the 6th Airborne, which had been rushed across by sea from England. The German penetration had reached its maximum in front of Dinon, some forty miles, on Christmas Eve. The first enemy tanks and infantry arrived above the defenceless town just at the moment when the first British formation had got itself into position there. A rapid skirmish followed, and when, on Christmas Day, the Americans charged in from the northern flank, the peak of the German thrust was overrun at Sel.
23:01 Speaker 00 One other excellent thing for the Allies occurred just about Christmas time. After five days of fog, which had grounded most aircraft, the weather suddenly broke clear, cold and sunny. An Allied air fleet, some 5,000 strong, swept down on the battle area and began to batter the German supply columns along the roads. At places, this massacre of vehicles reached the proportions we had known in Normandy. To this effort, which continued right through Christmas, was added the tremendous effect of the isolated Americans, holding out behind the German lines. Nearly every one of Rundstedt’s supply roads was coming under crossfire at one point or another, from these stranded garrisons. The effect, of course, was to wither up the German supplies, which were needed on the main front many miles away to the west.
23:46 Speaker 00 Heavy snow covered the ground. Soldiers of both sides were dying of frostbite and exposure. Yet still, for the Allies, the position was far from secure. If Bastogne fell before it could be relieved, then Rundstedt still had the reserves to plunge on again towards and possibly over the Merz. The crisis could only be said to have passed, when at last Patton got through to the 101st Division, with a convoy of supply lorries. And thus, at the new year, the Allies at last passed on to the offensive. From the north and south, immense pressure came down on the Germans salient. Mile after mile, the enemy was squeezed back to his original starting line in Germany. This was some of the most gruelling fighting of the whole war: the day-long, night-long, endless snow, the unremitting cold.
24:31 Speaker 00 Men froze to death in their foxholes in the night. Petrol, for the first time in my experience, froze in the tanks, and the antifreeze mixture in the radiators froze as well. There was another worldly beauty on the battlefield, for those who had the comfort and the leisure to observe. All round Brussels and Liège, it was milky fog, but when you drove past the frozen canals and the tobogganing children up to the heights of the Ardennes, the sun broke through and it was like a spotlighted stage, mile upon mile, of untrodden snowfields under the clear and frosty lamp of the winter sun. If you turned your back to the ruined villages and forgot the war for a moment, then very easily you could fancy yourself to be alone in this radiant world where everything was reduced to primary whites and blues: a strident, sparkling white among the frosted trees,
25:16 Speaker 00 the deep blue shadows in the valley, and then the flawless ice-blue of the sky. Flying fortresses went by, immensely high, spinning out their vapor trails halfway across Belgium.
25:28 Speaker 00 All this was an uplifting thing to see, and it triumphed for a little in the mind until one came upon a stranded tank threshing madly in a ditch, or saw a line of infantry passing over the hill. And then, in the villages, one met a recurring tragedy as sharp as any in this war. These Belgians had had their outburst of joy at the liberation, only to see the Germans come back again. Then the shells as the Allies returned, a second time. As the Germans retired, they took with them the men of the villages to work in Germany. No wonder that the women stood at their doorways, asking over and over again, "Are you sure they've really gone for good?" No, they had not yet gone entirely.
26:08 Speaker 00 Indeed, Rundstedt was attacking still and other salians, in Dessar, round Strasbourg, but something bigger than all this, bigger even than the Battle of the Ardennes, had risen in the East. The Russian offensive was developing wave on wave from the Carpathians to the Baltic. Under that colossal pressure, the Germans would never again attack with such power in the West. France and Belgium were at last secure. Having killed and captured and wounded nearly a quarter of a million Germans in this mid-winter fighting, the Americans and the British began to muster for their final strike into Germany.
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