Pod Insights a16z Podcast Autonomy & Defense Policy in the 21st Century About this episode The nature of warfare is constantly changing, but there’s no doubt that autonomous weapons systems are the future. In this session, Anduril CSO Chris Brose, Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI 8th District), and author and moderator Jacob Helberg will discuss the evolution of the U. S. policy around the use of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), what a 21st century military should (and must) look like, and what they consider to be the right balance of public and private investment, and ownership, in autonomous defense technologies.
Transcript 0:21 Speaker 3 So we're near the
0:23 Speaker 2 end of the year in 2022, and we should set the stage. Europe is facing the bloodiest conflict that it's had since World War II, and Asia faces the looming threat of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. We've seen in Ukraine how technology and autonomous systems have changed the nature of modern warfare. So my first question goes to Chris. Are we seeing new a new paradigm where autonomous systems are becoming tools of first resort? And how have new technologies like autonomous system changed modern warfighting?
1:00 Speaker 1 Yeah, thank you. And sorry, let me apologize in advance for my voice. But uh I absolutely think we're seeing a paradigm shift. And you know, if you kind of wind the clock back, you know, really I think the trend that we've seen playing out uh almost since the end of World War II is the United States military, allied militaries have sort of increasingly moved in the direction of getting smaller and smaller, uh, having large, expensive, exquisite, sort of heavily manned, hard to replace systems as the core of their military power. Um, and we've been able to do that. We've been able to generate military advantage because uh we've been able to hide evade detection, project power, uh, and this has been the core of how we've done that. I think the problem that we've been seeing now over the past you know 25 or 30 years uh are adversaries who have very concertedly worked to disrupt that entire approach to warfare and all of the sort of ways and means that we use uh to wage it.
1:52 Speaker 1 And I think what you're now starting to see is a movement toward a different kind of military. Um I think this is not you know something that just kind of showed up in Ukraine, right? I mean, you can go back to Ukraine in 2014, you can go back to what you know we've seen play out in Iraq and Syria and even before that, which is essentially kind of a movement to larger and larger quantities of lower cost, you know, kind of more expendable, more intelligent systems. Uh, and and in essence, that comes down to autonomy as the sort of centerpiece. And I think the the sort of major kind of paradigm shift here is uh, you know, we've had a military where you've had large numbers of people required to operate small numbers of things. Um, and that model doesn't scale. And when you're competing against uh, you know, countries that are you know multiple times your population potentially uh soon to have you know RGDP technological parity, we've got to come up with a different way to do this.
2:45 Speaker 1 And I think these are the kinds of technologies that will allow us to generate mass, um, which I think is the real sort of uh resurgence here, which is how do you generate large quantities of things under the assumption that you're probably not gonna have them forever? You're probably going to lose them when you're competing with them. Um, and then you have to consistently sort of generate and regenerate that type of uh combat capability. So at the center of that has to be autonomy. It has to be uh a large number of things operated by a small number of people. Thanks.
3:15 Speaker 2 And Congressman Gallagher, uh, thanks for dialing in. I'm curious, how do you think technology has changed the nature of the war in Ukraine? And what are some of the lessons that you think our front-end center for defense policy planners?
3:27 Speaker 0 Well, first of all, I'm sorry I'm not there in person. We are uh about to vote here in the House. It's uh it's an occupational hazard. So uh and I was really looking forward to seeing uh two people that I consider good friends, both of you have written books that are absolutely essential when it comes to understanding the future of warfare and the current uh competition we are in with China. Um I think I mean I agree obviously with everything that Chris said because he's a genius, uh, but I think the the war in Ukraine is a perfect example of how the character of war can change with technology, but the fundamental nature of war stays constant. So on the one hand, you've seen capabilities like lordering munitions, unmanned surface vessels that allow Ukraine to punch above its weight in combat, you have commercial entities like Starlink, Twitter, and geospatial intelligence companies that have all contributed to Ukraine dominating the information environment.
4:23 Speaker 0 But on the other hand, if you look at what's proving decisive in conflict, it's all the factors that would be familiar to a general from World War II, right? It's unit morale, it's industrial capacity, it's it's national unity. Um and from children huddled in subway stations to bombed out cities to civilians executed on the streets, all the ugliest elements of war have returned uh as well. So despite all the technology that Chris has talked about and all the progress we've made since 1945, warfare on some level is still an industrial affair that's fought by human beings. And when it comes to kind of what lessons we can learn from that, lessons for policymakers, I think there's one that stands out above all the others, and that's the rate at which modern war burns through critical munitions stockpiles.
5:09 Speaker 0 I mean, look, since February 24th, you know, we've rightly provided Ukraine with critical capabilities they need to defend their homeland, but look at the cost, right? The US has expended thousands of missile and targeting systems. We're talking, I think the latest counts were over 8,500 javelins, uh, you know, 700 plus switchblades, you know, over 1500 stingers. And you think about what that would mean if we found ourselves in a conflict with China over Taiwan, uh, we would quickly go Winchester on critical munition systems. And given that the CCP's theory of victory would likely involve a knockout blow, any Taiwan war in which we want to have a fighting chance would necessarily take a while. It would be a protracted conflict. The only quick war would be a, you know, a short war would be a quick Chinese victory.
5:57 Speaker 0 So I think you know, there's two things uh uh that come out of that. Uh first, we need to dramatically expand our munitions industrial base so that we don't go Winchester in war. Uh, and second, we need to ensure that Taiwan has large quantities of munitions and other critical supplies pre-positioned on the island, right? The the same thing that makes Taiwan difficult to invade makes it very difficult to resupply. There's no pollen next door that we can resupply through. So that's a huge lesson we need to learn from Ukraine. And I'm just not convinced that right now Congress has internalized that lesson or that we're moving with the requisite sense of urgency.
6:36 Speaker 2 So how have you both seen uh US policy evolve over the last decade? And from your respective vantage points, do you see the current geopolitical climate changing US policy on critical technologies like autonomous systems moving forward?
6:54 Speaker 1 Chris, you're I'll jump in. Um I think US policy is starting to understand that these are the kinds of technologies that are really going to make a difference. Uh they're not going to be the you know sole capabilities. There's a lot of other things that we're going to need to be successful. Um but I think there's a realization that uh in many respects core technologies that are being developed outside of national defense uh need to be brought inside. So you're starting to see things uh to make that easier, uh, but it's still not getting to the kind of scale that we're going to need to get to the type of uh, you know, the type of solutions that Mike's talking about. Um, you know, it's all well and good to do small little pilot projects and prototypes, but you've got to get to production. And it's not just production of things that we've had, you know, 25 or 30 years. It's things that we need to be producing now that are new uh so that we have them in the coming years.
7:42 Speaker 1 Um I think in terms of uh, you know, kind of the the policy piece of this. I mean, a lot of it, you know, uh a lot of it really comes down to whether we have the seriousness to spend the level of resources required uh to buy at scale. Um, you know, nothing really matters unless you're able to generate the kind of mass that Mike is talking about that uh the Ukrainians need now, and I would say that's kind of the double-A-ball version of what you know, I think we're talking about in an uh sort of a an Asia Pacific scenario.
8:09 Speaker 2 Makes sense.
8:10 Speaker 1 Congress. I just would
8:11 Speaker 0 only add, I I sort of think it's uh Kenzian. It's uh the best of times, it's the worst of times, right? I mean, on the one hand, you know, there's a lot of people uh with resources and energy and ideas that want to get involved in the defense space, and they they see the incredible work being done at Andorrail, they see the notable successes of certain companies uh like SpaceX, and uh, you know, I think there's more people interested in this that wouldn't have been deploying capital in that space before. And you have policymakers, high-level policymakers that are at least willing to recognize that we have uh a problem, right? Um I was sitting at the Reagan Defense Forum, I don't know if it was last year or two years ago, and uh listening to Secretary Austin uh speak and talking about how we're gonna solve the valley of death issue.
8:57 Speaker 0 Like, okay, good, I'm glad we recognize we have an issue, but four years ago I listened to Secretary Mattis say the exact same thing. And then I read Chris's book about how we're nowhere near to solving that issue. And so that's where it's the worst of times. I think we still have some wrong-headed ideas about how we can uh leverage technology in general and commercial technology in particular. Uh, some of the messaging coming out of DOD on, you know, doubling down on the Sibers model, for example, it strikes me as totally ridiculous and counterproductive. And then when you sort of connect the technology to grand strategy such as it exists, then we have even greater problems. I still don't think we have a coherent sense of what our overall grand strategy vis-a-vis China uh is or should be.
9:41 Speaker 2 How would a potential Gallagher administration uh address the issue?
9:47 Speaker 0 Well, I do strongly believe that we have to stop electing boomers uh as president. So I would at least satisfy that criteria, but I I doubt I doubt I will be winning Iowa or New Hampshire or or even Wisconsin anytime uh soon. Um
10:01 Speaker 1 Sounds like a statement of intent. Yeah.
10:03 Speaker 0 Yeah, that's right. That's a Sherman-esque denial, Chris. Okay. But listen, I think it would involve a few things. One, uh, kind of related to what we're talking about. You know, we got to rebuild our defense industrial base capacity for vital munitions. And there you kind of have to straddle the line between public and private cooperation, right? So I think we have some low-hanging fruit, which is we can maximize existing production lines as opposed to just doing sort of minimum sustaining rates, meaning DOD shifts the demand signal for minimum sustaining rates to maxing out current production capacity and draw upon the help of multi-year procurement authority procurement authority to do that. And I do think we're going to make progress both on the authority side and on the appropriation side for multi-year procurement for munitions.
10:54 Speaker 0 And then we can start to work collaboratively with industry to identify any gaps or workforce challenges as we try and ramp up production. And there I think we have a lot of lessons that perhaps we can draw from our experience with Operation Warp Speed.
11:18 Speaker 0 But you can model you can modernize the Defense Production Act to provide direct project financing, automatic fast tracking of permits, investment in the defense workforce uh training. And then the hope is as you do that and start to rebuild our defense industrial base, then you get the next 10 Andorrill-esque type companies that get interested in this game. So to sort of end where I began, uh the reason a a Gallagher for President campaign won't take uh take off is because um talking about rebuilding the defense industrial base and uh stockpiling munitions west of the international dateline is not something that you can really sort of reduce to a talking point at the Iowa cornrust.
12:00 Speaker 2 Chris, so much has been said about America's industrial over reliance on Taiwan. Can you walk us through what Andrew is doing, how you guys are managing your supply chain security and uh how you guys are avoiding the risk of being overly reliant on China?
12:16 Speaker 1 Yeah, I mean, I I think as a defense company that, you know, was born five years ago, we kind of started from the premise that we cannot afford to have uh massive exposure to China. Um and I think in the five years that we've been a company, we've unwound uh and are in the process of unwinding, you know, what limited exposure we did have in things that were not, you know, nationally security, national security critical uh components. Um I think you know, the the bigger piece here is you know, really kind of what Mike is getting at and what uh Chris Power was talking about earlier. So, you know, if I were so fortunate to be a special assistant in the Gallagher administration, right? I think the focus is how do you onshore this kind of production capacity back to the United States and how do you stand up truly, you know, kind of a new approach to manufacturing for the defense sector, where you know, we talk about a lack of innovation in terms of capability.
13:06 Speaker 1 Um there's also a lack of innovation happening in terms of producibility and manufacturing, where we're still making very old things in very old ways. So, you know, a large amount of the reason we're bottlenecked on things like javelin uh missiles uh is because they're old systems made in old ways, and you cannot scale that but so much. So I think a lot of the focus that you know that we've been bringing at Andrew, uh and certainly kind of where we're going, is how do you do something that the defense base doesn't typically do, which is tool up to produce large quantities of things at very high rates uh to be able to change those things very quickly, right? So have an innovation cycle that's very fast. Um and you just need an entirely different approach to manufacturing to be that flexible and that scalable, so you're both innovating and scaling. Um, because you know, if God forbid we do end up in uh, you know, in a in a conflict um and we start losing the things that we have, we're going to have to be able to replenish them very quickly.
14:01 Speaker 1 So the answer can't be, you know, well, the Ukrainians are out of javelins, you know. Well, in two more years we'll get them more javelins. Um, this is, I think the problem that we've been focusing on here. Um obviously is table stakes that you can't be uh, you know, kind of embedded in a Chinese-based supply chain. It's more about how you build the robust manufacturing and modern manufacturing capability in the United States to solve this problem.
14:25 Speaker 2 And the topic of supply chains has only grown louder as uh President Xi Jinping recently delivered his speech at uh the Communist Party Congress where he irrevocably committed himself to reunifying with Taiwan. Congressman Gallagher, there's been so many conversations recently about TSMC and the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. How can the US better deter uh near-term conflict with China uh to potentially assist Taiwan? And are there any contingency plans for a potential Chinese takeover of Taiwan semiconductor fabs?
15:01 Speaker 0 Great question. Um when it comes to Taiwan, I think one of the problems is that time is not on our side. Um the 2020s, I sort of view as the decade of maximum danger. And many of the solutions we're thinking about right now are not going to bear fruit until the 2030s. So what would be a good example of this? Um AUKUS, right? We all love AUKUS. Great idea. We love the Aussies, we love the Brits. Uh, so I'm all for AUKUS, but you know, nuclear submarines uh, you know, built and operated by the Aussies with our help are not going to be patrolling the Pacific until the late 2030s at best. So I think we need to take the urgency uh we have to deliver uh submarine technology to Australia and match it in other areas as well. Uh take, you know, Chris is talking about uh uh some some certain systems, right?
15:48 Speaker 0 Take energetics, right, which are a broad category of explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics, things that make missiles go far and go boom. The problem is DoD is still largely using the same energetic material developed in the 1940s. And a third of that material is produced overseas with supply chains reliant on China, of course. Um that's a huge problem that I think we need to shore up uh in the near term. Uh we need to have some sort of aukus energetic initiative that could pull resources and collaborate so that we can produce new energetic materials and then eventually develop kind of long-range missile systems that could be put in Australia's northern territory or fielded in Alaska. And as for other things related to Taiwan, look, I mean, plan A, B, and C should be to move heaven and earth to actually deter an invasion, right?
16:38 Speaker 0 The lesson of Ukraine is that uh deterrence failures are very costly. Uh, but failing that, we need to be prepared to go to the mattresses uh to defend Taiwan over the long term because it's in our vital national security interest to do so. So uh, you know, I understand the point that you need to plan for every contingency, uh, but it seems pretty clear to me that there's no way we can just let the CCP come to control TSMC's production capacity or take it offline or destroy it. It would hand them the ability to economically blackmail the entire world, dictating who gets to participate in the modern economy and who doesn't. So it's all the more reason we need to ensure that it never comes to that.
17:20 Speaker 2 So my last question to both of you is what are some other areas other than autonomous systems that you think are aren't getting enough attention and are flying under the radar, and that you also think it'd have outsized impact on US defense policy.
17:35 Speaker 1 Yeah, so I'll I'll answer that question a little differently and kind of want to comment on something Mike just said. You know, the United States military that we have right now is mostly the United States military, God forbid, you know, people talk about a crisis in the late 2020s. That's what we're going to war with. Um I don't think that necessarily has to be the case. You know, there's a lot of things happening now with in terms of modernization, you know, kind of new programs that are being started. And to Mike's point, those things are gonna deliver in the early 2030s, and there's a lot of folks patting themselves on the back in the DOD saying, like, man, we're really mooting at the speed of relevance. Um I think the challenge to industry and particularly non-traditional industry is how do you actually develop and field en masse new systems over the next two, three, four, or five years that create an alternative pathway for us.
18:24 Speaker 1 Um I don't think that's like, you know, the requiring the invention of new physics. Like this isn't witchcraft. Like there is a way that we can do this if we are serious. Um that's the piece that I would foot stop. Like we have to be serious about this. Um I think you know, what you're seeing in Ukraine right now, the speed that they're innovating, the speed that they're fielding things. Um, that should be a lesson that we can take back to ourselves to say it does not have to be the case that we uh are going to war in the late 2020s with what we have in the early 2020s. And if that's if that's where we find ourselves, then shame on us.
18:58 Speaker 0 Well, I'm uh what you don't have to defy the laws of physics, but it is still rocket science, Chris. So it's very very difficult, quite literally. Um I think something you started off by saying, Chris, you talked about sort of, you know, the need to have less humans uh on the battlefield. I think at some point, and I say this as the ranking member of the military personnel subcommittee, we're just gonna have to come to grips with the just rising costs of human beings in DoD. And it's not just the cost of your average soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. It's the 813,000 DoD civilians, the massive bureaucratic bloat in OSD, in the joint staff. I mean, that is just sucking the life out of the building and sucking our focus away from actual war fighting. So that's one thing.
19:43 Speaker 0 The other thing I've been thinking a lot about lately too is that I don't know if you remember last year China tested a nuclear capable hypersonic glide vehicle. Uh it was a huge thing. Financial Times had a big story, and they quoted an intelligence community official saying we have no idea how. They did this. Well, the thing is, we do because it turns out that the Chinese hypersonic program has benefited from American semiconductor technology. So we keep finding ourselves in this position where we're financing or enabling our own destruction, and we have a contradictory policy where, on the one hand, we're saying we want to restrict the transfer of critical technologies to China through things like the entity list, but on the other hand, we're greenlighting unlimited investment in the worst of bad actors, including Huawei, DJI.
20:32 Speaker 0 You should have seen the lobbying effort against my DJI drone ban. I mean, it was just crazy. Uh, we're investing in Chinese defense contractors. So figuring out how to resolve that uh contradiction, figuring out how we have sensible um controls on outbound investment on U.S. capital uh flowing into uh Chinese entities and funding effectively the PLA modernization and communist genocide, I think it's gonna be a very difficult thing that we're gonna have to tackle in the next Congress.
21:01 Speaker 2 Thank you so much. Let's give a warm hand for Chris Burroughs from Andrew and Congressman Gallagher.
21:07 Speaker 3 Thank you.
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