Pod Insights Real Vision: Finance & Investing Did the Banks Just Break? About this episode U. S. markets saw more turmoil today as the fallout from Silicon Valley Bank’s failure continues to unfold. The Fed has stepped in to help depositors secure their funds from SVB and Signature Bank, and U. S. 2-Year Treasury yields endured the steepest decline since the stock market crash of 1987. Maggie Lake is joined by Daniel Lacalle, chief economist at Tressis, to give us a breakdown of the banking risks and how contagion could spread across the globe. Plus, we hear from Forkast Labs co-CEO Angie Lau on the impact SVB is having and why this issue is far from over. Check out that entire interview here: https://rvtv.io/3mMpLbf and you can find more of Daniel’s work here: https://www.dlacalle.com/en/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript 0:02 Speaker 00 Hey everyone. If you like this podcast, go behind the paywall to get privileged access to the smartest minds in finance. Visit realvision.com/rvpod and use the promo code PODCAST10 at PODCAST10 to get 10% off our essential membership for the first year. Join the Real Vision community and learn how to become a better investor. And now to the top analysis of today's markets.
0:31 Speaker 01 Contagion contained. Hi, everyone. Welcome to the Real Vision Daily Briefing. With me today to help us make sense of this banking crisis that is unfolding in the US is Daniel Lacalle, Chief Economist at Tressis. Hi, Daniel.
0:46 Speaker 02 Hi, Maggie. How are you? Thanks for having me.
0:48 Speaker 01 I'm doing well. Thanks. I'm so glad to have you with us today. So much has happened over the past three days. A lot of it is confusing for many of us. I know I have a lot of questions. So before you even start for our listeners, go ahead and you know what to do. If you have questions, put them in the chat and we'll get to as many as we can. So Daniel, just sort of tell me, you know, we saw the government step in, crazy weekend, we saw the government step in, the US government stabilized the situation around Silicon Valley Bank guaranteeing depositors and creating a new fund to provide loans to banks, not just that one banks under stress. So what is the state of the US banking system here right now? How are you feeling about this situation?
1:31 Speaker 02 Well, it's very complicated because on the one hand, what you have is a Federal Reserve that has announced very rapidly that they will provide enough support to make the depositors not lose any money, which is, looks like a good thing. However, what I think is a big challenge is how are we going to address the problem of a US financial system that has about a third of the deposits uninsured. So if this is an issue of one
2:09 Speaker 02 bank or two banks, well, then maybe it is manageable. But if suddenly the Fed pivots and decides to cut rates or...
2:22 Speaker 02 God forbid, start quantitative easing yet again and inflation runs faster. Then the problem is going to be not a manageable situation from the mismatch of assets and liabilities between of a couple of banks, but a problem of a re-basement of the entire, the basement by the way, of the entire asset base of the banking system. So I think that right now, what we can say is that this is likely to continue to affect a number of small banks, and it's obviously very evident in the share price performance of some of them,
3:03 Speaker 02 and that the larger banks can manage this situation. But the the problem of these unrealized losses in the sovereign bond portfolio is not going to be easily solved, because it's a it's a it usually in a crisis, you have in the asset base, a number of assets relatively safe that will be a cushion or that will hold valuation steadily and be a sort of a hedge against the more volatile part of the asset base.
3:42 Speaker 02 The problem in this crisis is that it's not just the re-evaluation of the assets that have more volatility or that are riskier, but the the problem is fundamentally on the unrealized losses of hold-to-maturity sovereign bonds. And that is not a problem of Silicon Valley Bank alone.
4:07 Speaker 01 Right, okay, so for people who may not be as
4:12 Speaker 01 who don't spend a lot of time thinking about both how the banking sector works and really the the sort of mechanisms of the bond market, of the US Treasury market, which is what you're talking about.
4:22 Speaker 01 When you're talking about holds and maturity, you're talking about US treasuries, right? I mean, the idea was that that was supposed to be a safe asset or safer asset. So it would be sensible that things like banks had that on the balance sheet. Explain to me what you just said about the debasement of the entire system. So if they, if they do, first of all, do you think, let's take one step back, pause that. Do you think the Fed will ease and do QE? Do you think that's where we're at now, based on the fragility of the banking system?
4:54 Speaker 02 Let me start from that. Yeah, I don't think so. I don't think so for a very particular reason. I think that the Fed is very aware that the problem that we're living right now is relatively manageable. However, I think that the Fed knows that if they do
5:13 Speaker 02 easing with the inflation problem that we continue to have and the challenges of the banking system continue, then it's not going to be a manageable problem. So I think that that is the biggest, I would say, I would say that it's the biggest risk. So I think that what the Federal Reserve is likely to continue to do is to say, we're going to maybe pause on the rate hikes, maybe be a little bit more prudent in terms of the normalization of monetary policy. However, I find it very difficult to believe that they could implement
5:55 Speaker 02 a quantitative easing program, which is going to come at a very difficult moment because that quantitative easing program would likely generate higher and would certainly create a much larger asset valuation problem down the line.
6:15 Speaker 01 Yeah, and, and if they were to embark on something on easing, is the risk that they would, they would lose credibility, that treasuries would lose credibility, that the dollar would be lower? How would that, what would the negative impact of that look like?
6:31 Speaker 02 The biggest is loss of credibility. We remember in 2018 how the Fed changing course already broke a lot of the elements of trust on the monetary policy and normalization. Furthermore, when in 2018 the Fed changed completely its stance on normalization, what ended up happening was that the perverse incentives to add more risk that have led to the problem that we're living right now, the problem of Silicon Valley Bank and other
7:12 Speaker 02 small banks, actually started probably around that period when the market realized that it was a really good bet to add more risk all the time with a lower level of return against a lower level of return and lower yields.
7:32 Speaker 01 Yeah, and this is, so this, do you think that they have the Fed, so the idea of what could, what the monster they might create if they move into the quantitative easing, cutting rates problem, you think they're aware of, and is far more risky than dealing with the present problem? They've done that by insuring some depositors. Should they just insure all? Some people asking, why haven't they just locked stocks? Said, we're going to insure every depositor in the US.
8:02 Speaker 02 It's very difficult to announce that for a very simple reason. About a third of all of the US banking system deposits are uninsured. So the moment that people start to make the calculation of how much insuring the entire unsecured, uninsured deposits of the banking system would take, one would immediately understand that it is A, impossible, B, it is unsurmountable as a cost to the financial system. Right now, as you see in the Federal Reserve press release, what they're doing is that this, the securing the deposits of these two banks...
8:51 Speaker 02 It's going to be covered by a higher level of assessment from the banking system, which is, as I said before, is manageable. If you do it with the entire financial system of the United States, that obviously would make it impossible now to to cover it from that perspective.
9:11 Speaker 01 So they're going to have to deal with this. Does that mean that we're going to have this rolling situation where people are going to be trying to figure out which the next bank is? And then we're going to have to see them go in and address that individually and try to get their heads around that. So it kind of is this rolling failure problem that they are trying to trying to ring fence as it happens?
9:35 Speaker 02 Absolutely. I think that what the Federal Reserve is looking at is how are markets going to adjust? When are valuations going to adjust to the current level of uncertainty? And is that something that in terms of capital loss is enough to be a real stress test? No, you know, that banks do their stress tests, but they're always under the most dangerous words in economics, which are ceteris paribus, which means that everything else unchanged and everything changes all the time and at the same time. No, so I think that what the Federal Reserve is is doing is is is looking at
10:19 Speaker 02 how, where does the capital base of the of the banking system stabilize? And is that something that is going to avoid a liquidity event? Which I believe is the reason why they have implemented this first step policy movement. No.
10:43 Speaker 02 If they had done what you just said, if they had gone out and said, by the way, everybody, don't worry, we're going to ensure all of the deposits of all the banking system, everyone would have realized immediately that is impossible and you would have had a massive collapse in equity markets, much larger than the one that we have seen today, which is actually probably something that the Federal Reserve sees as acceptable, the today's today's correction and sort of stabilization.
11:14 Speaker 02 So I think that what they are likely to look is at each case on its own. They're probably like everybody else, like everybody else is looking at First Republic. Is that something that is uh uh that is likely to suffer a similar situation? Can we deal with that individually? Yes, fair enough, next, move on. I think that that is, and to be fairly honest, uh knowing how difficult it is to to to and that there's probably, this is like, this is like the, I don't know, the the the the devil's choice, no, probably none is is is the best one. But I think that what they're doing is probably the only way in which you maintain a certain
11:57 Speaker 02 level of confidence in a banking system that in all other aspects remains re- remains significantly robust, but think about this. This is, the Fed knows that what has happened to Silicon Valley Bank and what has happened to the other bank, I forgot its name today, that that that collapsed, is is their own doing, is that they, they.
12:24 Speaker 01 The Fed's own doing.
12:25 Speaker 02 Is the Fed's own doing, because the Fed was the one that always, the Fed and the mainstream economist, economist, etc., recommending that banks hedge and and and stabilize their asset base with long-term.
12:43 Speaker 01 Right.
12:44 Speaker 02 Uh sovereign bonds, which are supposed to be in a in a volatility environment, in a volatile market, the ones that provide stability and value support. Well, what was the problem? The problem was implementing negative real rates and implementing massive quantitative easing in the year twenty twenty and twenty twenty one. Which led to such massive overvaluation of sovereign bonds that in 2022, when rate hikes started, bonds were not a cushion or a haven, but actually as risky, as volatile,
13:26 Speaker 02 and as price destruction as the equity, as the equity market. That's why Silicon Valley Bank found itself in a situation in which, by following exactly what the Fed was saying, they found themselves in a valuation and capital trap. Think about this. A lot of people are saying that Silicon Valley Bank was imprudent because they didn't hedge the duration risk of their long-term sovereign bond portfolio. Fair enough. Why didn't they do it? Are they stupid? No. The reason why they didn't do it
14:10 Speaker 02 is because they heard, and they heard repeatedly from economists, from the Fed, from the international bodies, that inflation was transitory, that there was absolutely no reason to be worried about inflation, that it was just a base effect process, problem, and that there was absolutely no need to change the path of normalization, which was much slower and much more, much more, let's say benign. So what Silicon Valley Bank and the rest of these small banks did actually was to follow exactly what the analysis of the macroeconomic and inflation situation was coming from the Fed and its economists.
14:55 Speaker 02 Now, by the time that the Fed U-turns and admits that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and that they are stuck in a very large problem because inflation is persistent and elevated, and they start to hike rates, by that time, it would have been monstrously expensive and probably impossible to hedge the entire long-term duration sovereign bond portfolio. And they were stuck, and it was too late, probably.
15:30 Speaker 01 So this is an incredibly important point, I think, because it really explains what's going on because we talked briefly as we were coming on air. I think there's a lot of misinformation and misunderstanding, especially on Twitter. It's not helpful and a lot of people throwing around all sorts of accusations as opposed to explanations, although they may be, I don't know what the intention is. But that idea that they didn't hedge that interest rate risk, not because they were careless, but because of the messaging and basically, you know, what anyone would have done, given what was being told to them by officials, begs the question, who else hasn't hedged their interest rate risk? How widespread is
16:15 Speaker 01 this problem? I'm presuming it's not limited to regional banks. I mean, we saw bond moves last year that were unprecedented, according to so many people that came on air. We just saw the two-year yield move more than it has in three days since the 1980s, you know, since generationally, people haven't seen this. So who else is unhedged in that way, Daniel? You know, how widespread is the problem in your mind?
16:41 Speaker 02 It's very difficult to know because we don't look at every bank individually and it took a few weeks for analysts to find the level of hedge that Silicon Valley Bank had in itself. So it's very, very difficult. But what I would guess, and it's just a guess, I might be, what I would guess is that this is a widespread problem, that this is not something that is the reckless risk management of a few crazy lunatics in California, is that anyone...
17:27 Speaker 02 If you think about it, you know, not not in real vision, all the all the talents that you have and everything. But so many people out there bought and sold this completely ludicrous narrative that inflation was just transitory and that increasing the balance sheet of central banks to twenty trillion would not generate inflation. It was actually going to be phenomenal, etc. So if when you have such a consensual view, then it is very difficult for me to believe that an asset that was perceived as
18:08 Speaker 02 the lowest risk in terms of price and the lowest risk in terms of volatility would be totally hedged. Well, think about, I'm just trying to.
18:19 Speaker 01 Right, exactly. That's the other point. This was, this is a, this is.
18:22 Speaker 02 Why would you do it?
18:23 Speaker 01 Of the building, the business. Yeah.
18:25 Speaker 02 Yeah, it's if, why would you do it? If you are, actually, if you are a prudent risk manager and you have fifty percent of the assets are loans to small and medium enterprises, tech companies, crypto companies, green energy, you name it, blah, blah, blah, okay? And the other part, the other fifty percent is the stuff that the Fed buys, Treasury bills and mortgage-backed securities. And the Fed and all the massive number of economists around the Federal Reserve
19:07 Speaker 02 tell you over and over again that inflation is transitory, that there's not going to be any risk of inflation and therefore no risk of massive rate hikes and therefore no risk of massive quantitative tightening. And at the same time, you need to take prudent measures. So you keep unhedged the lowest-risk asset, sovereign bonds and mortgage-backed securities. And what you try to hedge in some form is the risky part of the asset base. So.
19:41 Speaker 01 It's like a barbell strategy, right? They have risky, right?
19:46 Speaker 02 Absolutely. So the idea that I'm trying to, I'm seeing some places written about this imprudent risk management policy. Who would have thought that they would do this? No way, no way. And more importantly, like I said before, by the time that the Fed U-turns and starts to hike rates, admitting that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and not a base effect case, by that time, the cost of hedging the entire portfolio was probably too large because by then,
20:28 Speaker 02 deposits were already coming down. Because this is another part that people are not talking enough about, is why did deposits start to leave Silicon Valley Bank precisely in 2022? One, the tech layoffs. Two, the loss of value in the marketplace of tech stocks. People started to need the deposits that they had in the bank and they were not aiming to utilize for daily purchases, et cetera. So all of that, all of that is the burst of the everything bubble that we have discussed a few times in real vision.
21:13 Speaker 02 We had a massive bubble in sovereign bonds, a massive bubble in equity markets, and when both burst, there is no hedge. There is zero.
21:24 Speaker 01 That hurts, right.
21:26 Speaker 02 That is the problem, if you think about it. So.
21:30 Speaker 01 We did have, we did have so many people talking about this, but people would joke and call us doom vision because we had people sort of warning, it was just that no one knew when it would happen. This is really, this is such an important, and we're going to take the time to have this conversation because it is really important to understand what's going on because there is this narrative and we have John mentioning it, so they're only going to bail out. That's questionable, whether that, that language around bailout is very, I think.
21:59 Speaker 01 There's a lot of feeling around that. There's a lot of energy around bailout. And I'm not sure if that's the actual correct terminology for the moment, but I understand what you're saying, John. They're only going to bail out depositors of poorly run banks. Hey, everyone, we're going to take a quick break right now to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing. Melson asking, so why have risk management at all if all you have to do is listen to the Fed? I think it's more complicated than that, as you just laid out. And the important thing about this is, back to your point, if this was a barbell strategy in an environment where we've had falling inflation, Jeff Conlick was just on television saying, for his 40
22:44 Speaker 01 year career, all there was was falling inflation, or gradually falling interest rates and inflation. So this was the environment that people have modeled in and worked in. That may be gone now, but a lot of people don't have those models. You're suggesting, if you are right, that it's not one poorly run bank. And that's what we should all be concerned about. This is a reset to a new regime where a lot of people are going to have this reckoning that they're either unhedged for the reasons you laid out, or the hedges don't work that they have on, correct?
23:17 Speaker 02 Very likely. But the person that asked this question must think, how do you hedge a portfolio of assets that may be volatile and that may be in risky businesses that you acknowledge are risky businesses, like technology, biotech, green energy, of course, nothing bad with that? How do you hedge that? With a long position in sovereigns. So the idea that they were unhedged because they were just listening to the Fed, but risk managers should not just listen to the Fed,
23:55 Speaker 02 but do what's right. No. Is that we're not understanding what a bank is doing. Silicon Valley Bank sees its deposits go through the roof. Its assets more than double in a couple of years. Okay? So what they do is actually be prudent. This is the amazing thing. So the point that I'm trying to make is...
24:24 Speaker 02 The way that the Federal Reserve is acting, and I'm not going, I'm certainly not a staunch defender of what the Fed does, but the way that the Federal Reserve is acting is the only way in which it can act. And as he very well says, it's not that they're bailing out the depositors of the badly run banks, is that they acknowledge that it's not a question of being badly run, but a liquidity event created by an asset or a couple of assets, mortgage-backed securities and long-term sovereign bonds in that is, are not the fault of badly, bad management. So the next step, in my view, is that the Fed will likely
25:09 Speaker 02 implement some form of liquidity measure by which those banks that continue to hold long-term, hold to maturity sovereign bonds that are unhedged, what they're likely to do is to exchange them for one year, even, even, even cash type of, of, of instruments in order to prevent the liquidity problem. See?
25:38 Speaker 01 Yeah.
25:38 Speaker 02 That is likely.
25:39 Speaker 01 I think they've, I think they're setting up a facility to do that. I think they're, I think they're already, they're already in the process of doing that. Um, so when you're talking about holding, you know, the assets, long, long-term US Treasuries in mortgage back, I can't fathom the amount of institutions that have those on their balance sheets. Are we, first of all, European banks? Are European banks at risk? And we have so many good questions, and we're going to get to them. Are European banks at risk?
26:09 Speaker 02 European banks are at risk. Because the, the, the main narrative to, to, to say that European banks are not at risk is European banks don't need to do mark-to-market and they have their, their own regulation by which they don't have these challenges. Any hedge fund manager in America knows that you, you do your Own math about what is the mark to market core capitalization of these of these banks. There obviously there is a risk. Is the risk more contained than in two thousand and eight? Absolutely it is. Absolutely it is. One hundred percent.
26:51 Speaker 02 In the middle of two thousand and eight, what European banks were doing, and you can read it, for example, in in my in uh.
27:01 Speaker 02 In uh, what was the the the? I forgot the name of the book, but Boomerang, Boomerang, okay, by Michael Lewis. And Boomerang by Michael Lewis, he he shows how it was German, French banks. Buying the assets that were bursting in the United States because they continued to be triple A. This is not a situation. This is not the situation right now. Right now is a situation of valuation of exist of the existing asset base. Is there a risk of contagion? There is, but it's not the same risk of two thousand and eight. And it certainly and the position of European banks is. Obviously, there's there's a risk of of that uh plummeting of of the value of of the asset base, but.
27:45 Speaker 02 It is true that European banks have behaved phenomenally throughout the years of negative rates. Because they have increased core capital year after year, and they have a number of of of of cushions in terms of their C T one. Uh, capital ratios that are way above in terms of of of, let's say. Uh, the ample level of of solvency compared with what they were in two thousand and eight, two thousand and eleven. But, and this is an important one, that does not mean, and obviously you saw the performance today. Of the S X seven E, the banks uh in Europe, obviously, if there is a a a problem of.
28:32 Speaker 02 That is created from the lowest risk asset to the highest volatility assets. The risk obviously exists of a contagion.
28:43 Speaker 01 So what about, what about institutions that are not banks? When, when, when we were talking about this and when people could sort of see this bubble coming, see some of these problems coming. One of the things we heard from a lot of the people coming through, a lot of the guests we had on, was they were very good, very worried about what you saw happen with the UK gilt market, that in the pension, in pension funds and in insurance companies and all of these different institutions that reached for yield in the same way, that had to go and find, you know, ways to get yields so that they could cover their, that, that, that this was going to be a problem for them. Do you worry about that or does it not matter as much because they don't have that potential
29:28 Speaker 01 for depositors to do a run on that institution?
29:33 Speaker 02 I could, I mean, obviously, we have had alarm signs all over the place.
29:40 Speaker 02 In Japan, it was the yen at forty year lows. In the UK, it was the pensions, the pension burst problem. But do I worry? Absolutely, I do. Because the, the reason why I worry is because you mentioned it, you mentioned something incredibly important a few minutes ago, is we are in a market in which there are two generations of traders that have seen nothing but expansionary monetary policy and cutting interest rates. So expansionary monetary policy, increasing liquidity, cutting rates, and an environment
30:20 Speaker 02 in which it was, it became a mantra that printing money doesn't cause inflation and therefore you can do it forever and as much as you want. And they, even in the, in the, they created a new stupidity called MMT. Okay, fair enough. All of that is, is the sign of a bubble. Because what we, we know that it'll Happen, we just don't know when. The problem is that when it happens, it happens at the same time. And this is my concern. My concern is that where is, where is, you don't have the possibility right now as a pension fund, for example, pension funds have been growing their
31:00 Speaker 02 exposure to equities, decreasing their exposure to bonds, but they don't have any, any cushion in the bond, uh, in the bonds that they hold to maturity because they were buying negative yielding, uh, real negative yielding bonds. So the big, the big problem of this is that, is that there is no real alternative apart from owning, you know, physical gold or something like that, but that's not something that is going to happen. The problem is that you cannot go back as a safe haven to the nineteen trillion of dollars of negative yielding bonds. That was the beginning of the problem.
31:43 Speaker 02 Accumulating nineteen trillion of negative yielding bonds where pension funds were the safest and most conservative investors had to purchase because that was in their mandate, uh, extremely expensive bonds from issuers that had worsening liquidity and solvency ratios, expecting that the increase in price would compensate the loss of yield. That in itself, it's such a massive problem that it puts everything else you want to put. The technology, uh, the nonprofit technology side of the, of the spectrum, the venture capital to peanuts.
32:26 Speaker 02 The big massive problem in the financial world right now is that your hedge against volatility and your hedge against, uh, the equity or venture capital risk was the largest bond bubble in history.
32:43 Speaker 01 Oh, wait, wait, wait. Say that again, because that's, that's, that's what we need to understand. The hedge against volatility. So this was what every single person was doing.
32:52 Speaker 02 Exactly.
32:52 Speaker 01 The hedge against volatility was what?
32:55 Speaker 02 Was hundred year Austrian bonds at oh point four percent, for example.
33:02 Speaker 01 The biggest bond bubble in history.
33:04 Speaker 02 The biggest bond bubble in history, nineteen trillion dollars issued at negative rates. Spain, Italy, Portugal, all of those countries that we knew that were not in better, but worse levels of debt to GDP, et cetera, issuing at negative rates because the central bank purchased a hundred percent of net issuances. The, the, eh, out of that nineteen trillion bubble, a significant proportion was in JGBs and Japanese bond market, a significant proportion was in Europe. But in terms of negative real yields, the United States also had a big problem. And what was the problem?
33:48 Speaker 02 That there was you, anyone, any prudent investor, did not have a way of analyzing whether the extent of that bubble, when the central bank was a hundred percent of the demand for the net issuances of that paper. So, you know, eh, the government of, I don't know, Portugal or Greece issued a billion immediately bought by the central bank. You had no clue of what the secondary market was for those bonds. So when you start, you start by creating this massive misperception of risk in the
34:31 Speaker 02 market by disguising the risk of the sovereign bond to an extent that is so phenomenal
34:42 Speaker 02 that now, two years later, we, all of us, don't know whether two-year bond, the two-year treasury at three point ninety-nine is a good or a bad investment. We don't know if it's cheap or expensive. We have no clue. We have no clue because there's, because all of the lines that we had, that were, that we were able to address to understand risk and value have been blurred by the insanity implemented in twenty twenty by central banks. And so, so when you start from that premise, the largest bond bubble in history.
35:24 Speaker 02 The question that any pension fund, any investment fund, any hedge fund has, et cetera, is how do you hedge your risk? When I was in long-short equities and the mismatch between longs and shorts was higher than what's allowed by the risk manager, how did you hedge that difference overnight? With treasuries. Of course, the risk manager would just wipe out your beta exposure with treasuries. Would you do that today? That is the problem. The problem is that the safe, low-risk asset is now as unsafe, higher risk and volatile
36:09 Speaker 02 as your equity exposure to cyclical components.
36:17 Speaker 01 Wow, that's a really big, I mean, this is, you know, we have all been taught that that is, that's the safe haven, that's where you go for safety. So should we expect to see more rate volatility, more sovereign rate volatility because of that? And then what does that mean? We got a lot of questions about gold, as you can imagine. Does Daniel from Max, does Daniel see this failure? And I'm not even going to say SVB failure anymore. Let's say the bond bursting failure as a bull catalyst for gold.
36:50 Speaker 02 Oh, certainly, certainly, in relative and in absolute terms. Absolutely it is.
36:55 Speaker 01 So people, I've heard people today say that didn't work during the great financial crisis because when people have to liquidate something, they will liquidate what they can. That will be gold. Gold didn't perform well then.
37:08 Speaker 02 Well, I would disagree with that. Gold didn't perform well in absolute terms, not in relative terms.
37:14 Speaker 01 Okay.
37:16 Speaker 02 And this is important because twenty twenty two was similar. You know, everybody said, oh, gold didn't work in twenty twenty two in dollars, but in euros, in yen, in pounds, in pesos. So we have to remember what we're living. We are living a global currency debasement situation in which the monetary insanity has gone so far that the only, the way in which it flows is slowly and at the same time. So there is no such thing.
37:47 Speaker 01 That's an important, that's an important point, too, because that's what I'm thinking. Is there anyone who's better positioned? And I think Ralph was alluding to this. In what countries would we not see the same extreme asset liability mismatch in banking that we've seen in the U.S.? But if we think about it less about banking and more about bond bubbles bursting, it's going to happen everywhere.
38:08 Speaker 02 Now, let me go to one small point to this question. What are the reserves of central banks all over the world? When they say that they own trillions of or billions of U.S. dollars or euros? Sovereign bonds, treasuries. Treasuries. China doesn't hold banknotes. China owns treasuries. So the idea that there's no contagion risk.
38:40 Speaker 02 I don't need to tell people to go back to two thousand and eight, two thousand and one, I don't care. Obviously, when the, when the lowest risk asset in the world, the U.S. Treasury, and the lowest risk currency in the world, or at least the currency with the, with the highest level of liquidity and highest level of, of, of, of relative strength, the U.S. dollar, when those two are in turmoil, thinking that it's not going to affect Belgium, to say something, or Spain, or Italy, is not insanity, is irresponsibility.
39:24 Speaker 02 Because there is nothing that, and this is an important factor. When we, if we go to the root of the problem, which was creating a massive bubble in sovereign bonds in 2020.
39:39 Speaker 02 Not in 2020, into 2020 and then stepping the accelerator to maximum level. If we go to the root of the problem, then what you need to understand is that if you think that the Federal Reserve has committed some mistakes, the insanity committed by the rest of central banks is multiple times that. So the most likely scenario is that we will see a spillover effect that the same way that happened two years after 2008 in Europe is likely to happen, but not because things move much faster.
40:23 Speaker 02 It's likely to move to Europe and it's likely to move to other countries. Because the, the level of artificial capital construction that we have seen in this period of the everything bubble is going to inevitably lead to a period of capital destruction. And that capital destruction can be moderated and contained to a certain extent, which is what I think is going to happen. But that doesn't mean that it's not going to happen.
40:55 Speaker 01 Yeah, and, and the issue here, so I'm thinking back to 2008. And listen, I think we all feel that same sense of anxiety because it's, it's sort of bringing back so many sort of shadows and hints of that. But do you think this is 2008? And do you worry, okay, you'll tell me why, but do you worry that there's a confidence? You know, it was all about like counter, counterparty risk. You didn't know people hoarded collateral. At some point it jumps the fence and becomes a confidence and a psychology issue as much as it is a financial issue, right?
41:32 Speaker 02 Why I believe this is not like 2008, 2008.
41:37 Speaker 02 Central banks and governments didn't care because they said, well, this is crazy people buying homes that they can't afford. And this is the crazy hedge funds that are going insane in their position.
41:50 Speaker 01 Yes.
41:51 Speaker 02 It was perceived as a private sector problem of excess risk. Ah, the difference in twenty twenty two and twenty twenty three is that the problem is in the in the public sector. A real estate bubble bursts like like a balloon. Pricks. Hmm. Uh, tech bubble, the same, et cetera, et cetera. How does a sovereign bond bubble burst? Slowly?
42:24 Speaker 02 U uniformly? And probably with not a crisis in which we see GDP collapsing and et cetera, but with stagnation. The risk is, risk is, and is, in my opinion, is the, is that we enter a Japanization situation, of course, because there is no central bank and certainly no government that is going to go out to the market and say, oh, and by the way, um, we are not going to provide liquidity for sovereign bonds. What the hell? Of course, they're going to do it. But what does providing liquidity mean? Printing more money?
43:09 Speaker 02 What does printing more money mean? Stagflation. Stagflation is the risk or is the way in which sovereign bond bubble bursts.
43:19 Speaker 01 Wow, okay, so it's, we have an interesting debate going on. I've heard different people throughout the day, well-respected people, say that this is a massively deflationary event. And I've heard people say this is a massively inflationary event.
43:35 Speaker 02 It's very
43:36 Speaker 01 How do you see it, or do you see it sort of in the middle?
43:39 Speaker 02 I
43:40 Speaker 01 Sort of?
43:41 Speaker 02 I I would start by saying one thing. When people talk about deflation, they talk about the inflation rate of seven percent, then the inflation rate of five, that is deflation. No, that is not deflation.
43:56 Speaker 01 Disinflation.
43:57 Speaker 02 Inflation is exactly disinflation is not deflation. Can we have disinflation? Yes. Can we have an environment of deflation, i.e. prices going down and below the two thousand nineteen, two thousand twenty level? No. No, because it's currency basement, because the way in which sovereign bubbles burst is through monetary debasement, monetary implosion. And that means that the purchasing power of your currency weakens. So so I think that, yes, there may be some disinflationary process.
44:38 Speaker 02 But I always have to remind, and this is unbelievable, I always have to remind people that inflation is a cumulative and that a four percent on top of a six and on top of a five is huge inflation. No, I always give this analogy to my students. If I gain five pounds in a year and six pounds in the other and four, the third, I am not getting thinner. That is not
45:06 Speaker 01 Daniel, you just described my holiday period. How dare you?
45:11 Speaker 02 Life, my life, I was describing my life.
45:15 Speaker 01 Mine too.
45:15 Speaker 02 That's why I know so much about inflation, because I see it every day.
45:21 Speaker 01 Oh, my gosh, I needed that little laugh because we're doing a series this week and well, this isn't really the name, but this week we were supposed to be talking about how we were talking last week about how we're screwed. This week we're talking supposed to be talking about some solutions, but but we've had to I I think we're sticking with the how we're screwed based on this conversation.
45:39 Speaker 02 Think about what I just said. It doesn't sound nice, but it
45:43 Speaker 01 It sounds awful.
45:45 Speaker 02 It sounds awful, but it doesn't hurt. Or people don't perceive that it hurts. We've lived stagflation, people by age, very young, but but we've lived stagflation. And and, you know.
46:03 Speaker 02 People sort of don't see it the same way. People, I think that there will and there is a concerted effort by governments, international bodies and central banks so that it doesn't hurt. But when it doesn't hurt, it doesn't solve. That's what we that we we need to understand. And and on the flip side, if you want to see some positives on it, the the pain compared to what this would be if we had a domino effect of of of collapses throughout the entire financial system
46:43 Speaker 02 according to the overvaluation of the asset base compared to that. So maybe it's that is sort of a not good, but certainly not worse case scenario.
46:55 Speaker 01 Yeah, it could it could be much, much worse. It sounds like the category that falls into. We're going to take another quick break to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
47:11 Speaker 01 I want to throw up, we have somebody pointing out the massive move we've seen in yields. I think we have a chart of the two-year yield. I mean, in three days, we saw a massive move. And there are a lot of people saying this is the bond market telling the Fed they are done. They are done raising rates. Do you agree with that? So you think they're will will they try to will they try to finagle something where you think they can raise rates at all? We've got a meeting coming up in March. Are they done raising rates?
47:40 Speaker 02 Well, look at the chart. The market has so so so-called told the Fed that they're done three times in the chart that I'm seeing, three times, and it hasn't happened. So and the reason why and and there's something, you know, I I we need to remember two things.
48:06 Speaker 02 The first we've talked about length inflation. The other one that we've talked about is that the Silicon Valley Bank problem. The all those elements were already evident in the losses of the balance sheet of central banks themselves. Massive losses published, published huge losses. So European Central Bank unwound provisions to cover the losses, which is unheard of. Think about if about prudent management, the risk management, think if any commercial bank had done that. So the the the point that we need to think of is that
48:50 Speaker 02 when this stabilizes, there is only one thing that central banks can do, which is reduce the balance sheet and increase and increase rates. So we might have a period in which they sort of stop for a while. But not what we have seen, if you look at the at the curve that the market, the market implied Fed funds rate has massively gone from hiking and then stable to hiking and then plummeting. But that I think is very, very risky, in my opinion.
49:33 Speaker 01 And we and we so I would I would assume that you, based on that, think that risk assets look risky here still. I mean, there's a sense that, oh, the Fed's done, maybe they're going to cut, and that's going to underpin risk assets.
49:46 Speaker 02 Yeah, well, the first thing that I that I think we should not consider is a bullish signal in the middle of risk of bank runs all over the place. A bullish signal that the Fed cuts rates and
50:03 Speaker 02 Even starts a quantitative easing program. And we all remember, we all have to remember, have to remind that from the moment that in the, that into the 2008 crisis, that we knew that the Federal Reserve was going to take action and that there was going to be a change in monetary policy from that moment until it started to come back, you had a good 20% of declines in capital markets and valuations were not as elevated as today. The only thing that I'm saying is the Federal Reserve changing course on rates and on liquidity
50:46 Speaker 02 because of a solvency and liquidity event in two banks so far is not a bullish signal for markets. It's not a signal for markets. It may be a stabilizing signal for markets, but people remember two, two generations of traders that have only seen expansionary policies. When people talk of Fed pivot as a bullish signal, they're expecting multiple expansion. And I don't see that happening anytime soon.
51:18 Speaker 01 Do you think that the large banks, the JP Morgans, the Bank of Americas are going to benefit from this? Do they look like safe places to be as people move their deposits over?
51:32 Speaker 01 We have a question. Sorry, I forgot who asked it, but great question. What's your feeling on that?
51:37 Speaker 02 Absolutely, absolutely. This, the, the, the constant, the constant financial repression environment that we have lived is something that very large banks can endure, but small banks are always suffering on the way in and on the way out as we are seeing today. So, yes, they benefit in relative terms. They benefit in relative terms. That doesn't mean that you're going to see those banks going up in value in the marketplace. That means that they actually benefit because if anybody is going, you know, obviously, you know.
52:23 Speaker 02 Who is going to be able, who can absorb unrealized losses in a bond portfolio? An incredibly large bank, an incredibly large bank. So yes, in relative terms, they do benefit. And US banks, in relative terms, benefit relative to emerging market banks, even if they're large.
52:44 Speaker 01 And, you know, watch that space for regional banks because as, as people have pointed out, they're very important to small, medium-sized enterprises tend to use regional banks. So, and they also are very political because they're in states and politicians pay attention to their community or regional banks. So that's going to be very interesting to see that dynamic. Question about corporate bonds. Would you expect, given everything that's happening, to see defaults on the rise? Are we finally going to see corporate spreads widen out because of this? Are you, are you looking at that space at all?
53:22 Speaker 02 Corporate bonds, the spreads are widening, but not massively, which tells you that the risk reward in terms of solvency relative to price is slightly better in corporate investment-grade bonds relative to sovereign. I think that that's what people are basically implying, which is not dissimilar to the 2011 European crisis, where people saw a much larger level of comfort in corporate bonds than in sovereign bonds themselves.
53:55 Speaker 01 Which is amazing. So people trust Apple's balance sheet more than they do the US government's.
54:00 Speaker 02 I would definitely. I would, I would definitely, I don't know anybody else, everybody else, but I would definitely and certainly, and certainly in, in Europe and emerging economies. So I think that that space is relatively safer. And there's an important factor is that unlike in the previous crisis, the, the corporate world in general in 2020.
54:30 Speaker 02 Had already started a deleveraging process, but in 2020 started to hoard as much cash as they could, improve their balance sheet as much as they could, repay debt. I mean, you you see it on the earnings calls of quoted companies, the the very large companies. It's incredible how they focus 100% on the on the credit market. They're always talking about their cash ratios, their cash flow and their improvement in in debt. So I think that investment grade looks a lot better.
55:04 Speaker 02 I think obviously the the there is a challenge maybe in the in the convert bonds of some of the companies that can be converted into equity and the banks, obviously. And and you mentioned the most important part of the risk
55:27 Speaker 02 area in in this in this environment is small and medium enterprises. The large companies are going to navigate the situation probably admirably. But small and medium enterprises are going to have huge problems because the credit crunch will likely happen fundamentally in the smaller in the smaller businesses.
55:48 Speaker 01 Which is so difficult, especially having gone through the pandemic where many of them also bore the brunt of. Garson was asking earlier, can you define what we as simple investors expect when we say soft versus hard landing? What should we see feel here? It's a great question, but when you're talking about, and it is a perfect one, talking about small and medium sized enterprises, because at least in the US, they play a really important part, role in the economy. We have a a chart, if we can pull that up, of financial conditions, right? We saw the Fed's been trying to tighten financial conditions by raising interest rates with quantitative tightening, trying to sort of have less money circulating around the economy.
56:30 Speaker 01 And this chart looks like a dramatic fall off in that. Given everything that's happened, do you do you think that we are going to see a steep recession? Which is what I think people refer to, Garson, when they're talking about hard landing. Is that is it more severe? Is it is it sooner now, based on what we're seeing happen from this banking crisis?
56:52 Speaker 02 I think that I I continue to believe this this this idea of governments and central banks accepting a situation that is bad but doesn't hurt. So we might not see, we might see a technical recession. We had a technical recession in the United States last year. But it it and you have an evident loss of purchasing power of salaries and now deposits as well.
57:27 Speaker 02 That is, that is the path. That is the path is gradual impoverishment.
57:35 Speaker 02 And widespread. So it's, it might be a situation in which you don't have a crisis, which is, which is a massive contraction of credit for the entirety of the economy, good and bad. Businesses and families. And when I'm saying bad or good, it's not morally, as I'm talking financially, solvent. No. You might have a situation in which precisely because the problem,
58:09 Speaker 02 the the the root of the problem is the sovereign bond bubble, is that it just, it just permeates slowly and widely throughout, throughout society in a way in which it doesn't look like a crisis only because it's spread out for a few, for a few more years.
58:30 Speaker 01 That's so interesting because it's not what we've been used to, right? We've been used to these sort of deep Vs, right? These sudden jolts and then these sudden. So is there any way we can all avoid gradual impoverishment, Daniel?
58:45 Speaker 02 Yeah, those V-shaped recoveries that we talk about.
58:52 Speaker 02 They're painful, but they but that is the reason why the United States has three point five percent unemployment and the European Union has six point eight.
59:04 Speaker 02 Is is that, yes, it's it's very tough when you get into a crisis. But the crisis works as a way of cleaning up a lot of the excess of the past. And then the economy is so dynamic that it recovers quickly. And it recovers quicker in terms of employment, in terms of salaries, et cetera. And the and the and the end game is better off for the the economy.
59:33 Speaker 02 But that doesn't seem the it seems that there is a widespread view among political economists that it's better to go the Japanese or the European way than the US way. I I disagree entirely. I have been at the I don't know if the the opportunity. But certainly, there was a coincidence of living the financial crisis in the United States. And I saw the economy recover dramatically and very, very fast and very well. And I saw the European economy drag on for another ten years. So I don't I prefer B shaped recoveries.
1:00:14 Speaker 02 We cannot avoid the the I think that the question is, can we avoid a crisis? You cannot avoid a crisis. You you can you can prolong it. You can extend the problem, but then it becomes larger. That's why I think that what the Federal Reserve is doing with all the the questionable and and and and criticizable elements that they have done in the past. That's why I think that what they're doing is the right thing right now. But the right thing and in the devil's uh the devil's uh uh choice, no?
1:00:48 Speaker 01 Yeah. Well, part of it, I think you hit on it. It's also not, you know, the solution is never just going to be about the Federal Reserve. You need political, you call the political economists. I would suggest maybe just political. The political side of the equation on board too with the monetary side.
1:01:06 Speaker 02 And that is a very good point because. Nagy, think about this. This is the first inflationary crisis and this is going to be the first burst of a sovereign bond bubble in which governments pay no attention to what is happening and continue to increase expenditure, increase deficit spending.
1:01:30 Speaker 01 And win elections. That's what it is. That's what it's about, at least for the moment. Daniel, I want to, you've been so generous with your time and it's, we really just wanted to go longer today because it's so important that people understand this so that they can wrap their head around it and hopefully think about what it means to their own portfolio. So let's end on that. You know, we can never say what should investors do because everyone has a different risk profile, everyone, you know, is at a different age. I mean, we can't possibly know that. But are there ways to protect yourself in this environment? You know, we talked about gold briefly. Is this a hard asset environment? You know, how should
1:02:12 Speaker 01 investors be thinking about this and be thinking about maybe changing their framework for what sounds like not only a challenging period, but maybe a new regime that we're in?
1:02:23 Speaker 02 Yeah, I think that you're right. You need to have hard assets. You need to have,
1:02:29 Speaker 02 you need to have decorrelated assets. Very few assets have been decorrelated and gold is one of the very few. You need, you need to have dollar exposure because yes, the dollar is weak now and it's a little bit stronger before and all of that. But relative, in relative terms, if we are in a currency de-basement situation globally, there is no, in a fire, there is no other house with more rooms and more and more doors and windows, which is the US dollar. So you need to have US dollar. You need to have, and, and you need to really, really think long term and like between, in the, like in 2008, 2009.
1:03:15 Speaker 02 We are going to be creating in the next three to four months the best opportunities in uh everything that is disruptive. I, you know, in moments like this, markets tend to give you the siren call that makes you think about inside and to the past. So look at old businesses, uh sort of uh hmm things that we think are going to be there forever. And in my opinion, you actually have to do the opposite. In my opinion, you actually have to start to think about what is going to be
1:03:55 Speaker 02 the next Apple, the next uh uh Amazon, the next uh the next opportunities of disruptive uh opportunities in healthcare and aging, which are a key theme for me long term.
1:04:12 Speaker 01 Mm hmm.
1:04:13 Speaker 02 Technology, but with profits, not not PowerPoint presentations with with colors. Hmm. And in uh everything that has to do with uh not with E S G, the way that people have constructed it, but with efficiency, with improvement of uh the the living conditions and the use of uh resources. Everything that has to do with those things to me are things to look at for the long term.
1:04:43 Speaker 01 So interesting, you're not shying away from innovation, from tech. You're just being picky about where you're looking, understanding the balance sheets and kind of, again, back to that barbell or decorrelated. You want you want a little bit of everything, like truly diversified.
1:05:00 Speaker 02 And obviously understand that if there's if there's a panic, yeah, everything is going to fall. But but the and the reason why it's important to have. Dollar gold exposure is because it gives you a little bit of comfort to look for long-term opportunities in periods of panic. So I'm not in, I personally find no interest whatsoever. And obviously, somebody might sell me the opposite. But in, in, in the, uh, in some of the obsolete and, and allegedly, uh, long-term value names, there are a lot of value traps.
1:05:43 Speaker 02 But I, I like the concept of value from the perspective of what really value is, which is these are businesses that are worth something, that have good assets and that have good cash flow generation, et cetera. And that they are going to be the leaders that take us out of this mess. Because we will get out of this mess. By the way, I'm going to end on a positive note. It's in my, it's in my book. We're going to get out of this mess better. Uh, I guarantee everyone that the next year is going to be the best in humanity. And the way to do it and the way to get out of this mess is not by looking inside and at the past, but outside and to the future.
1:06:24 Speaker 01 Well, I'm glad you gave us that glimmer of optimism, Daniel, at the end. I think we all need it. But there was so much wisdom in there. And I think, I certainly feel like I have a sort of better understanding of the landscape. And I think a lot of us in our gut felt like this was way bigger than SVB. I think we know that. But I think you really helped lay that out for us. So, so appreciate you and all the time that you gave us today, even though we didn't ask, we just kind of went long, but it felt like it was important, given all the questions we were getting. Thank you so much.
1:06:53 Speaker 02 Thank you so much, Mel. Yeah, I enjoyed it thoroughly.
1:06:55 Speaker 01 And we will be back, as you know, where this is what this platform and this company was built for, is to try to arm people with as much information in these really stressful times. So we've got flash updates happening. Ash is going to be back at 10 a.m. Eastern live tomorrow to continue to sort of push ahead to what to look for. I'm going to do an Ask Me Anything an hour later at 11 a.m. with Mike Green. So you definitely want to tune in for that. Bring your questions. We're going to do what we did with Daniel, just try to unpack this, get his thoughts about what this all means and how we all need to think about it vis a vis our portfolios. Just hit that QR code if you're not already a member and you can find out how you can join us for all of that. Thank you for your time and your great questions. Take care and good luck out there, everyone.
1:07:41 Speaker 03 If we want to change the outcomes for this really screwed up world, where our wages don't go up, where we're being replaced by technology, where governments are massively in debt and we foot the bill via taxes, where we see debasement of assets and we can't afford as many assets as we like, so the rich get richer, the poor get poorer. If we don't like to see the rise of populism based on this broken society, because the promises of the future have been broken, let's make our promises to our future selves come right. And that's by unfucking your future.
1:08:19 Speaker 03 Some of this is going to really fuck your future in 20 or 30 years' time, but we've got time to figure that out, because it's unstoppable.
1:08:40 Speaker 04 What's up, revolutionaries? Thanks for tuning in to the Real Vision Daily Briefing. For more content like this, head over to realvision.com and get unfiltered access to the very best, brightest and biggest names in finance.
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