Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing Which Mistake Would The Fed Prefer To Make? About this episode This episode is in partnership with The Gold Investment Letter - helping sophisticated investors successfully navigate capital markets and maximize profits in gold, silver, and mining stocks. GIL discovers the most undervalued companies and isolates special situations in the mining sector for our members. Sign up for our free E-letter for immediate action: https://www.goldinvestmentletter.com/realvisionHarry Melandri joins the show to assess whether there’s any cure for this global economic hangover? Harry Melandri, advisor at MI2 Partners, joins Ash Bennington to talk through the current state of the global economy, risks in the real estate market, and regional banks. In the second half of the show, Harry will share his research on the credit cycle and why we’re still not able to tell if the current monetary policy is too tight. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:00 Speaker 00 Hey there. Before we get started, just want to let you know today's Real Vision Daily Briefing is in partnership with the Gold Investment Letter, helping sophisticated investors successfully navigate capital markets and maximize profits in gold, silver, and mining stocks. GIL discovers the most undervalued companies and isolates special situations in the mining sector for their members, breaking down unique topics such as investor psychology, portfolio management, and macroeconomic trends, with a goal of drastically improving investment returns. Sign up for this free e-letter for immediate action. GoldInvestmentLetter.com.
0:46 Speaker 01 Which mistake would the Fed prefer to make? Welcome to Real Vision Daily Briefing. It's Friday, April 21, 2023. I'm Ash Bennington, joined today by one of our favorite guests, Harry Melandri, advisor for MI2 Partners. Harry, welcome back, man. Always a pleasure to be with you.
1:02 Speaker 02 It's great to be here. I'm shocked I'm one of your favorite guests, but I'll take that. Definitely take that.
1:09 Speaker 01 Well, you've earned it. Listen, the second half of the show today is just for Real Vision members, we should say. So if you don't want to miss it, you can sign up by using the link in the description or scan the QR code on the screen. Let's jump right into what's happening today. Harry, you know, we've been talking about this a lot at Real Vision. It feels like kind of a weird moment in markets and macro. We alluded to it at the very top of the show with that question, which mistake would the Fed prefer to make? It does have this feeling like we're sort of perched between the Scylla and Corybdis here of rising inflation, or inflation that still can't be contained, maybe better said, and some of the risks that we're seeing in the banking sector, some of the retreat we're seeing in home prices, just a lot of stuff happening. Big picture, where are we? How
1:54 Speaker 01 do we frame it? How do we contextualize it for the viewers?
1:57 Speaker 02 So MI2, the way we're looking at it is first of all, we have a rather bearish analysis of the real economy. For us, what we see is a classic inventory cycle that looks like it's running into a credit crunch and a construction cycle at the same time. I hesitate to use the word perfect storm because it's a bit of a cliche, but it doesn't, this doesn't look like it's going to be fun.
2:24 Speaker 01 Harry, let's, let's break all of that down for our audience, many of whom are not familiar with thinking about inventory cycles per se as a way of understanding market dynamics. What does that mean? First, what is an inventory cycle and where are we in it? And finally, why is it so important to understanding the overall picture of where we are from a macro perspective and its influence on markets?
2:44 Speaker 02 So, you know, you're asking me something so basic, it's hard to be sure my definition will, will meet the, you know, minimum requirement. But oscillations in the underlying level of activity in the economy can be amplified. And one of the obvious channels for that is the inventory channel. If you order a little bit too much inventory, and if everyone does it all the way along the, along the supply chain, pretty soon, we have way too much of everything. And soon after that, the economy slows down because people cut production. So I gave you some slides and it probably a good time to take a look at
3:26 Speaker 02 one of those slides. We, we have quite a few charts we could pull up, but this seemed like the best one to illustrate why MI2 thinks we're about to hit an inventory cycle. And it's a chart of the ISM customer inventories versus the ISM manufacturing headline number.
3:49 Speaker 01 And this is Institute of Supply Management that does these studies that give us a sense of what's happening in the economy. Boy, that's an unusual chart. Wow.
3:58 Speaker 02 So the red circles show you where the customer inventories flip above the manufacturing headline number. And the intuition is if you've stuffed your supply channels partly by oversupply and partly by a lower than anticipated demand, you tend to have to cut production soon afterwards. So either way, these circles tend to follow, tend to signal the start of an inventory cycle and a big cutback in manufacturing output.
4:31 Speaker 01 I can't quite read the X axis, but it looks like a pretty sufficient timeframe in years. I think it's probably about about 20 year time horizon. And what's interesting to me is that we see the largest gap between those two indicators that we see on this chart. That's pretty striking.
4:47 Speaker 02 Yeah, you know, I think a lot of that is just the scale of some of these enormous moves we've had. But yeah, you know, I would hate to lean on any one indicator too hard. But if this one is showing that it looks like the underlying growth is slowing, and you know, that's happening against an unfortunate backdrop. So as I said, it's not the only thing which points to a slowing economy. We also have a credit cycle. And I think with the credit cycle issue, I don't think anyone could have missed it. Like, banks falling over tends,
5:28 Speaker 02 everyone tends to spot it when banks fall over. And it really isn't a great sign. There's an economist at BU called Paul Schmelzing, and we've used his work in the past. We love his stuff. He's responsible for things like 800 years worth of data and VA. I think one of his pieces was VA, Volcker, and bond market reversals.
5:58 Speaker 02 Venetians, Var and Volcker, because he's using 800 years worth of data. So he recently did an analysis where they they did a taxonomy, if you will, coding the financial shocks over the last couple of centuries, I think. And when you this policy mix we've just had, where you see substantial injection of reserves and deposit guarantees, that tends to be associated with something that subsequently is is recognized as a systemic banking event.
6:37 Speaker 02 So, you know, it's it's definitely what we're seeing walks like a duck and it's quacking like a duck. And I think a lot of people are aware that the Fed, all it managed to really do was provide huge amounts of liquidity to banks that were struggling a bit with getting liquidity after they'd lost a lot of money on duration, among other positions. The liquidity they supply furnish doesn't eliminate the problem. It means that we don't have, they're not going to suddenly collapse because of deposits. We've already had quite a few banks that did that, that just collapsed because they ran out of deposits.
7:23 Speaker 02 But it does mean that we have a capital impaired, weaker regional banks at the moment in the US. Now, so the analogy is that the Fed resuscitated the patient but didn't cure the disease. Sorry, Ash.
7:36 Speaker 01 No, I was just going to ask you to talk a little bit and expand upon where we are right now in the credit cycle. Obviously, lots of folks have been following the news cycle very closely. Obviously, we see what happened with Silicon Valley Bank. We've seen some of these tremors happen throughout the system. There's been a lot of talk about a credit contraction, about some of the impact into firms not being able to get the credit that they may want or need. Let's talk a little bit about what's happening in the news cycle so people can contextualize this 800 year cycle in the context of what they're reading every day when they pick up the Wall Street Journal, because it is just an unremitting sort of stream of trepidation and doubt about what's going to happen in the future of credit.
8:15 Speaker 02 So you can tell that there is uh that we're restricted in the amount of credit available and that's that's not really a euro bond issue. If you look at Fortune 500 country companies, there's trivially small widenings in spread product in the in corporate bonds. There's almost nothing there. Mortgage bonds are a little weaker, but where you see real problems is in CMBS. CMBS is showing all sorts of signs of weakness and limited demand, but also in in, you know, what's generally referred to as a shadow banking sectors.
8:59 Speaker 01 Can we can we define that and talk a little bit about what commercial mortgage backed securities are and what their significance is in the system for folks who may not know?
9:07 Speaker 02 Sure. So when we originate debt secured by commercial real estate, that debt can be pooled and it tends to go into bond pools called CMBS and the CMBS pools, they may have a huge number of different bonds in them from from often specialized by sector. So you might see things like, what do you call them, malls in retail, you might see office CMBS, you get it's a huge amount of paper written on this. This paper has been distributed
9:51 Speaker 02 into insurance companies, it's in the banking sector, it's in pension funds, it's everywhere. Sensible real estate investors don't like to leave too much equity in their deal. So as real estate values rallied and as yields came down, people kept on refinancing their deals and issuing more paper and extracting the equity from the deal. We're now in a place where a lot of that paper, because yields, because rates have gone up, we have to, we question the underlying value of these things. And we question those collateral values partly because cap rates are now upside down with regard to funding rates, but also because
10:36 Speaker 02 we've had, sorry.
10:39 Speaker 00 Just a reminder, the Real Vision Daily Briefing is in partnership with the Gold Investment Letter, helping sophisticated investors successfully navigate capital markets and maximize profits in gold, silver, and mining stocks. GIL discovers the most undervalued companies and isolates special situations in the mining sector for their members, breaking down unique topics such as investor psychology, portfolio management, and macroeconomic trends with a goal of drastically improving investment returns. Sign up for this free e-letter for immediate action. GoldInvestmentLetter.com.
11:20 Speaker 01 No, I was just gonna say, we should say that cap rates are an important component of understanding real estate investment. This is capitalization rate. It's very often the way that real estate investors price property and get expensive, how cheap or expensive it is.
11:31 Speaker 02 Yeah, I'm bound to misspeak because it's not really my home pitch, but the right way to think about cap rates is you've got a net operating income on your piece of real estate, and if you divide that by the purchase price, you get a cap rate. So how much does your piece of real estate yield after costs? And as I said, the odds of me misdefining that slightly are very high.
11:55 Speaker 01 No, that was perfect. How much does it yield in terms of costs? And then the reverse, how much does it cost in terms of yield? You can think of them as sort of...
12:02 Speaker 02 Exactly. So this is where we get to cross compare cash flows. What we can do here is now take a look. If you've got a positive spread on the cap rate relative to your funding costs, there's a chance, and it is only a chance by the way, that your piece of real estate will positively carry, that you'll make money after you finance it. Now, you've probably, you haven't considered all of your costs in that, but if you were, you know, a positively financing piece of real estate will give you net cash flow after you pay off your debt service. Now, apart from refinancing the loan. Now, what's been
12:45 Speaker 02 going on? Well, we built a lot of real estate. We have a fair amount of real estate which is not, you know...
12:55 Speaker 02 No longer meeting the needs of business. So real estate, which maybe doesn't have Class A air conditioning units, Class A heating, Class A wiring for data, ceiling heights, all sorts of things. We have legacy offices, which are just not as popular. Businesses want top quality space and there's a fair amount of top quality space now that we fired so many people from the tech sector. So what does that mean? That means that rent's sliding. And as rents slide and vacancy rates increase, we get into this kind of vicious circle where it becomes hard to refinance real estate.
13:37 Speaker 02 Now, I don't want to spend too long on this because this is a, there's a lot to be said and there are specialists in the field. But let's just say that banks own a fair amount of real estate related debt. Insurance companies own a fair amount of real estate related debt and municipalities are exposed to tax streams from real estate related assets. So all of those groups might be a little worried about the returns on their assets.
14:08 Speaker 01 Yeah, and obviously it's worth mentioning that the position that we're in with commercial real estate right now, in addition to the cyclical factors that you're talking about here, which is this constant rolling, you know, between these different points in the cycle, we also have these secular factors, one-time factors, significant disruptions to the economy in terms of what's happened here with the COVID epidemic and the fact that, you know, I don't know about most people out there listening, but I don't go into an office anymore. And there are lots of folks who are like me, when you see that decrease in demand and the supply remains constant, obviously these buildings are durable assets. They don't go away when you have a real estate cycle, when you have a change to the economy.
14:49 Speaker 01 So what you have is prices declining as a consequence of this sort of one-time secular event that has had an enormous impact on the global economy here in the United States and abroad.
14:59 Speaker 02 Exactly. And I'm not talking to you from an office either. It might look like I am, but that's a pretty unconvincing backdrop. So.
15:08 Speaker 01 You did a great job with your home office, Harry.
15:11 Speaker 02 Thank you. Thank you.
15:12 Speaker 01 Very impressive.
15:13 Speaker 02 Yeah, I've got to hide the foosball table. It's apparently not something you're meant to have, but it's really popular.
15:21 Speaker 01 Let me ask you this. Is that midtown east? Is that the city building?
15:24 Speaker 02 I think, yeah, absolutely. I think we're looking out over Queens with that backdrop.
15:29 Speaker 01 What's really strange is we're facing the opposite direction, right? Because I'm looking at you toward New Jersey and Queens is behind me here on the Upper East Side. So everything's flipped.
15:38 Speaker 02 Yeah, exactly. So we can see that regional banks have a problem brewing. And that's worse when we think about the deposit situation. I read earlier today that $4.7 trillion worth of non-interest bearing deposits had been modeled as having a seven year duration. Well, let's put it this way, you have a large deposit in a regional bank. It's your upside to keep it there. Not very much. What's your downside? Well, if it's not federally deposit guaranteed, your downside is the entire deposit. So naturally, we've seen deposits bleed out of the banking
16:22 Speaker 02 system. And I would argue, there's nothing. People are not stupid enough to leave money in unguaranteed bank accounts, having seen what they saw with SVB Bank, Signature Bank, and so forth. So that bleed is just inconceivable to me that it will not continue unless the government, unless the authorities choose to guarantee every bank account, which there are really good reasons why they don't want to do that. It's effectively a form of socialization of banking system. And we need a banking system, which is a private sector entity. We don't want a socialized banking system.
17:01 Speaker 01 Harry, is the perception that large money center banks here in the United States, the Wells Fargos, JPMs, Bank of Americas of the world are essentially implicitly guaranteed?
17:13 Speaker 02 Well, that is a perception and that has been the reality. And we, the authorities refer to them as systemically important banks. So what you don't want is that the people who had their deposits in SVB Bank were very lucky that that bank was considered systemically important. And we should perhaps ask a few more questions about how that determination happened. And the bank itself had lobbied very aggressively to be considered not systemically important, which is a burden. So it's, there's a whole series of things one might ask quite pointed questions about. But right now, we're focused on this issue about whether or not the, the credit disaster that we almost had is over.
17:57 Speaker 02 And I would argue it's inconceivable to me that it is over, simply because you can't unsee a series of bank failures.
18:05 Speaker 01 Right.
18:06 Speaker 02 And if you know that you have an unlimited downside on a risk with very limited upside, why would you take that? And what's worse is now, think about it. Imagine that you're a regional bank and you had assumed you had a block of, of non-interest paying deposits that you could use and lean on for your funding and kept that kept your funding costs low. Well, your funding costs have just gone up massively. So you've got a sustainability problem. You've got a problem in sustaining your business model. You've got a problem in sustaining your profitability. And there are really good reasons why you'll be in defense mode going forward.
18:51 Speaker 02 And not just you, I would suggest everything in the shadow banking sector is also in defense mode. People having seen this kind of event will be quite cautious in, in rolling over existing risks.
19:06 Speaker 01 Harry, it's so interesting that you should make that point because it's precisely what Andreas Steno Larson was talking about in his most recent Steno's Signals, The Big Discrepancy Between East and West aired yesterday on Real Vision at four on 420. I want to take a look at this clip because it really makes precisely the same point that you're making right now. Let's take a look at it.
19:26 Speaker 03 So what we saw in March and April was this uptake in emergency lending from banks at the Federal Reserve, as a lender of last resort, stepped in with emergency liquidity when it was needed. And typically, what we see after a short while is that banks faced with liquidity issues and deposit flights tend to take very conservative decisions on their credit policies. And we have gathered evidence also of the past couple of weeks of very conservative decision making among large banks in the U.S., both for consumer credit, auto credit, and home credit. So I think the evidence is slowly but surely building now that the credit contraction
20:11 Speaker 03 will eventually unfold in the U.S. after a time lag, since the credit decisions are very conservative in banks. Also, small and medium sized companies, they tell us now in surveys that the availability of loans is less good than it was just a month or two ago. So that is ultimately what happens once liquidity stress hits financial markets. And therefore, when we look a bit ahead, I think the banking sentiment and the banking crisis is likely to worsen.
20:46 Speaker 01 Okay, so obviously, some bearish views from Andreas Stenos Larson, talking about this challenge where you essentially have this risk, heightened risk of credit contraction going forward after they have access to emergency liquidity. It's an interesting concept. Harry, what did you think about it? How does it jibe with your view or not?
21:05 Speaker 02 So I totally agree with Andreas in this case. I think that the Fed supplied all the liquidity the regional banks might need. The big banks didn't need it because they are systemically important. Everyone understands that they won't be allowed to fail. The scenario is unacceptable. But the regional banks are now looking at closer regulation. They're looking at more expensive capital, more expensive deposits. If rates stay where they are, they will slowly realize the capital losses that they would show if they marked their duration positions to market. So we will need rates to come down or all the regional banks, well, not all, but a fair number of regional banks will be questionable and the market will go on a
21:47 Speaker 02 seek and destroy mission for weaker banks, hence the incentive to stop lending and shore up capital positions. You guys have come across the joke about bears, haven't you? You know, being chased by a bear?
22:00 Speaker 01 I know precisely the joke.
22:02 Speaker 02 So two guys come across a bear in the in the woods and one guy drops to his knees and starts praying and the other guy starts lacing up his book, his boots. And the gentleman who's dropped to his knees and praying saying, oh, for goodness sakes, you don't really think you can outrun a bear. And his friend says, oh, no, I don't know. I can outrun a bear at all. However, I think I can outrun you. And this is the logic of the situation we find ourselves in now with the banking system. Weaker banks will be in trouble. So if you can put yourself to be in a stronger position than other regional banks by maybe cutting
22:44 Speaker 02 your lending, or maybe shifting your portfolio around to have better shorter duration bonds, more liquidity, then you can outrun, you can't outrun the market, but you can outrun the weaker banks until the Fed changes its mind. And I think that guarantees that the the weakness in the regional banks will remain. And what that really means is we have a situation where there's not really a good reason to lend, to do CRE lending, commercial real estate lending. It's not really a great reason to do residential lending either, except for the fact that a lot of residential lending comes from federal agencies. But that lending is slower. You have to dot I's and cross T's and it you don't transact huge portfolios.
23:29 Speaker 02 You don't certainly don't transact shopping malls, generally speaking.
23:32 Speaker 01 You're talking about the GSEs here, yeah, Fanny and Freddie?
23:34 Speaker 02 Yes, exactly. So agency, the agencies will continue to lend. So for conforming mortgages, we'll see that business continue. It'll slow down overall, though. And generally speaking now, we're going to reward banks that don't lend. And that that's a problem. We're going to see less real estate investment. And so GDP growth will weaken.
24:03 Speaker 01 Harry, what does this portend more broadly for equity markets for fixed income as we look, obviously, this sense of trying to search for direction, kind of a stagnant period right now in the S and P. How do you feel this carries over to equities?
24:19 Speaker 02 So it's a really good question here, which is, we've got quite a bearish view.
24:28 Speaker 02 We can see that we're in a bearish situation for the construction, for cyclical construction. We have an inventory cycle which is bearish. So why are equities so damn strong? And I can posit some arguments, I can't prove it, but one of the arguments I'd make isn't really made by me, it's made by a guy called Warren Mosler. He would point out to you that fiscal policy is more stimulative than it looks because higher rates with high
25:06 Speaker 02 debt to GDP levels are producing an awful lot of interest income for people who are now invested in government bonds or deposits or whatever, guaranteed deposits. So the amount of interest income, it's a very backward looking number that's produced on the Fred series, but this thing is, it looks like an exponential chart. We're seeing something like 865 billion annual rate of interest expense in the federal budget. That's a stimulative in flow of funds analysis, it's a kind of stimulus. Now, the counter argument to that is it's hardly a progressive stimulus. So you're basically putting huge amounts of
25:49 Speaker 02 money into wealthier
25:57 Speaker 02 into the portfolios of people who would normally spend on assets. They don't consume that money. So it's
26:05 Speaker 01 Important, important point here. I just want to double click on it because I think it's so important. Now, obviously, from one perspective, people will talk about the economic Inequality issue, which is certainly the case, but macroeconomists will look at this and say exactly what you just did, which is the difference between marginal propensity to save versus marginal propensity to consume. When a large portion of return goes into the hands of those who consume very little of their next marginal dollar earned. In other words, the next dollar they earn, what winds up happening is you don't have the kind of stimulative effect to growth. Whereas if you put it in the hands of working people, working people have unsatisfied needs. They get a little bit more money. They want to go out and spend it. They want to buy a bigger house, maybe start a small business, all of these kinds of things.
26:48 Speaker 01 When it's going to people who are essentially making money, they, I guess, the old fashioned word is the rentier class, making money on rents and basically clipping coupons from bonds. What winds up happening is it goes back into assets and you have this pro cyclical effect where you get even more asset price inflation as a consequence of that earning. And it turns out to be kind of a positive feedback loop that can be very negative for the economy.
27:13 Speaker 02 Well, thank God you completely get what I was saying because I was falling over my own words, but that's exactly what I was trying to get across. And you know, there's another effect right here, right now, which has also been stimulative. And I think it's just about to stop, but I could be wrong in that assessment. And that is the debt ceiling. If you think about it, the debt ceiling represents a restriction on federal borrowing, but it doesn't necessarily represent a restriction on federal spending. The U S T, US Treasury can go down the back of its sofa and find whatever casher can find from all sorts of places,
27:52 Speaker 02 including, say, the civil service pension fund or the social security trust fund. And it will borrow money from those places without actually hitting up investors for that cash. So you're getting additional spending, but without the additional bond market issuance. And that's got to be net stimulative for asset markets. Effectively, this is unfunded spending going right now. And you know, that situation will reverse. It will reverse when we get a resolution, the debt ceiling.
28:29 Speaker 02 And when we get that resolution, US Treasury and Janet Yellen will be back in those bond markets issuing all sorts of paper incredibly aggressively. So.
28:41 Speaker 02 Making up for lost time, I should say. So, right here, we've had quite a big stimulus to markets. You could argue it stimulated bond markets more than equity, but in practice, the markets are weighing mechanism and, you know, these are deep pools. I can see that at the margin, there's a little bit more money that can flow into equity markets because of this, and maybe that explains why equities have been so strong.
29:11 Speaker 01 Harry, I've got a question actually about equities. By the way, I should say, we're going to do a lot more questions after the jump when we go for Real Vision members, the second half of the show, the back nine, so to speak, the last 30 minutes of the show. But I wanted to give a couple of questions out here to some of the folks that are on YouTube because they're asking really good ones, Harry. Here's one that comes from YouTube 8848, and it's a very simple, very crisp question, only, only three words. I guess one of them's hyphenated. And the question is this, is tech overvalued?
29:41 Speaker 02 I think, you know, you've got to really look at each individual company and do an analysis based on that. Now, what do I think I, you know, I look at something like Nvidia, and it's really hard for me to not think that Nvidia is overvalued because I'm an L fart. And when I see 20 times revenue, a company trading on 20 times sales, I remind, I'm reminded of Cisco. Do you remember the speech that the CEO of Cisco gave before the dot com bust in like 2000, about 2000, I think he gave a speech?
30:21 Speaker 01 This was John Chambers, the then-
30:22 Speaker 02 Yeah. And he basically said, there is no way on earth, if you are expecting us to make a return on 20 times our sales, you are nuts, because no possible way that this company can generate that kind of a return on that. And sure enough, the, the stock collapsed, even though the company- Itself is just fine. The valuation of the company, the valuation of the company was way too rich.
30:56 Speaker 01 And by the way, I've got the chart in front of me right now. I don't think this quick, but I just wanted, I just want to describe for people what we're looking at here. It peaks in April of 2000, which was the sort of the epicenter of the valuations bubble on the dot com bubble. At it looks like about 80 bucks a share, give you some idea, a little context right now. Great company, done great things, obviously. Has a huge presence in the router space right now, trading at $47, some 23 years later. So that gives you a sense of just how overvalued this company was.
31:28 Speaker 02 Valuations can be very high. And then we have things like Google. So I'm not an equity analyst. In fact, I'm a terrible equity investor. I don't, don't listen to me on equities. I don't know what I'm talking about, but I look at Google and I think to myself. That Google has some excellent businesses, but those businesses are potentially threatened by new innovations. I read a headline today about chat GPS and the fact that it's can revolution potentially revolutionize such.
31:58 Speaker 02 Very richly valued companies, trading on very high multiples. In a market where everyone knows these companies don't need finance, they have a huge advantage over companies that do need finance.
32:12 Speaker 02 They can get, they can get too expensive. It's possible.
32:16 Speaker 01 Well, let me just say, just a quick shameless plug. If you're interested in learning more about chat GPT. I did a conversation on the Real Vision platform with an AI developer, former Google engineer, former Microsoft engineer. Named Mikhail Voloshin. Right now it's live on the Real Vision platform. We actually walked through, Harry, you get to take a look at this video because it's just incredible. We actually walked through a demo of chat GPT where Mikhail is telling it, hey, produce some marketing copy. Hey, produce some code. I want to fly a spaceship to Mars. Show me what it would look like if you were to write Python code that would calculate the orbit. And it just spits out code. I mean, you see this technology, it's just extraordinary. And boy, from a macroeconomic perspective. There's going to be some wild stuff that's going to come in terms of labor saving as a result of this technology.
33:00 Speaker 01 I mean, everybody who looks at this, who's serious about it has just seen this incredibly striking opportunity. I should say, we're going to have a lot more opportunity to continue this conversation. Harry, any final thoughts you'd like to give before we switch over to the next half of this show?
33:18 Speaker 02 I would, the thing I would emphasize right here, right now is the best earns hedge funds back in two thousand, July two thousand and seven. In July two thousand and seven, we had a credit event take place. Bestens had two mortgage-backed security hedge funds fail. However, the failure of the best earns hedge funds did not mark an immediate collapse. The market bled out below the surface for a long time before people recognized that in fact, it was going to be really, really hard to refinance mortgage-backed securities
33:56 Speaker 02 and position and distribute these securities. So you can have a credit event below the surface, even while everything looks fine.
34:09 Speaker 01 Yeah, you sure can. That event happened in July, I believe, of two thousand and seven, and the ultimate Lehman bankruptcy, the sort of the nadir of that moment was September fifteenth of two thousand and eight. So there you have it, about fourteen months in between those two events, a pretty striking way to end this half hour. So that wraps it up for this half hour on the Real Vision Daily Briefing. We're of course going to continue this conversation on the Real Vision platform. Listen, if you're not a member, click the link in the description or scan the QR code on the screen and join this incredible community, especially if you want to continue this conversation, a great conversation with Harry Melandri. With that, let's turn it over to the back half of the other side of the platform. We'll see you soon. If you are leaving us on YouTube and if you're joining us, the conversation very much continues.
34:55 Speaker 00 Thanks for joining us today. Just a reminder, the Real Vision Daily Briefing is in partnership with the Gold Investment Letter, helping sophisticated investors successfully navigate capital markets and maximize profits in gold, silver, and mining stocks. GIL discovers the most undervalued companies and isolates special situations in the mining sector for their members, breaking down unique topics such as investor psychology, portfolio management, and macroeconomic trends with a goal of drastically improving investment returns. Sign up for this free e-letter for immediate action. GoldInvestmentLetter.com.
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