Pod Insights a16z Podcast a16z Podcast | The (Definite) Optimism of Peter Thiel About this episode What is Silicon Valley’s greatest reigning monopoly? How did PayPal manage to emerge from the dotcom implosion? Can you build a great tech company and keep it private forever? And how did Elon Musk manage to wreck an uninsured, million-dollar car with Peter Thiel in the passenger seat speeding on the way to a VC meeting? Marc Andreessen and Thiel discuss all of it in a wide-ranging conversation that toggles off the topics in Thiel’s new book “Zero to One.”
Transcript 0:00 Speaker 1 Come on in, have a seat. Woo! There we go. If you're looking for a seat, it's just like church. There's two more up here in front. Former over here. The closer you get to the stage, the more likely you go to heaven. So for those of you who don't know me, I'm uh my uh my name is Charlie Rose Jr. Um I uh will be interviewing uh Peter Thiel today. Um everybody here probably is aware of Peter, my background. Um I will quickly recap uh his professional accomplishments uh as follows. Um, tech founder, CEO, venture capitalist, hedge fund manager, derivatives trader, corporate attorney, chess champion, political activist, book author, public speaker. We are thrilled to have him with us today. I'm really thrilled to be doing this. Um Peter is one of the people, I'm gonna run the risk of embarrassing uh him. He's one of the people I respect the most in the world.
0:46 Speaker 1 Uh and there's really three reasons for that. Um is uh Peter is those of you who have followed him over the years or have known him or have read his book, is a truly interdisciplinary thinker. Like he really draws threads together across fields. Um, and uh, or you might describe lateral thinker. Um always has an original viewpoint. Um and you always end up learning something. Um is uh Peter, I give Peter a lot of credit for what's happening in the Valley right now, because I think Peter really raises the bar on the people around him. Um he raises the expectations of the companies that he works with uh and the founders he works with, and he raises the expectations, I think, of the thinking that we all do in the valley. He's really you know substantively elevated a number of debates. Um and then third is just sheer intellectual generosity. Um he's a teacher, uh, and he was a teacher before the book.
1:33 Speaker 1 He was a teacher in a Stanford class uh that resulted in the the sort of bootleg notes uh uh Blake Master's notes that went viral, um, and now he is a teacher uh through the form of uh of this book. Um the book has come out, the book is called Zero to One. Um the book tour has been very highly publicized. Uh if you haven't, definitely go on Google News and type in Peter Thiel and you will get a cornucopia uh of excitement. Um the book tour has gone highly viral uh itself. Many things Peter said has gone viral uh in part because for some reason uh when Peter says something uh pessimistic or negative, it immediately goes viral. Um but uh Peter uh also uh is an enormously optimistic person about about many things. Um and so what I'd actually like to focus on today uh is the optimistic Peter Thiel. Um and so the things that Peter thinks are are going well, um, the areas where Peter thinks that things could clearly be improved.
2:23 Speaker 1 Um and then in particular, given the nature of of this audience, um, a little bit more of the how-to, which is like, okay, uh I got the basic idea, but like how do I actually do X? How do I make the world a better place? How do I build a fantastic company? How do I build a monopoly? Um so we will go through uh a number of those topics. Um I would like to start though by going uh back in history um to one of my favorite topics, which is which is PayPal, uh, which is the company that Peter founded and ran. Um the PayPal story is amazing. I think everybody here uh has a general sense of the PayPal story. Uh in particular, the founding story of PayPal has been quite well told, I think, and then also the fact that PayPal, of course, got bought by eBay and is now actually will become a public uh separate uh public company again very shortly. Uh when it goes when it splits, estimates are it'll be on the order of a 40 billion dollar public company.
3:13 Speaker 1 Uh so it's uh it's a very significant entrepreneurial achievement, business achievement. Um and then of course the PayPal Mafia has become central uh to Silicon Valley, and the people in who were at PayPal have become you know really formative and foundational people uh for the modern valley. Um what I'd really like to focus on is what I think is the really dramatic part, which is the middle part, um, which is what happened after the founding before the sale um because the world was a pretty exciting place. PayPal is an exciting company. Um so I like to set the stage by asking everybody to recall if you're old enough. Some of you were in uh uh elementary school at this time, but some of you will recall. Uh March of 2000, um, which was the high of the Nasdaq uh in the dot com bubble, which was possibly the most exciting month of all time. Um, because everything was going up into the right, everything was working, everything was wonderful, all companies could raise infinite amounts of money at higher and higher valuations.
4:07 Speaker 1 Um the new economy had arrived, Silicon Valley was going to win everything, um, and all was gonna be glorious. Um I'd like to start March of 2000 um by asking you to describe what was the state of PayPal in March of 2000.
4:20 Speaker 0 Well, we uh we at the start of the month we merged um Confinity and X.com, which was the company started by Elon Musk, uh PayPal is myself and Max Lefchin, and uh and the combined company had uh $15 million in the bank. Sorry, one
4:35 Speaker 1 five or five. One five, fifteen million dollars.
4:38 Speaker 0 We had a uh uh we had an exponentially growing customer base because we had these referral programs where we um you got a new um uh if you signed up you got $10. If you referred someone who signed up, you got $10. So we had a $20 customer acquisition cost. The customer base was growing at sort of a five to seven percent daily compounding rate. It had hit 100,000 users in on February 3rd, 2000, and it got to a million by mid-April of 2000. And with the exponentially growing customer base was also an exponentially growing burn rate since um we had no revenues and certainly uh no profits. Um and so the CFO had the projection that uh the 15 million dollars was gonna run out in about six weeks.
5:25 Speaker 0 Uh people did not seem especially worried about it at the time. Um, but uh but we we did um
5:31 Speaker 1 oh the reason they wouldn't be worried is because everybody knew you can always raise more money. You could always raise more money. Higher valuation.
5:37 Speaker 0 I think in fairness, Elon myself were were a little bit worried. Uh and uh we we sort of um we managed to uh yeah, we managed to raise some money that month. So what was that?
5:49 Speaker 1 So what was that like? What was fundraising like in March of 2000 for a company like this?
5:53 Speaker 0 Well, um it was uh it was it was much crazier. You know, there's always this talk, are we in a bubble again today? And um, and it's complicated question. I don't think we are, but but I think uh compared uh it's it's nothing compared to what it was at that time. So we had this round-the-world trip. There was one one day we were in South Korea, there were three competing investor groups we met with. There was a professor from a university who's hiding behind a palm tree in the hotel to spy on us and steal internet business models from the US. So there's this frenzied thing, you know, everybody was trying to get in on the action. Um I was uh one group then took me to the airport, and uh, and I was you know, I was running this new payment system, this new payment technology, uh, and I was not able to buy a plane ticket.
6:39 Speaker 0 My credit card didn't work, I probably just didn't have enough credit on it or something. Um they immediately and this was not disturbing at all. Um it was uh it was they were really excited, they bought me a first class plane ticket on the spot. Um the next day they called the law firm and said, you know, where do we wire the money? Um and the law firm figured, okay, they must have signed all the paperwork, so they gave him the account. So they wired five million dollars in. They had signed no paperwork. Um then the um, and then sort of the opening negotiation was um, you know, we're we're not telling you where the money came from. Um you have to take it. We're not telling you where you can send it back. And so, you know, and so we I mean we did it, we didn't end up taking them as investors, but but so but I I sort of um, and you know, there had been this this period for a year and a half, two years where things have been getting crazier and crazier, but there was sort of a sense in March 2000 that it was hard to imagine how it could go any crazier.
7:37 Speaker 0 Yeah. So you know, people sending five million dollars without paperwork, okay. Hard and and South Korea was a country was really hard to get money out at the time. They still had like all these capital controls, so it was it was phenomenal they got the money out. And um, and so we closed on, yeah, we closed on 100 million on Friday, March 31st, and the following Monday, the bottom fell out of the market. Okay. So then we had a some time to build the business.
8:04 Speaker 1 So the bottom falls out of the market. Um, and it's always hard to think about these things in retrospect, but kind of the bottom falls out of the market in March or April. Um a lot of people, I just remember from the time, a lot of people, you know, there were sort of equal arguments of like, okay, this is it. And I remember like Roger McMahon, I think in particular came out and said, this is it, like you guys don't understand. Like the end is here. Um and then other people came out, and of course, the conventional wisdom that had worked in the stock market for the preceding eight years or so had been by the dips. Um and so people said, woo, this is great. It's a buying opportunity, um, because everything will go up to the right again. It it took a while for it to become clear what was actually happening. What was what was the view inside the company, and what how were you and Elon kind of processing through this, especially given that I assume the burn continued then? There was there
8:44 Speaker 0 was a sense um, we did dial back the marketing pretty quickly, although there was um there was uh the the then there then emerged this very big fraud problem in rapid succession. Um, and so the burn stayed over 10 million a month um all the way through September 2000. So we had um sort of seven months in a row of uh 10 million plus burn. Um we kept raising some more money in these additional tranches. And um, and there was you know, there was a sense, I think, in the few weeks afterwards that everything was over, but then I'd say that that by the summer, there was sort of a sense that you know there was actually still a lot of time left. And I remember having conversations, the two conversations I remember were um were mid-April.
9:32 Speaker 0 Uh his group of friends, um, and we had this event on a Sunday, and it was let's take a picture of everybody on the day the internet ended. And um, and so and that was actually that day was the low. It went from 5,000 to 3100, and then it recovered um that the next Monday. But then um, sort of end of August 2000, talking to one of my friends, and it's like, you know, the NASDAQ was back at 4200, you know, it's gonna go all the way to 6,000. And then it was after Labor Day 2000 when it just went straight down for you know month after month for two years. And so yeah, we I mean we had sort of all these blocking and tackling problems to deal with. It felt uh it felt really, really chaotic on the inside.
10:17 Speaker 0 Uh uh we got on top of the fraud problems starting in um fall of 2000. We had all this money, so um you know there's always it's always good to have more capital rather than less, but uh but certainly one downside was perhaps we didn't move quite as quickly in figuring out the business model. We had uh you know the business model in early 2000s was you were gonna upsell people on financial services. Um and you know, online banking customers were valued at 50,000 a customer. And so if we could acquire customers for 20 dollars, that was a great arbitrage. Yes. Upsell all of them to 50,000 online banking customers. Um then um, and then sort of by fall of 2000, we had sort of zeroed in on uh on just payments being the thing to do, and you had to you had to just take a slice of all the money you that went through the system.
11:10 Speaker 0 And
11:11 Speaker 1 is that when the really the like had the eBay kind of attach happened? Was that at that stage, or had that already happened? They were they were sort of um Well, you were you at that point the the default payment system on eBay by then. Yeah, we we'd started uh targeting eBay January
11:26 Speaker 0 2000. I'd say it was 30, 35% of the sellers in eBay were using us by April or May, so it was it was fairly heavily embedded. They had an alternate um payment system called Bill Point. It was sort of a partnership, a joint partnership between eBay and Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo didn't want to take any fraud risk, and so um the product was you can always get a product to be uh fraud proof if it's unusable. Right. And so the bank had a bias
11:52 Speaker 1 to have a have it's kind of both sides. You can always you can always take all the customers if you're willing to take all the fraud. You can always shut off all the fraud if we're willing to shut off all the customers.
11:59 Speaker 0 Yes.
12:00 Speaker 1 So one could argue there was a little bit of that, you know, a little bit of both of those happening. So
12:03 Speaker 0 we were we were sort of on the customer side and um eBay was on the anti-fraud side. Yeah. Um but so yes, there was it was this very uh, but then you had this very weird dynamic with eBay for the next uh two and a half years where uh it was sort of symbiotic, but it was sort of like they owned ran this big store, and there was a different company that ran the cash out registers, and the people running the store could never figure out how to get their cash machines to work. If they just figured out once we'd be in trouble, they never seemed to quite be able to figure it out, though, and eventually they bought the company.
12:33 Speaker 1 So it's so it's fall of 2000, going into winter of 2000, spring of 2001. It is now clear that the you know, the world, the nuclear winter has arrived um and the money is shutting off. Um, you know, my my the particular thing I remember very vividly is you know, the great taking loud cloud public
12:47 Speaker 0 in
12:48 Speaker 1 March of 2001. Um
12:50 Speaker 0 that was about the the last point where it shut down.
12:52 Speaker 1 Yeah. Our last money came in like March April 2001. 2001, right. Um and so um, and I remember just we were on the road for three weeks, and while we were on the road for three weeks in March of 2001, the NASDAQ dropped in half. Um sorry, was it the NASCAR is it tech stocks dropped in half? I think it might have been the NASDAQ might have dropped in half again. Um but like literally all of our comps, the way you your price IPOs is you price based on comparables of existing public companies, and literally we're on the road selling stock and the comps all drop in half. Um and then Yahoo blew up and Intel blew up, and like all these big technology companies uh blew up. So it was through that time it was becoming clear that the nuclear winner had arrived. Um you guys still had the tiger by the tail in terms of you still had the growth, you had the eBay thing. Um how did you kind of process through though? Okay, like we really now are in a different environment. Like how different did the business plan get when it became crystal clear that the capital spigot was turning off.
13:39 Speaker 0 Well, we just um we just dialed up the the amount we charged to people. So we we had had this tagline in early 2000, uh, always fast, free, and secure. And so the the and so there was a question how do you charge customers if you say that your product's always going to be free? Um so um and so uh David Sachs, who uh uh uh ran the the product team came up with this idea of um upgrading people, and so you were upgraded from a customer to a business account, you know, and then there were all these extra benefits and just had to just pay a small 2.9% fee on every payment. Uh uh you just had to click one button to be upgraded. And uh one of the things that did work uh with the payments companies once you had all these customers, you could actually upgrade people because you already had all the payment information.
14:27 Speaker 0 So there were all these other companies have been built on acquiring lots of customers and then upselling them later. And it turned out the day you tried to upsell them, they all left. Right, right. Um but in our case, uh we we had very little attrition. Right. And then it took the company public? We took the company um, so yes, we we got to break even in September 2001. We were the first company in the US to file after 9-11, filed end of September. Uh we took it public in February of 2002. Uh, and then eBay bought it in uh July of that year. So what was
14:59 Speaker 1 it like doing an IPO in February of 2002? It was it was probably the sky was sort of still falling, but a lot of the sky at that point was on the floor. Well, there's uh there's
15:06 Speaker 0 a lot of yeah, there are a lot of crazy things. So there was um certainly um certainly the press had become much more hostile in all these uh all these strange ways. That's like the understatement of
15:18 Speaker 1 all time. So there was um had gotten up to the
15:20 Speaker 0 windows.
15:21 Speaker 1 I'm not
15:21 Speaker 0 gonna
15:21 Speaker 1 get the quotes
15:22 Speaker 0 exactly right, but there was this article um this um sort of this column in the I think it was a San Jose Mercury News around uh October of 2001 after we'd filed our IPO and it was uh the title was Earth to Palo Alto. Um and has anyone sent uh told these people that um you know um you can't have a company in which the average age of the executives and the S1's 29 years old. You can't have um, you know, we don't we need uh money a company that people think might be used for terrorist money laundering as badly as we need an anthrax epidemic,
15:55 Speaker 1 right?
15:55 Speaker 0 And on and on and on.
15:57 Speaker 1 Um we uh we
15:59 Speaker 0 had uh we had um as we you know when you when you file for an IPO you you get uh these S1 forms um that you have to uh you have to do with the SEC and you get a reviewer from the SEC and and uh there's sort of a spectrum of people, some are better, some are worse. Um and we had this uh one person named uh Gottly, who the our lawyers in advance was, oh yeah, there's one person who's just terrible if you get this got leave guy. And we and he sort of ideologically believed companies should not go public. They were all run by crooks. And so it was this this crazy open-ended process where uh it would be things like you have to disclose that um you're not allowed to do business in Louisiana anymore. It's like, oh well, that's news to us. Um I just talked to them. And you know, it's he like he was seeking out reasons.
16:45 Speaker 0 So I'm calling from the SEC to the state banking officials in Louisiana. Uh is it is PayPal allowed to do illegal banking activity in Louisiana and sort of no, if they're engaged in illegal banking, you're not allowed to do that. And then he came back to the company and said you have to disclose that. So it had uh it was sort of a rather crazy process, but we we we somehow got it public, just like you guys got Cloud Cloud Public and um February 02, and then uh and then there was you know there was always this complex negotiation with eBay for for close to two years. And I think I think one of the types of negotiation that's always super complicated is when you have a sort of a bilateral monopoly where you have one person who's a seller and one person who's a buyer. Um and it did it actually did make a lot of sense.
17:31 Speaker 0 And by that
17:32 Speaker 1 you mean by that I mean it wasn't like there was anybody else eBay could buy. You were it, because you were already the default. Yes. And there was no real number two other than eBay itself. And then there was really nobody else for you to sell to at that point. Well,
17:42 Speaker 0 nobody else, people would be scared that eBay would shut us off. Right. So
17:45 Speaker 1 75%
17:45 Speaker 0 of the volume was on eBay. Right. So we could only sell to eBay. It made a lot of sense to combine the companies because there were actually huge synergies. Um and uh and so there was always this this uh super complex question what the what the price was. You know, once you had it as a public company, you could just say some percentage premium to that. Well,
18:02 Speaker 1 let's talk about that for a second. So, how many how many different deals almost happened before the actual merger?
18:07 Speaker 0 There were there were I'd say five separate, we had the first serious negotiation was late 2000, there was one in spring of 01, there was one in fall of 01. Right. There was one in March of 02, right after the IPO that looked like it almost came together, and that fell apart, and then it was like you know, gonna be this um uh this crazy uh eBay PayPal war that was gonna escalate. Um and then in June of 2002, um there was this eBay convention in Anaheim, and uh you know, it was sort of a big company. We managed to get a booth there, even though they weren't that friendly to us at the time. So we sent 30 people down to the convention, and we uh we handed out all these PayPal t-shirts.
18:52 Speaker 0 And so um that this was and so they saw this sort of all their power sellers wearing PayPal t-shirts, and they um that at that point they decided to buy the company. Yeah.
19:04 Speaker 1 And did the price yes,
19:06 Speaker 0 they did. Um did the price did the price go continuously up through the negotiation? Do you think? Um I think it was about the same in June as it was in March, but again, it was gonna contact with the market, kept going down.
19:16 Speaker 1 Okay, right. Because on the one hand, you were growing, eBay was growing. They were trying to compete with you and they weren't able to. On the other hand, the world was falling apart. It went it went down, uh
19:23 Speaker 0 it went up a lot relative to the pre-IPO. So if we had not taken it public, it would have been a much lower valuation. Right, right.
19:30 Speaker 1 Um so uh what do you think would have happened had you not sold PayPal? Um PayPal continued as an independent company. What would have happened? It's hard to
19:39 Speaker 0 say. You know, the the certainly um certainly if you'd been able to keep it going as an independent company, it would be a lot bigger 10, 12 years later. Uh there were, you know, there were sort of a lot of crazy risks. There was uh you know, there was an investigation, Spitzer started for vice-related payments we were doing. Well, he would know.
19:59 Speaker 1 Um
20:05 Speaker 0 Yeah, we did more, not so much the adult, it was more the the uh the the offshore sports uh betting sites um and um and uh we got the notice the the uh acquisition was announced on uh Monday July 8, 2002. We got the notice on uh Tuesday, July 9. Um and so if you sort of had the counterfactual experiment, you know, it would have been like you know, probably the stock would have been hit 20 to 40 percent. And um, and then the question is would eBay have tried to take advantage of that of that to hurt the company. So there's sort of our all these scary scenarios had it stayed um, had it stayed uh stayed um a standalone company. Um but certainly there are all these postmortems, and um we've you know
20:54 Speaker 1 we've
20:55 Speaker 0 debated uh uh many times whether it was the right thing to sell or not. Um, you know, it's it's always a somewhat sad thing when you sell your company because you don't you you you sort of no longer running it, you no longer have control over it. It's like you know, um you want to sell your kit or something like that. Um but it's um I'm I'm still of the view it was it was the right thing to do. I think I think most tech MA deals don't make sense because most of the time there's no there are no synergies. This is one where it made tremendous sense.
21:24 Speaker 1 Yeah.
21:24 Speaker 0 It was because of the dependency because of the bilateral. Yeah, and the volume increased tremendously after the acquisition.
21:30 Speaker 1 So um, so of course PayPal now is famous for the PayPal Mafia, and so you know, just to list names, you know, you and Reed Hoffman and Roloff and David Sachs and you know, a whole cast of I mean the the Yelp, you know, the Yelp guys, uh, you know, uh the YouTube guys kind of aut Max um and you know, everybody basically like you know, there's I don't know what 10 or 12 people who have gone on to do really foundational things, right? And and and for and one indication of that, like the the most like amazing venture capital portfolio of all time would be if you just simply invested in all the PayPal founders, uh or all the PayPal uh people for all the new companies. Um but you know that's how we know these people now, and now they're out and about they're doing their things at the time, they were all working for you. Um so what was it like what was it like with all those personalities uh in that place at that time? We had a lot of strong personalities.
22:14 Speaker 0 Um there were, you know, I think um, and I think the company had its share of challenges. So, you know, one one one cut I have on is always this question why was why were there so many successful companies that came out of PayPal? I think it's a hard question to answer, but but sort of one of the lessons you learned at PayPal was it was hard but possible to build a great company. And there were sort of a lot of ups and downs, a lot of uh challenges, um regulatory fraud, marketing, business model, you had sort of work out over the two and a half, three years. Um the uh I think that's actually not the lesson people normally learn in these companies. Um because most of the time people are either in companies that fail, and then the lesson you learn is that it's impossible to build a great company, and so the next time around you try for something that's less ambitious.
23:05 Speaker 0 And so, and then you certainly will not build a great company, or you are in uh a company where everything works just phenomenally from day one, sort of like Microsoft or Google, where you then learn the lesson that it's easy to build a great company. And there's a way in which um um both the lesson that it's easy and the lesson that it's impossible are sort of equally wrong because uh both lessons uh tell you that you don't there's no point in working hard, or you don't need to work hard. You know, impossible, no point, easy, no need, and so you end up not uh not doing what it takes. So I think there was sort of this intermediate aspect where even though PayPal was not as successful as some other companies have been, um, it was a context in which people uh got a very good perspective on what what
23:53 Speaker 1 you needed to do. Yeah. So I think when people, when founders today who are, you know, have read about you guys or met you guys, I think they view that you guys must have been an incredibly harmonious organized team that probably worked in lockstep and kind of probably completed each other's sentences and got along really well at all times. Is that how it was?
24:09 Speaker 0 Uh not sure if that's precisely correct. Um I mean there's certainly there's uh certainly always an aspect where um all's well that ends well. Right. And um, and uh but but certainly there were sort of all sorts of crazy uh points of uh points of conflict. You know, I I always think um conflict happens when different people want to do the same thing. And one of the challenges in it's not when different people want different things, it's when people want the same thing.
24:37 Speaker 1 Okay.
24:38 Speaker 0 And um and in a and so the challenge you have as a boss is to try to have people do different things. If you're like a sociopathic boss, what you you know, what you do is you tell two people to do the exact same job, and you'll generate a fight out of nothing. Right.
24:52 Speaker 1 Uh and so if you if you don't want to and there are bosses who do that.
24:55 Speaker 0 And there are probably there are some bosses who do that. And so if you want to avoid that, you should always have people do different things. The challenge in a startup is that there's a lot of fluidity in the roles, and so people end up doing a lot of different things, and there's sort of ways these roles overlap. Um David Sachs, our head of product, uh liked to say that the uh product was a single seamless whole, which was certainly true on one level, but then of course was a recipe for the product team being in conflict with absolutely everybody in the company, since um the fraud team thought the product should be different, or the customer service team thought, you know, there's certain customer questions that should be answered, um, and on and on down the line. Um but uh but yeah, no, there
25:36 Speaker 1 were there were a lot of
25:37 Speaker 0 a
25:37 Speaker 1 lot of crazy challenges. Yeah. So one of the defining kind of industry defining members of the PayPal Mafia, the Elon Elon Musk. Um, and so you uh had the opportunity, I think you've probably first met Elon when you uh when you guys uh ultimately ended up merging our companies together and then worked with him, and obviously you've known him very well since I know you've been very close to and very kind of uh you know, you you've been tracking very carefully and been involved with in various ways his companies that he's built since. Um, you know, given the prominence that he has in our industry, and given how I I mean my view is he's really shaking up the view of what's possible in Silicon Valley. And we could talk about that um at length. Um so I'd like to kind of probe a little bit into like a your view on what makes Elon tech, because I think you're kind of uniquely situated to do that. So I'd like to start with um what was what was Elon like to work with at PayPal? Like how long did you guys actually work together and what were the jobs and what was he like to work with?
26:27 Speaker 1 Well, he was uh
26:28 Speaker 0 incredibly um smart, incredibly um hard working and um incredibly ambitious. So it was definitely not the person you wanted to compete against. So this was the first encounter we had with him was as this competing company four blocks down the street on University Avenue in downtown Palo Alto. And so um, and so I I do think one of the really good things we did was to was to join forces in March uh 2000. Uh there were all sorts of challenges in in getting this work worked out in all these different ways. Uh, you know, and there's so many different Elon stories I can tell. Um there was there was one um, I believe this was literally the day of the market peak in March of 2000. Um, and we were we were uh driving up to Sandhill Road to meet with uh one of our VCs to brainstorm on how to raise some money.
27:17 Speaker 0 Um Elon had made um fair bit of money in his previous startup, most of it had gone into had gone into X.com. One million dollars has been spent on McLaren X1 sports car.
27:28 Speaker 1 For those of you, this is worth a Google search. This car, well, this it was the it was the it was the first million dollar sports car. Something like that. It was it's it was basically the supercar of it. It's like just take the most extreme idea of what a car could be, and this was it. And we, you know, and we uh
27:42 Speaker 0 we were driving up uh Sandhill um, we've we were supposed to prepare for the meeting. We just talked about the car, you know, it goes zero to a hundred miles per hour in six seconds. He'd taken it up to 180 on the highway 280, it's pretty fast miles per hour. Um, you know, we um we got to the part of Sandhill right past Santa Cruz, where it's sort of a uh four-lane, two-lane each way, uh 35 mile per hour zone, and it was sort of time for a demo, and we can sort of debate who go to who into uh doing the demo. Um but um it the car was taken from 45 to 85 miles per hour in two seconds flat while changing lanes. Uh Elon, the driver lost control, it skidded. There was enough torque because he sort of turned the wheel while accelerating really hard that as it hit the side of the road, we sort of achieved uh uh the car went up in the air.
28:31 Speaker 0 There was about four to six feet between the car and the air. We did a 360 degree rotation in the air, you know, horizontal, not vertical, but horizontal. And then it um and then it crashed into the road, and uh it was sort of a it was sort of like an unidentified flying object over sandhill road. The uh the the first uh the first person who stopped uh told us that she uh didn't really want to stop that day. She figured the people in the car were just dead and she didn't really want to deal with that.
29:00 Speaker 1 Um but
29:02 Speaker 0 it had a you know had a it had a crash resistance driver compartment that Elon had told me all about as we were driving uh up the road. So it has this Hitchcock like feel. Um and as we uh and uh and the and the first thing uh Elon said was uh you know, wow, that was really intense. And then um and then it was um, you know, I'd read all these stories about people who made a lot of money and bought sports cars and crashed them, but I knew this would never happen to me. And so um, and so I uh I of course had no insurance on the car. And then um, and then we actually, you know, uh we both had a little bit of whiplash, but we first uh hitchhike and went to the VC meeting, and then um and then sort of went to see a chiropractor afterwards. Um but anyway, we were both we were both ended up being we both ended up quite fine.
29:49 Speaker 0 But uh but there was sort of so there was always this sense that um, and this is what I think is sort of remarkable at the the Elon story in retrospect, uh, was there was always Always sense that Elon really pushed the envelope. And certainly, you know, certainly on the uh Well, by the
30:05 Speaker 1 way, I just want to go back to it's not just the driving. It was this was his liquid net worth. Is that he put into the car? I think he had it was like one third of it.
30:14 Speaker 0 Yeah, it was like a significant part. There was one of the investors I talked to years later who talked to us in summer of 2000 and said he didn't want to invest in the company because the CEO, Elon was living in a one-bedroom condo in Palo Alto at the time. And the CEO was clearly lying to him because he told him that his car was worth more than his house.
30:35 Speaker 1 Of course, it's not true. It
30:36 Speaker 0 was totally true. Right. And so anyway, there were sort of a lot of uh lot of crazy stories like this. But I think so. I think I think um, and so I think there, I think certainly when Elon um went on to start Tesla and SpaceX um in sort of two, oh three, oh four time frame. Um, you know, with respect to both companies, I think the conventional wisdom was that they were not going to succeed. It was it was uh way too ambitious. Oh,
31:07 Speaker 1 the conventional wisdom was he was out of his mind. Yes, something like that. I mean, either what you knew two things. You knew two things in life. You knew there would never be another American car company. And you knew that. You knew that because they made a movie about it, right? They the last major American car company was called Tucker. And they made a movie about what a disaster it was and why you never ever start a car company in the United States. And then SpaceX, there hadn't been a new, I mean, uh rocket ship company in 60 years. Yeah, so
31:32 Speaker 0 there's always there's always sort of a half full, half empty version. I had a conversation with Elon in 2008 when it was still the jury was still far from clear on either Tesla or SpaceX. Um, we ended up investing in SpaceX as founders' fund in 08, was sort of six years into the process, and people thought we were crazy to invest um six years after they'd gotten started. And um on the Tesla side, um, yeah, Elon's commas, yeah, there hadn't been a new car company in the US. The last successful new car company in the US had been Jeep, which was started in 1941. Right. Um and so you know, the standard interpretation would be well, you can't start a new car company. Elon's interpretation was you know, it's about time for a new car company. Right, right. And so there's always a half full, half-empty version of these things.
32:20 Speaker 0 But I think, you know, I would say if you take both SpaceX and uh Tesla, what I think did work, um, and was was perhaps very underrated for for many years. Um in both cases, um, you know, uh I always have this sort of anti-competition bias, and the competition was really weak. And so describe what you mean, like which competition. Well, I think I think you want to, you know, you want to aim you you don't want to go for the things that are the most competitive. Um, you know, um, you know, you it's sort of opening a restaurant is my sort of the paradigm example of an intensely competitive and really bad business idea.
32:57 Speaker 1 Um and uh and so
32:59 Speaker 0 to the extent you're competing, you want to compete against um industries that are somehow where something's sort of off and you can do something that's very, very different. And certainly the US car companies were very off, they weren't gonna build an electric car ever. And so there was a way in which he picked really weak competition there. And then aerospace was where these sort of weird government quasi-government conglomerates that were pretty badly managed by the 2000s as well. So I think there was sort of an opening to to do this. Um the thing that's you know, most of the innovation that we do um involves some combination of brilliant breakthroughs and sort of step-by-step iteration. We're sort of very good at iteration. We're pretty good at occasionally coming up with brilliant breakthroughs. Um, but I think both Tesla and SpaceX were stories that involved complex coordination where you needed to get a lot of different pieces uh to fit together in just the right way.
33:52 Speaker 0 And so if you ask, you know, what was the real breakthrough with Tesla or the real breakthrough with SpaceX, it was actually that you had everything coordinated. I think something similar is probably true with the iPhone with Apple. There was, you know, no single part that was massively better than anything that had come before, but it was actually getting all these pieces together in just the right way. And um, and there was sort of a vertical integration to that that uh people generally did not do, and that I think he pulled off
34:20 Speaker 1 in both cases.
34:22 Speaker 0 So
34:22 Speaker 1 we have um I want to leave time for audience QA, but I want to hit a few more topics uh before we go to that. So um you alluded earlier, let's just do a kind of a situation check on where we are in Silicon Valley right now. So you alluded earlier to, I mean, obviously there's the high can there's been high concern for some time that there's a new bubble forming. Um even some of the some of us who have said there's no bubble have now started expressing public concerns about burn rate um and loss of discipline, you know, money. You talked about the you know, the the five million dollars shouldn't be the account. I haven't heard that specific story happen yet, but I wouldn't be surprised,
34:49 Speaker 0 um,
34:49 Speaker 1 given some of the activity, especially for money coming in from outside Silicon Valley. So what's your assessment? What's it bubble? What why do you say why are you confident when you say not a bubble? Like how do you think about that?
34:58 Speaker 0 I'm not sure you can ever be fully confident. Um but I think I think these, and we've had certainly a history of all these crazy bubbles for a few decades now. You know, there was the uh Japan had this crazy bubble in the 80s, um, you had the tech industry in the late 90s, you had the housing finance one in the last decade. So it's definitely reasonable to ask the question is there another bubble? Um I tend to think um the bubbles always required the public to be involved in a very big way, and there were these psychosocial phenomena on some level. And um, and this the public is not really involved because the companies are not going public till extremely late in the cycle. And there may be, I haven't looked the exact numbers, maybe 30 or 40 tech IPOs a year versus something like 300 in the late 90s. And so um in this entire boom, the public has in some sense uh not really been involved.
35:44 Speaker 0 Um is that more because they haven't been able to get involved in the public? Well they haven't been able to haven't been able to. Because they haven't
35:52 Speaker 1 wanted to.
35:52 Speaker 0 Well, they probably haven't wanted to, they're probably still burned. They probably haven't wanted to. The companies haven't wanted them. You know, it's all all sorts of different factors. Um but I would say the other the other thought on this bubble question is I think I think if you identify it, my candidate for where the bubble is today is it's the government printing money, it's the government bonds, um, it's um minus two percent real interest rates. And um, and so the things that are bubble-like are the things that are most like government bonds. So that's corporate bonds, it's um probably housing, which is linked to the very powerfully linked to the interest rates. Um, and then to some extent, it's stocks that act like bonds. So it's stocks that pay very high dividend yields. Um, it's a lot of the old tech stocks, like Oracle or IBM or Microsoft, where you um financially model them like government bonds, and the most important variable in evaluating them is the discount rate.
36:47 Speaker 0 Um most of the kinds of companies we invest in are actually the the main variable that dominates is growth. How fast do they grow? And so if the if the bubble is centered on the risk-free interest rate, then you have to be careful of assets that um are linked to the risk-free interest rate. Um, and things that are actually linked to growth are very different. And so I don't know, sort of one way I've put it is, you know, I probably three quarters of my net worth is in illiquid tech stocks in Silicon Valley, and it's because I believe there's a giant bubble centered on government bonds, and this is the furthest I can get from it. Government bonds. Yes.
37:24 Speaker 1 Furthest from government bonds.
37:25 Speaker 0 Interesting.
37:25 Speaker 1 Um so that actually leads me to another, you mentioned uh companies like Microsoft and Oracle. So you said we've been talking a little bit publicly on this topic. So take us through what your theory on what's you um I think I think you're you're I think your nomenclature is tech companies and is it anti-tech companies? Um or how do you describe that? You see define a technology company and then describe your view of some of the large incumbents like Microsoft and Oracle and why you don't necessarily view them as technology companies.
37:50 Speaker 0 Well, when you uh when you invest in a company, um, there's always a question are you investing on the creation of new technology, or are you or are there cases where you're betting against the creation of new technology? And so um so I would say that um there is a whole set of companies in the Nasdaq 100 that are actually bets against technological innovation. So Microsoft is a bet that there will never be anything like Linux, it's a bet that there will be uh that the operating system won't ship to mobile platforms, it's a bet that nothing will change. You know, IBM is a bet that we'll keep the same Clue G software from the 70s and 80s and need lots of service people to support it. Umracle is sort of a bet against cloud computing. Um so uh um there are sort of a lot of it doesn't necessarily make these bad investments, but uh the fundamental thing you're doing is you are uh betting against technological innovation.
38:44 Speaker 0 And this is always obscured because the companies themselves have this pro-tech narrative because there was some point in history when they were actually technology companies. Microsoft was a technology company in the 80s, probably still in the 90s, um, you know, much less so in 2014. But that's you know, when when Microsoft recruits engineers in 2014, it doesn't say, you know, you're working at a bank where we're just you know, money's just flowing as long as nothing happens elsewhere in the world. Um and so you know, General Motors was a technology company in the 1920s.
39:18 Speaker 1 Right.
39:18 Speaker 0 Um by the 70s and 80s, uh investment in GM was a bet against Japanese and German uh innovation in cars. Right. And so there's always this that you always have this sort of
39:28 Speaker 1 an arc. Right.
39:29 Speaker 0 Well,
39:29 Speaker 1 let's let's probe on that for one more direction. Um so uh you you talked as in your book and on the book tour, you've talked a lot about your theory of monopoly versus commodity, and in a nutshell, right, Peter's thesis, two kinds of businesses, monopoly, commodity monopolies are sort of infinitely profitable and can go on to do all kinds of amazing things.
39:44 Speaker 0 Oh, but very profitable.
39:45 Speaker 1 But very problem is the consequence of being profitable, he would argue, can go on to do very amazing things. Commodities inherently are zero profit, and the enemy of innovation is therefore um is is being zero profit because you can't afford to fund innovation. So commodity companies are not gonna innovate. Um So, you know, sort of the sort of revised thesis, monopoly is better than commodities. On the East Coast, you know, the reaction to that has largely been panic and freakout. On the West Coast, the reaction to that among founders has been, hell yeah, let's go build monopolies.
40:14 Speaker 0 This is certainly the advice that this is certainly on the how to advise side. If you're an entrepreneur founder, you always want to build a monopoly. Now there's a public policy question as to when these things are good or bad. That's a somewhat separate question. Right, which is why you get the East Coast reaction. But so and those are two different questions, just to be clear. But I think uh from the point of view of someone who's starting
40:32 Speaker 1 these companies, you always want to go for monopoly. So let me ask you this though. So you describe, you describe companies, you describe companies that basically have become, as you said, sort of bank like uh bets against technology, Microsoft, Oracle, um, and uh General Motors. And um, I forget there was a fourth one in there. Um sorry, IBM, IBM, IBM. And so you could describe, like I think you could describe it. There was a point at which all four four of those companies had become monopolies. Microsoft's Microsoft certainly. Uh obviously, General Motors at one point was some giant market share of US auto production. Um Oracle is some giant share of databases with enormous pricing power. Um and IBM obviously is like it IBM's at one point, actually, well, IBM went through decades of actually antitrust prosecutions over being a monopoly, and even today has a very large monopoly position in sort of uh it's the Fortune 500 uh in terms of global services.
41:18 Speaker 1 So how do you reconcile your view that monopolies are the enabler to competition? Like what like how do you sustain that view in the face of the observation that these companies that that were monopolies um are no longer innovative?
41:30 Speaker 0 Well, I think there's always uh a challenge with these companies staying innovative over time, whether and that doesn't, you know. So I um my claim actually my claim is not necessarily that monopolies are more innovative for all time. Okay, it's um you get to monopoly if you do something really innovative at some point. So um so the goal should be to do something super innovative where you're so differentiated that you get a monopoly. And then hopefully you keep innovating and you you build on that monopoly.
41:58 Speaker 1 Can we talk about that hopefully part? What's what's the hopefully? What's the if somebody becomes a monopoly? Arguably today, Google and search um or you know, take your pick of the next big company. Well, there's um what's the hopefully? Like what has to happen. Well, you you well for the company to not just evolve into being enough, as you said, like another.
42:14 Speaker 0 I would say as long as the founders run the companies, um, there's normally enough pressure to keep doing things. Once uh the founders are replaced with um uh politicians who act like CEOs, um, you end up uh with um you know much less incremental stuff happening. So uh and so I I do think um, you know, so I I I don't know, I don't think Apple was much of a monopoly in 97 when jobs took over again, but you know, you shifted it from the home computer focus to the consumer electronics focus, and that's something that would have been very hard for someone who is just a politician CEO to do.
42:49 Speaker 1 So from in historical terms, then it's a that's sort of a bet on the great man thesis as opposed to the historical forces thesis, because the easiest thing in the world for monopoly to do, and sort of the default position is to stop innovating because they don't have to. Right? It's like the the model for every successful monopoly is we don't care because we don't have to, right? And every time you deal with your cable company or any monopoly, like you
43:07 Speaker 0 experience that. Yeah, most of the time these things decay over time.
43:10 Speaker 1 They decay. And and and and so um, and so I guess I'm I'm I'm proving you whether you agree with this, which is by default monopolies will decay unless there is a great the quote, great man, a great person, aka the founder. So it's a it has to be an intrinsic motivation on the part of the founder to keep it going, or yeah. Well, there's there's always a risk these things decay at some
43:27 Speaker 0 point. Um and and certainly um it's unlikely, you know. I I don't I don't think it's necessary for the government to be that involved in regulating them because they normally actually do have some shelf life, at least in a space where you have continued innovation. But um, but you know, yeah, the goal, the goal, if you can get to a monopoly that lasts for a few decades, that's still much better than opening a restaurant. Yes.
43:50 Speaker 1 Let's keep it in context here. That I would agree with. Well, it depends on the restaurant. The food supply chain in the world right now is responsible for like up to half of all carbon emissions for the current level of food output and the current kinds of food we consume. Like a hamburger consumes 350 gallons of water in its production cycle. I mean, just these these crazy kind of out of control uh, you know, food supply chain, energy supply chain things that clearly lead to you know, just massive. I mean, Beijing is already drowning in smog, right? You can imagine how much worse it could get if these trends continue. Um it seems like there should be a natural alliance of sort of uh sort of very radical innovative technologists with environmentalists. It seems like it's if there's a shared agenda there, and yet that doesn't exist at all. Um do you think that that's a bridge that can or should be crossed? Well, people
44:31 Speaker 0 should be trying to do a lot more on it. You know, so certainly I think the uh I think always the people who are concerned about uh climate change and global warming, I always think they should be much more open to nuclear power. Typically they're the opposite.
44:43 Speaker 1 Typically they want to go, at least seems to me, typically
44:44 Speaker 0 they want to reverse. I'm I'm hopeful that it's a bit of a generational issue where the the anti-nuclear people are these boomers, these baby boomers who came of age in the 70s. Um and once they lose grip on power in the next decade or so, um, we may be able to have a nuclear renaissance in this country.
45:02 Speaker 1 Is that a
45:02 Speaker 0 hangover
45:03 Speaker 1 from Three Mile Island,
45:04 Speaker 0 or is that
45:05 Speaker 1 something else?
45:06 Speaker 0 I I think it was not so much the accidents as it was the uh dual use of nuclear power for both peaceful and military purposes. So people always cite Three Mile Island in 1978 as a uh critical turning point. I think it might have actually been um when India got the bomb in I believe 74 or 75, where we had given India all this reactor technology. We thought it could never be weaponized. It turned out it could be weaponized. And so there was something, there was something you know very scary about nuclear bombs, and it somehow didn't fully register till the late 60s and 70s, and I think that's that's what really triggered the anti-nuclear stuff.
45:41 Speaker 1 And are you
45:41 Speaker 0 making nuclear
45:42 Speaker 1 investments? We've you
45:44 Speaker 0 know, we've started, uh we started to look at we started to look at this, yeah.
45:47 Speaker 1 Yeah,
45:47 Speaker 0 it's definitely yeah, it's it's all these challenges
45:50 Speaker 1 with it, but we've started to look at it. Yeah, okay, good. So let me thank Peter very much. Thank you all for coming.
45:56 Speaker 0 Thank you very much.
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