Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing Peter Zeihan on the Israel-Hamas War About this episode 🚀 The Exponentialist - Become a charter member https://rvtv.io/3FAb8hjGeopolitical strategist and author Peter Zeihan joins Maggie Lake to unpack the complex geopolitical landscape. They look at the most recent developments in Israel and how this could impact the Russia-Ukraine war, discuss where China stands amid Middle East tensions, and explore how technology is changing the face of global warfare. Unlock the potential to showcase your brand to our global audience. Contact us at partnerships@realvision.com for advertising inquiries. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 13,837 words · 3 speakers
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1:39 Speaker 01 Hi, everyone. Welcome. With me today is Peter Zion, president and founder of Zion on Geopolitics. Hi, Peter. It's great to have you back on Real Vision.
1:47 Speaker 02 Hey, hey, it's great to be back.
1:48 Speaker 01 We were just commenting, you're joining us from the road, which is kind of where you're living at the moment because it's so busy. And of course, there is just so much tension right now on the geopolitical front, right? I'm going to date stamp this because some people will watch it afterwards. So it's Wednesday, October 18th, 2023, and we have a very tense situation in the Middle East, Israel and Hamas. Hamas at war, US President Joe Biden is visiting Israel right now. We have protests breaking out across the Middle East. So let's start with that. And how are you thinking about the next chapters here as we are facing a potential Israeli invasion? What are the potential scenarios we need to be considering around this?
2:32 Speaker 02 Well, unfortunately, there's really only one scenario that we need to look at, and that's the ground invasion of Gaza. The Israeli intelligence system clearly screwed up and missed what has been the largest operation in this area in at least the last 30 years, arguably since the independence of Israel in the first place. And it was a topic that supposedly this was the only thing that the Israeli intelligence services were watching. So the degree that the Israeli government dropped the ball is extreme. This isn't like 9/11 where it was a Hail Mary from a different hemisphere. This is stuff that was happening directly under their nose where they're supposed to be watching every single day. And the only way that the Israelis now can deal with it is to roll into Gaza and go house to house.
3:16 Speaker 02 Because if they had good intel on where these people were, then the attacks would have never happened in the first place. So they've got to do it the old fashioned way. And that means sifting through an area with a population of 2.3 million people in order to find the perpetrators and to rip up Hamas by the roots. There is no way that that is pretty.
3:38 Speaker 01 Yeah, and I think that's what the concern is. We were seeing it already, right? Terrible civilian casualties, humanitarian crisis at the borders they try to do this. So one of the questions we we've received a lot, I'm sure you're getting a lot, is what are the odds this spreads beyond Israel and Hamas? And other countries become embroiled in it?
4:00 Speaker 02 Probably relatively low. Egypt is a security partner of the Israelis, has been for 30 years. And they used to control the Gaza Strip between 1949 and 1973, and they hated it. So there's no love lost between the Palestinians and the Egyptians. And while the Egyptians will not say this publicly, they are Thrilled with what is about to happen. Oh. Yeah, Jordan is a satellite state of Israel that is basically paid for with international aid primarily from the United States. So that's not a security threat either. Syria is in a civil war. They don't have the capacity to control their own territory, much less do something at the goal on. That that just leaves Lebanon, which is a failed state.
4:43 Speaker 02 And while Hezbollah has some teeth, what they don't have is an army. So they might be able to launch some rockets over and that might cause some heartburn in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. But it's not a traditional invasion. So from the Israeli point of view, all of the the local states are are known quantities. Uh, the only questions that matter then are Iran and Saudi Arabia. Uh, in the case of the Iranians. They have some missiles that could reach Iran, but nothing that can change the balance of forces on the ground. They certainly can't deploy an army because they'd have to go through Iraq and Syria just to get there in the first place. That's well beyond their capabilities. And then there's Saudi Arabia.
5:24 Speaker 02 Now, the Saudis have been pushing for a direct alliance with the Israelis. They've been quiet security partners for the last twenty years. Uh, basically, whenever the United States has some said something less than complimentary about the Saudis or the Israelis, the two of them get closer together. And Israel has become a transit point for American weapons, technology and training into Saudi Arabia now for quite some time. And they were trying to formalize that relationship. The question now is whether that's still going to move forward. And that is subject to an internal debate within Riyadh that's intergenerational. The king's generation, the older folks, like the idea of the Palestinian cause.
6:06 Speaker 02 And thought that any deal that was going to proceed had to include something for the Palestinians as well. The younger generation that includes the crown prince thinks the opposite. Thinks that the Palestinians are wastes of skin and just need to be disappeared into history. So they can get on with the real work of Saudi power. And so they are now having a debate internally about how seriously to take this. And when they're done with that debate, which will probably be within a month. We're going to have a very firm idea of what Saudi plans are for the next twenty years.
6:38 Speaker 01 So that's very interesting, and I think that is the optics traditionally. I mean, we see the protests happening everywhere. What are the complications for the Saudis if they decide to go in that direction? It is a break with the past. How does that sit with within the dynamics of the Middle East?
6:56 Speaker 02 Well, keep in mind that the Middle East is run by a series of autocrats. So you've got your political elite, in the case of the Saudis, the royal family, who control all the lovers of power. And then you have the street that has to be managed. And obviously, the street is boiling right now. But this isn't the first time this has happened. And it is very, very, very rare that the street can actually overthrow the elite, because the elite controls all the security services, all the guns, and generally, they have no problem shooting their own people. Also, remember that the street in Saudi Arabia is fat. The national security strategy of most of the Gulf states is to give their people heart disease so they can't protest. And the Saudis have been very, very successful at that.
7:40 Speaker 01 So we have a question from Ian, because we're doing this live. Appreciate your questions on the platform. If Hamas is removed, what comes after that? Do we get a power vacuum? So if the Israelis have no choice to move in, what happens to that region?
7:59 Speaker 02 That'll be up to the Israelis. It's going to go one of two directions. Either the Israelis are going to directly occupy it in perpetuity, in which case they will be fighting a series of guerrilla wars against the local population forever. Or they clear out Hamas and then go home, rebuild the wall, and Hamas Mark II takes control. Either way, you're looking at a humanitarian disaster for this region for the foreseeable future.
8:27 Speaker 01 And what about the US role in it? So President Biden went over. A lot of people were surprised at that move. What do you make of that? And what are the implications?
8:37 Speaker 02 One of the fun things about Joe Biden is because he's older than the pyramids. He's seen the long stretch of history here. And he has come to a lot of conclusions about who the powers are worth sticking with over the long term, once you like just kind of wave the bullshit away. And in his view, Israel, for all of its warts, and there are many, is still the only Western-oriented country, is still the only country with the concept of human rights, is still the only country with a modern economy that can look after itself for the most part, is still the only democracy. And while it is flawed by all of those measures, it is better than Egypt, or Lebanon, or Syria, or Jordan.
9:19 Speaker 02 And so if you have to choose, you might as well choose publicly and boldly. And that's exactly what he's done. Will that generate complications down the right line? Yeah, it's going to generate complications tomorrow. But making it very clear where the United States stands and the pecking order of this and other regions, you got to admit, it's kind of refreshing compared to the presidents we've had for the last 25 years.
9:43 Speaker 01 What are the complications? What's the risk of him doing this?
9:47 Speaker 02 Well, the United States has been trying to get out of the Middle East for the last 20 years. We finally pulled it off under Biden. It was a mess with the Afghanistan withdrawal, but it freed up American strategic bandwidth for other things. Biden's now making it very clear that he doesn't really care what happens to the Palestinians. Because Israel is the friend, Israel is the family, Israel is the ally. That means that we are going to be in a situation where the street, and to a lesser degree, the elites of this entire region know exactly where they stand in American eyes, and that is going to force them to take certain policy changes that we're going to perceive as anti-American. Now, I would argue that under the surface, we were already there.
10:30 Speaker 02 I mean, let's be honest, most of the Arab world aren't friendly, and they're certainly not what I would consider pro-American. But it's the United States establishing itself as a power broker without being a manager. And the Middle East has not not had, I'm sorry, let me phrase it differently. The Middle East has not had this sort of strategic power vacuum for a very long time. It's going to lead to a lot of these smaller powers taking matters into their own hands. That's going to generate a lot more hot conflict. In the case of Israel, that's just an issue for Palestinians. But for the case of the Saudis, that means all of a sudden they have to seriously consider arming themselves.
11:12 Speaker 02 For the Egyptians, it means that they're kind of on their own and they're going to also have to make public stances vis a vis Israel and show exactly where they stand. It's a bracing moment. And it's, this region has always been a mess. Biden's basically calling it a mess and picking sides. From a train wreck fascination point of view, this is going to get really interesting.
11:41 Speaker 01 Hey, everyone, we're going to take a quick break right now to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing. So you think that they can position themselves because some people, as a power broker and not a manager, so I'm assuming no boots on the ground, no presence, but picking sides. Some people would say America's ability to even do that is weakened to say that they're a power broker when you've got China in the wings. In fact, we had a very specific question about this and I'm going to read it. Some of you sent messages in ahead of time, DM'd me, which I appreciate.
12:25 Speaker 01 And this one is, so there's been speculation swirling and I'm going to caveat this, by the way, we're going to take questions, whether they seem conspiratorial, where they're getting the information.
12:35 Speaker 02 It's the Middle East, there's going to be a lot of conspiracy no matter what.
12:38 Speaker 01 And I'm not, I'm just giving voice to some of the, some of the sort of comments coming in from viewers. We're not saying one way or the other, how we feel about this. I just want to make it clear because obviously this is very fraught, right? But there's been speculation swirling about how China has been indirectly supporting Hamas by selling weapons and providing funding to Iran. There's also been talk of how a Chinese think tank back in spring of 2003 boasted that China would benefit working behind the scenes from conflicts in Europe, Middle East and Asia. To weaken the US geopolitically so that they, as we know this is coming, ultimately make their move on Taiwan. Let's separate that out for a second because we're going to dive into China later. But is this, do all of these issues that are going on weaken the US to a point where they're not really in a position to be a power broker?
13:24 Speaker 02 No, I haven't seen anything so far that really hurts the United States at this point. In the aftermath of the war on terror, we've got a million man army, or excuse me, a million man military that has now had three years to rest, recruit and rearm, absorb the lessons and get ready for what's next. We're not going to be putting boots on the grounds in the Israeli area, certainly not in Palestine. So there's no real issue there. Also, because the United States is not involved in any sort of meaningful conflict at the time, we easily have the capacity of intervening indirectly with military support, special forces, finance, intelligence in a dozen areas at once. So I'm not really concerned at all about limitations on American power
14:03 Speaker 02 at the moment. Now, the idea that China would benefit from crises elsewhere in the world is not one to reject out of hand. Because the idea is if the US is obsessed with this, that and the other thing, that maybe we'll miss things like Taiwan. But until you actually have boots on the ground, that is not the case. So during the war on terror, it would have been impossible for the United States to engage another part of the world with 100,000 troops because all of our deployable forces were already in play. That's not the case today. So they would have to bait us into multiple hot conflicts where we were actually involved with the shooting. We're nowhere close to that. That's not going to be Ukraine
14:43 Speaker 02 as long as Ukraine is alive. That's kind of piece one. Piece two, I'm not sure the Chinese are capable of even having that conversation internally right now. Chairman Xi has so destroyed the capacity of the Chinese government to even think. He has purged local governments and regional governments and now the academic situation and the business community to such a degree that there is now no one within the Chinese system who will bring him information. This isn't a Trump problem where he doesn't want to be surrounded by people. People who will speak truth to power. This is more of an Obama situation where he doesn't want to communicate with anyone. And so he is making decisions in the dark based on no information flows.
15:28 Speaker 02 We now know, for example, from the aftermath of that balloon situation, that he didn't even have awareness that the balloon existed until after it was shot down. He has so truncated himself. And so within the Chinese bureaucracy, there's no decision-making capacity except for Xi. And Xi doesn't have the information he needs to make decisions or even be aware that a decision needs to be made. So any Chinese involvement here is a degree legacy from before the information system completely broke down. So if you want to say they're selling weapons to Iran and Iran sending weapons to Palestine, you know, there might be something to that, but there's no brains behind it. This is just bureaucratic inertia at this point.
16:12 Speaker 01 So how do you be so sure that Xi is so isolated? How do we know that? It's so hard to get information from China. How do we know that to be true?
16:19 Speaker 02 I would say that the single biggest indicator we got is when Secretary Blinken was finally, like two, three months after the balloon incident, finally able to get into China and he discovered that the foreign minister didn't even have access to Xi.
16:32 Speaker 01 Hmm. So I think there is some concern about what you're saying, but flipped that could the generals just do something? Could some, much like with the balloon, do something without the sort of, you know, authority and full weight of the Chinese government and inadvertently start something in Taiwan or start something somewhere else?
16:54 Speaker 02 I, I think that's a bigger risk. Keep in mind that the same purge that has gone on throughout the bureaucracy has not left the military unaffected. And for the balloon situation, for example, it wasn't their military. It was some asshat in the intelligence director who just thought that this is how we stick it to the Americans.
17:15 Speaker 01 I'm gonna have to use that phrase somewhere today, too.
17:18 Speaker 02 It's a non-zero risk and our intelligence services are capable of monitoring those people because they're having conversations. You can't bug Xi's phone because he never talks to anyone. I don't want to say it can't happen, but Xi has purged talent out of the military as well. And so if, if someone in China did pull the trigger, you would expect to see a relatively similar breakdown in the decision-making within the military that we're seeing within the bureaucracy, and it probably wouldn't go as well as a lot of people think it would.
17:51 Speaker 01 So if we, we're gonna go back to China, but just to circle up on, on the, the conflict that's right in front of us right now. So the Joe Biden sort of being sort of outward about what everyone thinks is going on, kind of positioning the US as a power broker in, in your line of thinking. But is there political will at home? So the military's rested. We still have might. What about what's going on here? I mean, we have not, not, no functioning Congress right now. As we speak, there's attempts to find a, a new House Speaker, but they're failing, but they'll find one. But we are obviously twisted up in our own political
18:32 Speaker 01 problems. We see the Republicans pushing back hard on continued aid to Ukraine. Forget about anything else. There seems to be so many divisions here. Is the, is the US on a path to become more isolationist? Biden might not be. The White House administration may not be. But what about Congress? And what about the American people? Is there support for us to be a power broker, a police officer, be that, sort of have that role on the global stage anymore? Even if you think that we can sort of get other people to think that? What about internally?
19:04 Speaker 02 Keep in mind that aside from providing intelligence and equipment, the Biden administration has not moved us closer to being in any sort of meaningful conflict with anyone. This is probably what we're seeing is, is a, the, under Trump and under Biden, the building of the new template, where the US regularly puts its finger on the scales, but doesn't actually put boots on the ground. So the risk is to be borne by foreign partners. The fighting is to be done by foreign partners. So we're not going to have troops in Ukraine. We're not going to have troops in Gaza. But we are perfectly willing to step in with military assistance and intelligence in order to help certain players that we want to do better. That is probably what we're going to be doing for the next 20 years, regardless of who wins the next presidency.
19:47 Speaker 02 As for decision making within the United States, yeah, Congress is kind of a mess right now. And that's going to last for a while. We're going through our once every generation or two political reshufflings, when the factions that make up the parties move around. And at times like that, you get these little cliques, like the Jim Jordan clique or the Matt Gaetz clique, who rise to prominence because the party is no longer capable of policing its own. We're seeing the same thing on the Democratic side. It's just because they're in the minority, it's not as loud. That will last until such time as the factions settle into a new format. And I think that's still going to take at least another three or four years. I don't think it's going to happen before this presidential cycle is finished.
20:31 Speaker 02 If you look at this as objectively as you can, the very short version is that the Trump administration, by elevating the populists, pushed the business community and the national security community out of the Republican coalition. So they've effectively become swing voters. And with all this churn now, Congress is going to have a very difficult time doing anything until such time as the party structure settles into a format that is more appropriate for the environment that we're in. If I were a betting man, I would guess that this is the moment that a third party of disaffected Republicans forms and then sucks in a lot of moderate Democrats to become the balance of power within Congress. We're not there yet.
21:15 Speaker 02 A lot of these disaffected Republicans haven't quite come to the conclusion that they are no longer functionally party members. But I think we're going to get there in the next two years.
21:26 Speaker 01 I mean, there has been talk of a third party in the US forever. And it never happens because of the way the primary voting is set up. It's just the money that's needed. So, you know, some people saying unless you have campaign finance reform, you're just not going to be able, we've had the billionaires try to run, but they don't have enough appeal and it's still, there's just a lot of logistics.
21:46 Speaker 02 A third party that can capture the presidency, I agree. I don't think that can happen. But this is the seventh time we've gone through one of these transitions. And in the first three, we definitely got a third party that formed. And then one of those three parties died. In the more recent three, what's happened is there was an evolution within the coalitions and the factions switched side. What we're going through right now is a lot more similar to the first three. Because right now, the core, the decision makers, the old school Republicans have been ejected from their own institution. And these are people who have the money, who have the skill set, who know how to work together, and above all, have never not been part of a political coalition.
22:30 Speaker 02 So they're kind of having this allergic response to being out of power completely. That's going to trigger them to do something that from our point of view today, might be a little unprecedented. But if you look back historically, we've done this three times before.
22:45 Speaker 01 Yeah, we just don't, we don't look back historically often enough. It seems it's a recency bias, right? So, um, as we try to figure out the future now, because it's a sort of a moment where we will see changes in the Middle East. Who stands to benefit from this? Is Saudi Arabia now the power to be reckoned with? And, and is there an energy implication to all of this?
23:10 Speaker 02 Well, that is certainly Mohammed bin Salman's plan. If, if, if the Saudis decide to ignore the Palestinians and just cut the deal with the Israelis, they're perfectly capable of managing their own street. And then you have this bilateral alliance within the region that takes the most technological power and merges it with the largest regional economy and the world's largest oil producer. Now, that, that's, that's a powerful partnership. And if the Saudis do manage to move on from the Palestinians, and the Emiratis already have, the Moroccans already have, the Egyptians already have, and that would probably Triggered the Omanis and the Kuwaitis and all the others to join as well. So if this sticks.
23:52 Speaker 02 Uh, you're talking about the Israelis in the Arab world, more or less strategically being on the same side. And at that point, it doesn't really matter what the Americans do. In fact, that would allow the Americans just to step back and allow the region to take care of Iran. From our point of view, that might be the least bad outcome.
24:11 Speaker 01 And what about energy?
24:13 Speaker 02 Well, the United States.
24:14 Speaker 01 Is there a threat? Because I think people thought, looking on the face of this, not that initial headline, based on what used to happen when there's conflict in the Middle East, that oil was going to go through the roof. We haven't seen that happen yet, but but how does energy play into this?
24:29 Speaker 02 Uh, well, again, it's Saudis. I mean, Palestine and to a lesser degree, Israel, you know, not an oil producer or an oil consumer or an oil transit point. So back in nineteen seventy-three with the Yom Kippur War, that is where the Saudis, under the older generation, took a strong stance for the Palestinians and against the West when it came to energy policy. That created OPEC, that created all the pain that is still kind of lingering in the back of our lizard brain. But that hasn't been relevant for thirty years. So what we saw during the late nineteen nineties and the very early two thousands is every time something would cook off in the Palestinian territories, oil prices would go up just out of emotion.
25:10 Speaker 02 But once we had the nine eleven assault and the Iraq war and the coup in Venezuela, or the coup attempt in Venezuela, the oil markets kind of wizened up and like, okay, there are a lot bigger things going on here that have a very real impact on this market than stone throwers in the West Bank. And so over the next twenty years, the Palestinians just vanished from the scene as a factor in energy. Uh, and what we're seeing today is an underlining that that is still the case. So if there is going to be an oil shock, it will not have anything to do with Palestine or Israel. It will be about the Saudi response to what's going on in Palestine and Israel. And at the moment, we're still waiting for that intergenerational argument to be shaken out.
25:53 Speaker 02 If the king wins, well, it was the king's generation that played a role in the formation of OPEC. And it will not be quiet if it goes that direction.
26:05 Speaker 01 Does the Netanyahu government survive this?
26:07 Speaker 02 No.
26:09 Speaker 01 Why not?
26:10 Speaker 02 There is a large faction of the population in Israel that are basically wards of the state. They're ultra orthodox, they study the Torah, they have low taxes and high subsidies and so a very high population growth, lots of kids. And they now have been sufficiently strong at the polls to generate a significant amount of the factions that are part of the Netanyahu government. And to be perfectly blunt, most of them are, most of them are wastes of skin. They've never had a real job, they've never been in business, their education is purely religious, it's not based on politics or geography or economics or anything. And they're ministers. And they have been on watch while this attack manifested.
26:55 Speaker 02 And the credibility hit to them with the overall population in Israel is crippling. So I don't know how long this government can last, but I know that this specific government will fall because they have proven they're incapable of running the country without a lot more practice at doing something else. Now, whether Bibi falls or comes back in the next election, who knows? That dude is a political survivor, do not write him off. But this specific coalition government, yeah, it is not long for this world.
27:24 Speaker 01 Does Biden's visit there make it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to, to continue on those talks with Israel? I mean, the relationship between the US and Saudis have not been great.
27:36 Speaker 02 Yeah, well, I would say if you're Mohammed bin Salman, this is great because it's showing the writing on the wall and what their Americans want. And so, you know, you can either align yourself with that or align yourself against that. The older generation, this is going to be more complicated because if there's one thing that everyone in Saudi Arabia recognizes is that they're fat and they're lazy and they're incapable of defending themselves. They have to have a security guarantor. And if they side against Israel in this fight publicly and loudly, well, that'll never be the United States or Israel then. And all of a sudden, then they've got to find someone else, anyone else. And all of the other options are messy.
28:16 Speaker 01 China.
28:18 Speaker 02 China doesn't have the capability to project power to the Gulf.
28:22 Speaker 01 Well, you know, there was all these talk about yuan being priced, oil being priced in yuan and the Chinese laying this, the groundwork for the moment when Saudis would turn to them. You don't think that that, any of that bears fruit?
28:37 Speaker 02 The, the, well, there, there's a relationship there. I don't mean to suggest they hate each other. They don't. It's a business relationship, though. The Saudis know that the Chinese don't have the military capacity to project past Taiwan, much less all the way to the Persian Gulf. But they also recognize that the Chinese are the world's largest oil importer and the Chinese recognize that the Saudis are the world's largest oil exporter. So the idea that the two of them want to have some sort of corporate economic relationship is equally silly. But there's only so far that you can take that. And as for the denomination issue, the Chinese were very clear at the BRICS summit. They had no interest in a post-dollar world. It's just, that wasn't picked up by US finance because it doesn't match the de-dollarization
29:22 Speaker 02 drama mantra that we're all talking about here. It's really not a discussion in Beijing or in Johannesburg or in New Delhi. But the only one, the only country that feels that they have a strategic interest in a non-dollar world are the Russians and they just want everyone to use the ruble, which is of course stupid.
29:42 Speaker 01 We're going to take another quick break to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
29:53 Speaker 01 So you completely reject this, because that de-dollarization theme is strong.
29:58 Speaker 02 It's strong. It's strong in your world and nowhere else.
30:02 Speaker 01 Right. Yeah. Interesting. Because we hear a lot about the weaponization of the dollar, the, you know, the, the US using SWIFT as the beginning of the end of the reign of the dollar.
30:15 Speaker 02 There's got to be an alternative. The yuan is not internationally exchanged. The rupee is a very soft currency. The Russian system is under sanctions and the Brazilians have no idea what they're doing.
30:29 Speaker 02 There is no alternative here at all. The closest would have been the euro, but 10 years ago, when they were having their financial crisis, they started confiscating insured banks' deposits to pay for their bailouts, which eliminated any possibility of it ever being the euro. And in the aftermath of the sanctions on Russia, the euro and the yen are de facto subsidiaries of the US dollar now. I mean, there's not even anyone who's pretending that they might be next.
30:54 Speaker 01 So Edward, I think we answered part of your question with China's role in the conflict and strategic objectives, but Edward was also asking about Russia. So this has, in many ways, of course, obscured all headlines about what's happening in Ukraine. I mentioned before that there's been pushback from the Republicans and members of Congress about continuing to fund that. What is this? How does this situation in the Middle East now impact the conflict in Ukraine?
31:24 Speaker 02 Well, it's definitely a problem because it's a distraction. There is no economic outcome from the Gaza operation. It's a non-factor economically and from a strategic point of view for the United States, it's also a non-factor. The only way it matters is through second, third, and fourth degree steps, none of which are guaranteed to happen, none of which are likely to happen. But Ukraine, Ukraine, a couple orders of magnitude more important. This is the ninth war that the Russians have launched since 1991 and in an attempt to reshape their neighborhood. And if they succeed in Ukraine, Ukraine doesn't solve their strategic problems. They're trying to build a better external crustal defense.
32:08 Speaker 02 Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland solved that problem. So if Ukraine falls, we will have a different war and one where the United States will have boots on the ground and nukes will fly. So blocking the Russians from advancing past Ukraine is a core national interest to the United States. In addition, the economics of this speak for themselves. You've got the world's number one wheat exporter and number five wheat exporter locked in a war. It involves the world's largest and third largest Sources of potash fertilizer, it involves the world's second largest sources of oil and natural gas. The economics of this are immense. And so you can, I can think of no better way
32:49 Speaker 02 of showing you that everyone who was Republican who could do math has been ejected from the party than talking about how Republicans are now against assisting a country that is a democracy have failed, an economic conduit that's critical in order to hold back a irredentist power that holds huge control over wide swaths of the global economic system. I mean, it's like this is should be the type of conflicts that traditional Republicans are all about because it stops so many things. But instead, we've got this wing of the party that has managed to take over and clearly can't find Canada on a map or do basic math.
33:28 Speaker 01 And so, but that's important. I mean, this is, you know, we're going into an election year, and they have a very loud megaphone that they're speaking through. So what does that mean for the future of US support for Ukraine?
33:41 Speaker 02 We will find a way to make it work because the alternative is to risk losing American cities. We found out in the Battle of Kiev that the Russians were incompetent at modern warfare. They're not any good at logistics. Their training was atrocious. And the fact that you've got Ukraine, which functionally didn't have a military on the first day of this war, but it still exists, is a testament, not necessarily to Ukrainian pluck and creativity, but Russian absolute and utter incompetence. And so if we see the Russians prevail in Ukraine, when they reach the NATO border, a fight between the NATO forces, who are the best in the world, and the
34:21 Speaker 02 Russians, who are definitely in the bottom half, would be a bloodbath. And the Russians would be obliterated. But that doesn't change any of their strategic needs. And so nukes would come into play. And the Biden administration, because it's led by a guy who predates the splitting of the atom, knows this in his gut. And we will find a way to make it work.
34:44 Speaker 01 That's a terrifying prospect because what you're saying is that they will be backed up against a wall and they will use nuclear weapons against American cities. Is that what you're?
34:54 Speaker 02 Yeah, the Russian demographic is one of the worst in the world. This is their last generation where they can try to use conventional military force to reshape it. They know that this is their last ship. They know that this is their last decade as a coherent conventional military power, despite all their flaws. And so they're going to push until they get to a border system that they can hold with a degrading internal system. That goes all the way to Warsaw.
35:20 Speaker 01 So every time I talk to you, Peter, your turn of phrase is so funny, but what you're saying is so terrifying that I feel like I'm simultaneously like want to cry and laugh at the same time.
35:29 Speaker 02 Good. The alternative is to just cry.
35:32 Speaker 01 Yeah, it's true. Actually, you and I were talking about a little bit about just the sort of mental strain of having to hold all of this for everyone, you know, to watch this and try to figure out the future. And Roy, I appreciate your comment saying, how can we cope? Like, what are the choices do we have to cope? Well, we'll talk about that in a little bit. But it is, all of this is so very, very serious, what we're talking about. So is the US military aware of this? And in what role would they play? Because presumably, if they believe what you just laid out, the scenario you laid out, which is that the use of nuclear weapons is a real threat from Russia, they do not have a US
36:13 Speaker 01 Congress that's listening and may or may not have the next president who's listening. What's happening on the US military front?
36:21 Speaker 02 Sure. Well, I'm not worried about the next election. I'm pretty confident that Trump is going to face a landslide defeat. We can go into the logic of that later if you want to.
36:28 Speaker 01 Yes, we will.
36:29 Speaker 02 Okay. But on the military question, there's a reason that the Biden administration has fast-tracked absolutely everything involving missile defense.
36:40 Speaker 02 By the books, by the numbers, we certainly don't have enough missile defense to protect against a broad-spectrum Russian strike. However, keep this in mind: every weapon system, every economic system that the Russians have used in the last two years has failed pretty dramatically. To think that all of the nukes are the one thing that works to spec, I think, is, takes a little bit of analytical creativity. I would argue that the concern that this administration is going to have to deal with is what happens if we get to that point and Putin hits the big candy red button and nothing happens? How, what do you do with someone who attempts to kill a half a billion people but fails?
37:23 Speaker 01 I can't believe we're having this conversation. But that's, that's the, I, I think this is the, it underlines the seriousness of, you know, a, a, a sort of squabbling that's happening in DC because these are, these are the very, you know, even if you don't buy into, even if you don't buy into your theory, these are the stakes of what we're dealing with on a, on a global level. And we can't seem to, you know, we can't even move forward with any legislation. It's a little bit terrifying.
37:50 Speaker 02 Basically, what the Biden administration is dealing with is four, the four previous administrations abdicated pretty much all global involvement. And while I can argue that the United States, because of its insulation and its economic structure and its demographic patterns, is actually in a really good spot for not just today, but for the long term, that does mean that there are a lot of things that have gone down, that we've lost the ability to influence easily. This is one of them. Our biggest failure, biggest failure of the Clinton administration specifically, was ignoring the Soviet collapse and not managing the fallout, and we are still paying for that. We are still trying to clean that up.
38:30 Speaker 01 So General Mark Milley, former Chairman of Joint Chief of Staffs, has been making the rounds and was just, I think, on 60 Minutes and warned about the changes that technology is bringing to the battlefield, specifically drones. We've seen them in Ukraine. I believe they were used in the Hamas attack, but they certainly have risen, you know, in everyone's mind now about how... And now add on AI to that. We know the Chinese have been investing massively, we think, in the use of AI military. The general certainly thinks that they have done that. How does this change the calculus of war? Because if we're talking about shooting nukes, that seems very old school. But what about the
39:14 Speaker 01 threat? How do you contain this kind of technological threat that maybe you don't need the kind of apparatus and money that you used to? Doesn't that sort of make it a far more dangerous landscape?
39:26 Speaker 02 It certainly makes it messier. So until very recently, the United States was the only player in the game when it came to drones. We had drones of every size, from things the size of a grasshopper to things the size of a 737. What is unique about the American drone system, and so what we thought was true about all drone systems, was that they were expensive and they were in small numbers. American technology, when it comes to the military, has always been about quality over quantity. Because wherever we go in the world, we will always be hideously outnumbered. So we've got to be able to punch harder at a further distance. And that's the Reapers, and that's the Predators, and that's the Special Forces drones, all of that. What we have seen in the last few years,
40:11 Speaker 02 however, is that there's a cheap approach, that there's nothing about the technology that says it has to be top-notch. And if you make 50 really, really cheap ones, you can still do a lot of damage. Now, for the United States, I'd say that kind of the problems fall into two general categories. The number one is the new Joint Strike Fighter, which is supposed to be our only airborne weapons platform for the next 20 years. Its range is somewhat limited, and those little Iranian moped drones have greater range than the Joint Strike Fighter. So all of a sudden now, our weapons platform...
40:47 Speaker 02 To be perfectly blundered, broadly useless. Because if they were to launch a thousand of those things at a base where the JSF was based, one of them is going to get through, no matter how good your defenses are. So that limits the sort of military activity the United States can do. Largely removes our ability to have air cover from ground installations. We'll have to do it only from naval platforms.
41:10 Speaker 02 The second problem we've got is anyone can do this. I mean Hamas is many things, but an economic player, no. A technological player, no. And the fact that you can basically put these together in your garage and launch them by the dozens makes for a different sort of conflict. Now that works both ways. And what the United States military is doing is something called the replicator initiative, where it will basically start using American resource scale to build Hamas-style drones. And the goal is to be able to independently attack 2,000 Chinese targets and destroy them within 24 hours using our naval platforms. So basically, things like destroyers and God forbid carriers
41:55 Speaker 02 just carry tens, if not hundreds of thousands of these things. And we just lost, launch a locust swarm. So two can play by this game. But it does mean that the military tactics that we use are going to have to evolve. Instead of having a very large, I'm sorry, a very small number of very high-end military vehicles, you just launch a cloud of very low-end stuff that is attritable and disposable.
42:21 Speaker 02 I don't think people have thought through how much that adds gives the advantage to a country like the United States. We will have to fight differently. And kind of the sunk costs that we've put into some of these technologies are suddenly going to become very questionable. But there is no country in the world that can adapt in the way the United States can. So let's say two years from now, we have a direct fight between the Americans and the Chinese. Sure, they can build a lot of drones. But they have to target something that they can't see and that can move. And AI is nowhere close to being able to target things over the horizon, where they have to do a search pattern. Whereas the US Navy is going to know exactly where their targets are. They're on land with satellite recon, we can find them. And we just launched 10,000 drones at whatever it happens to be.
43:06 Speaker 02 So. This is a really, really bad development for the Russias and the Chinas and the Iran's of the world, getting the Americans to think about this differently. Is our ability to adapt to that environment, combined with our mobile firepower of the Navy, that's going to be crippling for all of them.
43:25 Speaker 01 I think it's probably safe to say this is a bad development for humanity, but point taken on the military advantage.
43:31 Speaker 02 It's just part of the process.
43:33 Speaker 01 So, we were talking about the military capability and the political will. What about financial? There are some who have openly suggested and worried that the US is spread too thin financially. We're funding two wars, or funding might be a strong word, but giving aid into two wars now. Our strategic petroleum reserves have been brought down in order to fight inflation, maybe win elections. We have huge deficits. We have a lot of treasury issuance. Foreigners are not buying treasuries. Janet Yellen has just recently said the US can afford financial support for both Israel and Ukraine, but do we have a financial problem or cost to this that's going to become difficult?
44:14 Speaker 02 There's a lot to unpack in that. Let's start with the things I am not worried about. Most of the stuff we sent to Ukraine is hand-me-downs that we haven't used in over 25 years, and honestly, the Russians are doing a favor because we're disposing of it into their teeth. Otherwise, we would have to dispose of it ourselves, which would cost money. So actually, the Russians are doing a financial solid by absorbing that ammo for us. Israel's a little bit different. Israel is a much more technologically acute force, and they're after things that are precision-guided, and that they have to get it from the United States. So, the financial cost of supporting Ukraine is very, very low in real terms. The financial support of Israel is much, much, much higher. That said, this is a country of only 8 million people, and they're trying to carry out a military operation in a zone that's only
44:58 Speaker 02 twice the size of the District of Columbia. So, the scale of the needs is relatively low in comparison to what the US military is capable of. For the broader question... Uh, there's a lot of low hanging fruit in the United States when it comes to making budgetary savings. Uh, we have a healthcare system that is by far the most expensive in the world, twice that of your average first world country. And if we were able to just kind of go to a middle of the road system, we'd save 10% of GDP right off the top, which would pay for everything we're discussing here. In addition to entitlement reform, would pay for it all, just that one thing.
45:40 Speaker 02 I would love, love to see meaningful healthcare reform in this country. Uh, barring that, as long as the United States is the sole currency, and again, there's no pretender to throne at the moment. We do have the option of monetizing. That is not my preference, but it seems to be the preference for the last five political administrations. And honestly, if Americans had a problem with that and wanted to have a different system, they would have voted for the other guy every single time.
46:11 Speaker 02 There's an opportunity cost here. If we had stuck with what Bill Clinton did with the balancing of the budget back in the nineties, not only would we not have a budget deficit today, but we would have paid for the retirement of the baby boomers. But we chose a different road, so. There's a difference between the opportunity cost and a national cost. There's no alternative for anyone right now. And honestly, the more the US withdraws from the world economically, the more viable the US dollar becomes as the global currency. Cause the first thing you want from a currency is for whoever controls it to not intervene in currency markets to benefit themselves.
46:56 Speaker 02 So I feel bad about this. I'm a fiscal conservative. But people who feel my way have been out of power now for a very long time.
47:05 Speaker 01 Yeah.
47:05 Speaker 02 And I've learned to live with it.
47:06 Speaker 01 You can say that again, but which brings us back to the potential third party. You said that you believe that Trump is going to lose in a landslide.
47:13 Speaker 02 Sure.
47:14 Speaker 01 That would seems contrary to a lot of the polls and certainly, uh, what his supporters believe. Why do you think it's going to go that way?
47:21 Speaker 02 Well, supporters obviously believe in him. Uh, no shock there. Okay. So a couple of things. Number one, uh, he has full control over the Republican Party apparatus. And I have no doubt that he'll get the nomination. I mean, he, he could. He could campaign from prison where he's been convicted of ninety felonies, which is how many there are now. And he could livestream the abortion of his underage illegal migrant, uh, trans lover, and he would still get the nomination. He's got a lock on that. His supporters are fervent, they're cultists, they're, they're not going anywhere. Uh, but then he has to win the general. And if there is one thing that Donald Trump has made very clear, it's that he doesn't
48:06 Speaker 02 think that the decision should be made by the general population in the general election. He wants the competition to be purely at the primary level. And so if you're in an American independent, you're like, hold my beer. Because independents in the last midterms did three things that hadn't happened in American history before. One, they showed up. Independents usually don't vote in the midterms at all. Second, independents will violently vote for their own perceived best interests. And in exit polling, they indicated they thought the Biden administration was doing a horrible job, and that his economic policy was borderline suicidal, and that the damage
48:50 Speaker 02 being done to independents in particular were unfair and unwise, and they voted for Democrats anyway. And then third, independents almost never vote for the same side twice, they're very fickle. And so when Trump lost, they were voting against him. And then they voted for, against him again. And so if the independents are willing to break all these normal patterns, you've got to look at the electoral map of the United States and figure out which states the independents hold the swing. And that's about twenty of them. And so you take the states that will go red no matter what happens with the independents, and the ones that will go blue without whatever happens to the independents, you put them to the side, and you look at what's left, they all go purple.
49:35 Speaker 02 So we're probably looking at the Trump team getting maybe a dozen states, none of which are big. And with Biden sweeping, among other places, Texas and Florida.
49:48 Speaker 01 You think both of them make it to the election? I mean, not to be grim.
49:52 Speaker 02 Oh, yeah. This, this all assumes that neither of them die. That's fair. If you, if you, if one of them keels over for whatever reason, then we're in a completely different environment.
50:03 Speaker 01 And a really unpredictable one that close to the election.
50:05 Speaker 02 Right, yeah. Which, incidentally, is another great entry point for a potential third party.
50:12 Speaker 01 Right, right. Someone who sweeps in and can, can get away with not having done the full.
50:18 Speaker 02 At that point, you might be able to talk about a presidential run from a third party. Mostly, I'm focused on Congress.
50:24 Speaker 01 Right.
50:26 Speaker 01 We, how do you, how are you thinking? You just, you were in Mexico not long ago. A lot of attention always during an election of the crisis at the border. It's being broadcast nonstop in certain areas of social media. Certainly going to, the Republicans are certainly trying to use it against the Biden administration to drum up support. I know you, you, of course, concentrate on demographics. How are you thinking about what's happening at the border?
50:54 Speaker 02 Well, let's hit it from the non-political demographic angle first before we get into the, the muck. The United States birth rate is the lowest in its history. And if we continue on our current path, we're going to be facing a Chinese or European style dissolution thirty, forty, well, no, fifty, sixty years from now. So we're at the beginning of what could be a very dangerous period. And in the next fifteen years, we're going to see China and Germany disassociate. And so we're going to get some very clear examples of the path that we're on soon.
51:26 Speaker 01 When you say disassociate, what do you mean by that for people who don't follow demographics or?
51:30 Speaker 02 China will cease to be a functional nation state with an industrial economy.
51:34 Speaker 01 Because of the birth rate?
51:36 Speaker 02 Yeah, their birth rate dropped by seventy percent in just the last five years.
51:41 Speaker 01 During COVID?
51:42 Speaker 02 Uh, predating COVID.
51:46 Speaker 01 Why does that mean they have to stop functioning as an industrial state? What about technology? What about other?
51:52 Speaker 02 We have a number of countries in the world that are in a similar situation. Korea, Germany, Italy, and to a lesser degree, Spain are all in that same bucket. But it's not that they're running out of children. For most of them, that happened 30 years ago. This is the decade they run out of working aged adults. So, young people do the consumption. How do you run a system without consumption? Older workers do the production investment. How do you run a system without production and investment? So, at a minimum, we're looking at a fundamentally new economic model that hasn't been invented yet. And for a system like China where decision making is now impossible, I'm looking at them losing national cohesion.
52:30 Speaker 01 What does that look like?
52:32 Speaker 02 This has happened 20 odd times in Chinese history. So, there's a really rich palette of national disasters to draw from. All of them involve a degree of civil breakdown, warlordism, and famine.
52:46 Speaker 01 It sounds so extreme. Some people, when they hear you say that, just think that that just can't happen. It just sounds so doomist and extreme.
52:53 Speaker 02 Well, then they have to say it can't happen again.
52:58 Speaker 01 Because it's happened before.
52:59 Speaker 02 Over 20 times.
53:00 Speaker 01 But not in modern history.
53:02 Speaker 02 Oh, it happened just after World War I.
53:07 Speaker 02 People forget that what sets the China of today out from the China of the last 3,000 years is the Americans provided them with trade access to the world for the first time and sent all the regional powers that were occupying home for the first time. And so, for the last couple of generations, the Chinese have been allowed to build without interruption while having American granted access to the world. This is not their normal.
53:34 Speaker 01 Good point. And European countries are facing the same situation?
53:39 Speaker 02 Yeah, not as extreme as the Chinese situation. We keep getting new data out of China that indicates that it's just getting worse by the day. But Germany, this is their last decade as an industrial power as well. They're simply not going to have the workforce to continue the attempt.
53:53 Speaker 01 Yeah, Sebastian, we had a question from Sebastian. With Germany's trilemma beginning to take shape, how do you see neighboring countries doing if the manufacturing base is starting to fall apart? How would Switzerland, I guess you might be from Switzerland, Sebastian, how would Switzerland, for example, do in this case? I mean, I think you can say, what does this mean for Europe more broadly?
54:10 Speaker 02 So Switzerland does have a younger demographic than Germany. They have a minimum 20 extra years. That doesn't mean that their future is particularly bright in the long term, but they've got a lot of time to potentially figure something out. And they're going to learn a lot from what the Germans do or don't do. France has the healthiest demography in the region. A lot of this is going to be picked up by the French. Now, yes, the French are not capable of doing German-style precision manufacturing, but that doesn't mean they're a slouch. As for the Central Europeans, most notably the Poles, demographic situation is similar, but they're all 15 years younger. So there's, again, another couple of decades. So you'll see this system break up, and a lot of people leave, just like they did the last time
54:53 Speaker 02 that the Germans faced a major geopolitical stress back in the 1840s. Remember, we got a million Germans in like a four-year period for outmigration. You're probably going to see something very similar again. The trick, of course, is whether the United States can fix its immigration system between now and when this break really happens, so that we can take advantage.
55:13 Speaker 01 Yeah, well, I mean, that's the question for everybody, I suppose, though, right? So we're looking at what we now call a crisis at the border, but based on what you're saying, it sounds more like opportunity at the border. If you're looking to replace or funnel in younger, a younger population, can't the same be said also for China and Germany? I mean, if you're talking about a breakdown in society, don't people become a very...
55:39 Speaker 02 An asset.
55:40 Speaker 01 Yeah, an asset. And wouldn't you look to invite them from other places that are facing... A different standard of living, climate crisis, I mean, we know that. So, you know, does the immigration conversation change?
55:54 Speaker 02 I hope it does. In the case of Germany theoretically, emphasis on the word theoretically, it might be able to use immigration in some way. The scale of what is necessary would be huge, though. You need to bring in two to three million people under age 25 a year for the next 20 years. And if you do that, Germans are no longer a majority in our own country. So, you know, the cultural transformation-
56:15 Speaker 01 That's the rub. That's the-
56:16 Speaker 02 Yeah. Cultural transformation of doing it so late in the day makes it much, much harder.
56:22 Speaker 01 And the same is true of for everywhere, though, right?
56:25 Speaker 02 For everywhere. So, Canada is an example of a country that did it before. So, the Canadian demography was very similar to the German demography 15 years ago. And so, they started up a massive inward migration program under the Harper government, continued it under Trudeau, and I don't mean to suggest that they've solved it. But they've provided an interesting case study for how it doesn't have to change you.
56:49 Speaker 02 The United States has a much healthier demography than Canada had 15 years ago. And is generally the destination for a lot of countries who want, or people who want a better life. So, we can theoretically make the decision to do this at scale. But the countries that we would reach to for that are now very different. So, Mexico has been so economically successful over the last 30 years. The net migration from Mexico to the United States has now been flat to negative for 15 years. And with NAFTA, they've industrialized and their birth rate has dropped. And so, now they are a destination country for inward migrants as well.
57:29 Speaker 02 And so, for the first time in U.S. history, we've got Canada, the United States, and Mexico, who are all on the same side when it comes to migration issues. That's a very different conversation that's being had now compared to just five years ago.
57:43 Speaker 02 Most of the migrants we're getting are coming from failing states: El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Cuba, and most recently Venezuela.
57:55 Speaker 02 The numbers, the apolitical numbers are obvious. We need these people. The politics are obviously more of a problem. And in that, the issue absolutely has been Donald Trump. Because he's done two things. Number one, he's closed down almost all methods for legal migration. So it doesn't matter if you don't know how to clean a window. It doesn't matter if you can design a supercomputer. You have to come illegally if you want to come to the United States. It's like, so all the people that we say that we want, we're saying they can't come either. Second, he built the wall. Now, the wall is going through the border zone, which is the most remote part of the American continent. The Chihuahua and the Sonoran deserts are some of the greatest natural barriers in the world.
58:38 Speaker 02 And by building the wall, he has built fifty construction roads across this barrier in order to build something that's twenty to thirty feet tall. Well, I ask you this. If you can quadruple your income by using a ladder once, wouldn't you? Especially now that on the other side of that ladder
58:58 Speaker 01 Is a road.
58:58 Speaker 02 Are roads. So Donald Trump functionally has been the most pro-illegal migrant president we've ever had. Now, the Biden administration is, if anything, as hostile to migration because he's attempting to bring the unions into his political coalition. Part of this whole, our politics are a mess, is that some of the factions have broken away already, and the unions are one of them. And they, as a rule, are the first or the second most anti-migration group in the country. So no one in Washington wants to talk about meaningful immigration reform until we know where the unions are going to land. That's not going to be this year or next year.
59:38 Speaker 01 It's interesting, because when you're talking about it, you know, we know that there's a fight for talent in corporate America, for the, you know, for valuable talent. It sounds like human capital. I mean, that's, there are acquisitions made for that. It sounds like you're describing a very similar situation setting up, but there's no country that politically is there yet to have a discussion about it.
1:00:01 Speaker 02 Yeah.
1:00:01 Speaker 01 Or framing it that way.
1:00:03 Speaker 02 And for most, it's too late. I mean, China is just too big. They could absorb all of the world's willing migrants, assuming the migrants wanted to go there, and it wouldn't be enough to move the needle. Canada is a very special case. Their percentage of foreign born is tripled out of the countries in second place, and it's a tie between us and Australia and New Zealand and Argentina, where we're all right around 3%, whereas the Canadians are at about 10%.
1:00:29 Speaker 01 When you're traveling around, talking to people, so many people are just fundamentally closed off to the idea that China might be as weak as you say. I mean, we have certainly hear voices that are convinced that they are an existential threat to the US. Where is the divide? Why are you so sure that China is so weakened and others are so sure they're going to invade Taiwan and be a threat to the US?
1:00:54 Speaker 02 Well, there's always the linear forecast fallacy. The idea is that the last 20 years had this percentage of growth, so the next 20 years will be that percentage of growth. I mean, by that logic, we're all going to be Nigerian by the year 2150. So that's number one. Number two, there's a lack of understanding of the degree to which China is a technological power. And even for semiconductors, and forget the high-end stuff, which the Chinese can't even pretend to make, like the low-end stuff between like 70 and 90 nanometer, things are just like barely a step over the Internet of Things. Yes, the Chinese make a lot of those, but with imported equipment and imported software and imported labor, the skill sets
1:01:35 Speaker 02 of the Chinese just have not improved much. Labor costs have gone up by a factor of 14 in the last 22 years, but worker productivity has barely doubled. So China is no longer the low-cost producer, and they were never able to become the high-tech producer. They do low-end, they do assembly, that is not nothing. That is an essential piece of the process, but it's not a dominance part of the process, and that is the easiest part to move. And so what we've been seeing in just the last couple of months is foreign direct investment is now negative, because people are realizing that you don't put your people at risk, you don't put your capital at risk, in a system that now criminalizes due diligence.
1:02:19 Speaker 02 It's the story is in the process of turning. China has size and that matters, but that's not the only factor. Now that we're losing those network effects, I think that the pace that we move out of China is going to be three and four times the pace that we moved into China. And to be perfectly blunt, it needs to be. Because if we can't build out the industrial plant in North America before the Chinese system breaks, then we have to do it without Chinese gear. And that's going to make everything a lot more difficult and expensive.
1:02:52 Speaker 01 So you believe the narrative of deglobalization and reshoring is going to happen, but for because of economic necessity in some way, not because of a political disagreement with China?
1:03:04 Speaker 02 The politics are not just a sideshow. That is very real. The national security side of this is relevant. But we've never, ever in human history, seen a country face this sort of demographic collapse. Even if we decided to actively assist the Chinese in everything they do, this is still their last 10-year period.
1:03:27 Speaker 01 So we talked about Putin being, you know, what happens if his back is up against the wall? What about Xi?
1:03:34 Speaker 02 Well, that's the problem. We don't know. There's this great story that I was told once that basically, you remember back in January, just before the Ukraine war started, when the United States was releasing this intelligence that not a lot of people believed about what the Russians had planned up to and including the day that the war was going to start? Well, it turns out that we had found a way to weasel our intelligence system into their secure rooms where they were basically giant safes where there was no eavesdropping possible. There was no electronics, but we managed it anyway. Because Putin has an inner circle. Some of them are even competent. There's people he discusses things with. So there are phones you can tap and there are faxes you can read and emails you can hack.
1:04:19 Speaker 02 And it turned out their information security was not as good as we thought it was. And so we just shared it with everybody. There's nothing like that in China. It's not because they have better IT protection. It's actually much worse than the Russians. But Xi doesn't speak with anyone. So there's nowhere you can go. There's no information you can get. There's no conversations you can listen into to find out what the Chinese are going to do because it's all in one guy's head. So the normal things that you would do indirectly is like, you know, you look at the economic issues, you look at the military distribution and you guess what someone in his position would do, none of that's relevant because we don't know what he knows. He's destroyed all the lines of information to himself and yet at the same time established
1:05:03 Speaker 02 himself as the only decision maker. You can't climb into someone's head when you don't know what they know.
1:05:12 Speaker 02 And so we're in a complete black box. All I can say is that because he has done this, the Chinese system is not functioning as you would expect a nation state to function economically, strategically, in anything. And so we have been seeing ever more interesting policy failures across the system, whether it's in housing or in finance or in supply chains or in diplomacy, the whole thing is showing the early stages of system failure. And so that 10-year horizon I keep talking about, that's actually the best case scenario. That assumes you've got a government that's doing mitigation all the way down and we don't have that right now.
1:05:54 Speaker 01 So you're describing a situation where there's potential nation collapse in China. They don't necessarily have nuclear weapons, but North Korea does.
1:06:03 Speaker 02 Well, the Chinese have nukes.
1:06:05 Speaker 01 Okay, so Chinese, you have Putin, who is hell-bent and there is a risk of nuclear. I mean, it sounds like there's a terrible potential for some sort of nuclear conflict.
1:06:20 Speaker 02 Do you understand why the Biden administration is fact-tracking missile defense now?
1:06:25 Speaker 02 There's not a lot that we can do here. We can't stop in Ukraine because we just face a bigger war a few months later. North Korea is a bit of a black box itself and so we were always going to need some sort of missile defense there. And the Chinese system has become a question mark. And, you know, barring preemptively carpet-nuking these places, which I am not recommending, your only option is to make sure that if something does get flung, you're in a position to intercept it. Missile defense.
1:06:58 Speaker 01 Do we see other nations? Run toward nuclear armaments now that if they also come to these same conclusions? Is this a sort of
1:07:08 Speaker 02 That's a policy question.
1:07:10 Speaker 01 Nuclear
1:07:12 Speaker 02 That's one of the risks that the Biden administration is miss making by going to Israel. If it becomes obvious that the United States is going to pick favorites, but not put boots on the ground and is not interested in a broader regional strategic picture. We just pick friends and go from it. Then anyone who is not one of those friends, whether they're friends or foes, good or bad countries, nukes are really the only option that they can really have. So I'm not so much worried about nukes in Iran. To be perfectly blunt, this technology is nearly a century old. And if Iran was capable of doing it, they would have done it already. I'm worried about Poland. I'm worried about Sweden. I'm worried about South Korea and Taiwan and Japan.
1:07:54 Speaker 02 I'm worried about Saudi Arabia, countries that have the technical or financial means to either build one themselves or go out and buy one. And if they think the United States really isn't concerned with their security, and for the most part, we are not, then they're going to have to do something themselves. And that's a very different world. And that's where we'll be within 10 years.
1:08:16 Speaker 01 So what changes that scenario?
1:08:19 Speaker 02 If
1:08:19 Speaker 01 That's a very dark road we just described. You just described
1:08:24 Speaker 02 It would take a really big if. So the world that we are just now leaving, the globalized system, we created that at the end of World War Two in order to combat the Cold War. We basically created this system that provided so many huge economic benefits that everyone wanted to join. We would have to do something on that scale again. And I don't think we can do that without a significant change in the way Americans view everything. Coming out of World War Two, we understood the cost of global instability in our bones. And so there was a tolerance for international involvement. We didn't have that after World War One. We had to lose a half a million soldiers to be sufficiently shocked into involving ourselves.
1:09:10 Speaker 02 And so we're at this moment of political transition in the United States. Maybe the next transition is going to be more internationally minded. But it's hard to see the logic for it. The North American economy is doing very well. And in in the transition we're going to see over the next 10 years, it's probably going to double the size of the industrial plant. I mean, that's that's a huge growth story. But it doesn't involve the Eastern Hemisphere. So it's difficult for me to see people on the left or the right embracing the sort of commitment that would be necessary to hold history at bay everywhere else. And then, of course, if we do decide we want to do that, the question is whether we can. You know, this this isn't 1970. We're not the only country with a navy anymore.
1:09:57 Speaker 01 Right, which begs the question, if if the US turns inward, is there anyone else that can fill that role as we had Andrew asking about, you know, peacemakers, you know, uh, the pa- uh, any country in a position to be able to step into that and somehow glue things back together and and or at least stop an acceleration toward it, some kind of nuclear conflict?
1:10:19 Speaker 02 There's only two countries in the world that have the capacity of doing that today on a regional basis. So France could do it in far Western Europe, uh, Turkey could do it in Southeastern Europe and the upper parts of the Middle East. And they could have spheres of influence that have their own rules and their own security system that could work for them. But that's it. The Japanese found a way to get along with the Trump administration and the Biden administration. Japanese are the only people who figured out how to work with both sides of the American political aisle. So what could have been an independent sphere is now part of ours. And obviously, we're going to look out for the Western Hemisphere ourselves. And that's it.
1:10:57 Speaker 02 Keep in mind that our military, in terms of the firepower it can throw, is several times more powerful than the combined navies of everyone else. And the second most powerful navy in the world is Japan, and now they're on board. And the third most powerful is Britain. And if they can ever figure out Brexit, they'll probably be on board, too.
1:11:21 Speaker 02 No one else can try.
1:11:24 Speaker 01 We have a very global audience and sometimes people wonder if you're overly optimistic about the potential of the US. What do you say when people say that to you?
1:11:32 Speaker 02 Oh, I'm perfectly willing of dumping on the United States when we do something stupid and we do things that are stupid a lot. But when you look at geography, the United States has the best geography in the world and significant insulation from everyone else. And if you look at demographics, the US is the healthiest demography in the rich world. And even if we keep aging at our current point, we're not going to reach a Chinese or a German style problem before 2060, probably 2070. So just playing the numbers and playing the map, this is the place to be. We're not perfect. Dear God, we're not perfect. And I think Churchill said it best, is you can always count on the Americans to do the right thing after they've exhausted all other options.
1:12:14 Speaker 01 Yeah, we certainly seem to be living that right now, don't we? So, so this is so much for us to hold in our head. I always love when we have a chance to catch up with you, Peter. What are you, what are you going to be sort of looking most closely at right now? There's so many moving parts. They're all interconnected. What's, what's going to sort of hold your attention right now? What are you looking at?
1:12:34 Speaker 02 Ukraine is easily an order of magnitude more important than Gaza. So Gaza, for me, is, I hate to say this, especially if you're Israeli, I apologize, but it's a distraction. It's not a major issue. It's major for Israel. It's not major for anyone else. The future of Ukraine will determine what is possible in the Western Alliance, not just NATO and the EU, but the whole structure of the region and how Russia dies. Because if Ukraine falls, Russia will come for Europe. And if Ukraine succeeds, then we have to deal with the breakup of the Russian system, which will be much messier than the breakup of the Soviet system. And an order of magnitude more important than that is how China disintegrates, because
1:13:16 Speaker 02 it is the workshop of the world. And we've got $35 trillion of sunk costs in industrial plant in that continent, or in that country, most of which is going to have to be rebuilt somewhere else. And how that process happens is going to determine the human condition for the next 50 years.
1:13:35 Speaker 01 Is Putin still in power next time you and I get together?
1:13:39 Speaker 02 I think he is sufficiently consolidated in power with his own system to not have to worry about assassinations. And by Russian standards, he's in great health because he doesn't drink. So I would expect him to continue to run the Russian Federation until the day the Russian Federation dissolves, whether that is a year from now or 30 years from now.
1:14:02 Speaker 01 Which I assume is a big risk, because if he's not willing to yield power, it can't be taken from him, that will complicate the end.
1:14:10 Speaker 02 He's spent a lot of his last 22 years as president, basically dismantling the methods by some, how someone might rise up through the system. So he's got his inner circle, he's got his outer circle. The two of them combined are under 130 people, and that is everyone within the Russian system who is a decision maker. There's no one coming up from below. He hasn't been as thorough of purging the system as Xi has, because Xi is one, there's no one else. But Putin has done a very good job of making sure that those 130 people think of him as the person who ultimately decides everything that matters. And they know that there is no one else among the 130 that could even theoretically take Putin's place, with one exception, there's a guy by the name of Igor Sechin, who runs
1:14:54 Speaker 02 Rasmacht, the state oil company, used to be an arms smuggler during the Soviet period. He might have the guts and the brains to do it, but if there's every, if there's one thing that the other 129 agree on, it's that Igor Sechin is an asshole, and he would probably be killed within 24 hours of offing Putin.
1:15:11 Speaker 01 Well, everyone has been, no one survives trying to take out Putin so far. So he must have a long reach himself.
1:15:21 Speaker 02 Yeah, well, he comes from the security services. So intelligence is in his blood, and that's where his strongest allies are. And his second strongest allies are in organized crime. So if you want somebody gone, he either has the official state do it, or some irregular group do it. And it's, at least from a leadership point of view, it's been effective.
1:15:43 Speaker 01 All right, Peter. As usual, it's going to take me a while to recover from this conversation, but we love catching up with you. We appreciate all your insights. I think we managed to cover just about everything. So yeah, look forward to doing it again soon.
1:15:57 Speaker 02 Until next time.
1:15:58 Speaker 01 Yeah, thanks. Be well.
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